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The conflict in the Middle East is a turbulent situation o f �reat signi
ficance to the entire world.

This study examines the internal political scene

of Israel and its affect on the overall Middle East situation .

It focuses on

ideology, s t ructure , and policy within Israel as components o f that scene .
The ideology o f Zionism provided the ,iustification for the creation o f
Israel and continues to form the basis for governmental decision making there.
An analysis of the . principles of Zionism and o f the statements , writings, and
actions o f Zionist leaders showed that the ideology could reasonably be inter
preted as racist and expansion i s t .
More important than the ideas o f Zionism i s the actual implementat ion o f
those ideas through government policy.

Israeli policy in regard to cit izen

ship, immigration , security, economics , labor, land, and political represen
tation is examine d .

Important characteristics o f Israe l ' s economy are its

dependence on foreign capital and assistance and its continuing attempts to
attain self-sufficiency.

The study shows clearly that discrimination against

Arabs and Jews of Asian and African descent living in I�rael is widespread
and that the righ ts , bene fits , and opportunities for these groups are not
equal to those of European and American Jewish immigrants .

More significantly ,

it is indicates that government policy is partly respons ible for these in
equalities . and has worked to place Western Jews in a superior position in
Israeli society.
Another part o f Israe l ' s implementation o f Zionism has been its action
concerning Jewish control of land.

From the time of early Jewish immigration

to the presen t , Zionists have attempted to increase the territory inhab ited
and controlled by Jews .

The methods used to accomplish this have included

purchase, acquisition of abandoned land, expropriation of inhab ited land
through expropriation and force , and mili tary invasion o f other nations .
Israeli expansionism is related to the Zionist principles that Jews should

establish a state with boundaries similar t o those o f ancient Israel and
that all Jews should b e gathered into that state .

Adherence to these ideas

requires territorial expansion and Israeli policy has clearly shown expansion
ist tendencies .
One o f the most significan t determinan ts o f policy in any country is po
litical structure.

In Israel, s t ructure is dominated by political parties.

Israel is a multi-party, parliamentary system in which no party has ever gained
a majority in the legislature.

Rule by coalition has meant that major policy

changes have been difficult to achieve .
ated Israel for

The Labor Party and its views domin

thirty years , tempered by the need for negotiations with and

concessions to the other parties.

In Israe l ' s centralized structure , local

government, interest groups, and public opinion are relatively insignifican t .
In a system with these characteristics and Israe l ' s strong ideological commit
ment , it could be anticipated that a h igh degree o f policy consistency would
exis t .

This has proven to be true in Israe l .

Although Begin ' s Likud govern

ment has a different public position on major issues and uses s t ronger rhetoric,
the substance of its actions are similar.

It has returned the same land Labor

was willing to return and has generally followed Labor ' s p�ans for establishing
settlements in the occupied territories.

Israe l ' s system o f multiple parties ,

parliamentary governmen t , rule b y coalition , and centralized government makes
policy consistency a significant feature o f its politics .
Also contributing to this policy inertia is the nature o f leadership in
Israel .

The structural features mentioned above , the superior position o f

Western Jews , the historical necessity for Jews to operate secretly, and the
limited access to important information in Israeli society have created an
elitist system o f leadershi p .

The characteristics and views o f this elite , and

in fact the specific individuals in the elite group , have not changed much
in Israe l ' s history.

The ideology o f Zionism and the translation o f i t s principles into social
structure and government policy has had a tremendous impact on the conflict in
the Middle Eas t .

I t has worked against the creation o f good relat ions between

people, cultures, and nations there and prevents a lasting solution to the
Palestinian question.

Israel can not grant equal rights to Arabs within its

borders without compromising Jewish control and it can not allow Palest inian
self-determination withou giving up territory i t needs to accomodate more Jew
ish ipunigration to Israe l .

The country ' s political s t ructure and the nature

of its leadership have contributed to its policy consistency and make major
changes unlikely in the future.

'Ill e most successful force in creating any

policy change has been external pressures , particularly from the United States .
Tilis is most dramatically illustrated by the Camp David Accords which were a
direct rest•lt o f U . S . mediation efforts .

However , Camp David did not succeed

in extracting maj or concessions from Israel or in setting adequate groundwork
for a solution to the Palestinian problem.

Flexibility on policy questions

by Isra.el i s necessary to achieve a fair and permanent solution t o Middle
East problems.

'Ille ideology o f Zionism, Israel ' s political system, and i t s

elite leadership severely restrict Israel ' s ability t o be flexibl e .

Internal

change in Israel is a necessary ingredient in the achievement of Middle East
peace and stability.

·
.

.
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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The conflict in the Middle East between Israel and its Arab
neighbors has been an intense one with worldwide repercussions and
has the potential to be a dangerously unstable situation.

The many

issues involved have been investigated, discussed, analyzed, and
negotiated by many scholars and policy makers.

Always, when carry-

ing out relations with other nations, a country's internal situation
is of vital importance.

This paper is an attempt to relate Israel's

domestic policies and internal structure to the Middle East questions.
The significance of the domestic scene in the formulation of
foreign policy has been often noted.

In relation to the American

context, Dr. Henry Kissinger states that incompatible domestic structures between nations can generate a gulf and become an obstacle to
understanding.

In such a situation, according to Kissinger, the

symbolic aspects o f a conflict can come to overshadow the substantive
ones.

1

This may be particularly relevant to the case of Israel in

which religious and national symbols have played such a great part.
The more basic connection between domestic and foreign policy is
described by Marian Irish and Elke Frank, who say,

"Responses as well

as initiatives in foreign policy are inevitably conditioned by the
domest,ic setting in which policy makers must operate."

2

In addition,

the setting in which policy makers have operated in the past affects
their view of the world to further condition the nation's fo ·reign
policy responses and initiatives.
Inherent in any discussion of Israeli politics is the ideology
of Zionism.

This ideology, as formulated by leaders of the Zionist

movement and as put into practice by the leaders of the Jewish state,

has had and will continue to have great impact on all aspects of
Israeli policy.

This study will examine ideology,

policy,

and

structure within the state of Israel to provide an overall analysis
of the issues raised above.

Propositions
The study focuses on the following propositions:

1.

Ideology,

political structure and public policy in Israel combine

to 'form a domestic political scene that has a definite impact upon
the nation's foreign policy.

The environment in which foreign policy

decision-making occurs is conditioned by characteristics of each of
the factors.

Also,

the Israeli domestic situation influences the

Arab vision of Israel's nature and purpose,
national relations in the Middle East.

further affecting inter

This paper will attempt to

analyze this domestic environment and determine its effect on the
Middle East situation.
2.

Because the ideology of Zionism is so important to the politics

of Israel,

its precepts and its practice must be examined thoroughly.

One issue in this examination is whether the ideology is a racist one
and whether racial discrimination against Arabs and Jews of Asian and
African origins exists in Israel.

More significantly,

it is neces

sary to determine if racism is a function of Zionist ideas and of
government policy.

3.

Another

�mportant

aspect of the Middle East situation that is

affected by Zionism and Israeli policy is land.
have claimed that,

based on ideological concepts,

- 2 -

Critics of Israel
the state has

embarked on a continuing plan to extend its boundaries and increase
the area under Jewish control.

A goal of this paper is to determine

if Zionism and Israeli policy have created a program of expansionism.

4.

The structure and operation of a political system are major

determinants of policy in any country.
inated by political parties.
of this system,
development.

In Israel,

the system is dom

This study will examine the development

including the influence of Zionist ideology on that

Also,

the effect of the structure in terms of policy

results and the distribution of power and benefits will be analyzed.
5.

One noticeable aspect of Israeli politics has been the tremendous

success of the La.bor Party in maintaining control of the government.
Consequently,

only a small number of .individuals have reached top

leadership positions in the state.

A topic to be con�idered here is

whether this indicates that Israel has been dominated by an elite
during most of its existence and what factors could have created and
maintained the elitism.

If a political elite has existed,

did the

election of Menahem Begin and the Likud Party bloc eliminate it and
lead to major foreign policy changes?

6.

The problem of the Palestinian Arabs,

involving their demands for

return of land taken over by Jews and for a national homeland,
crux of the Middle East conflict.

Therefore,

an important

is the

subject of

this paper will be how Israel's domestic political situation affects
possibilities for a solution to this problem.
7.

To provide a more comprehensive view of the Middle East situation

and Israel's role in it,

two supplemental issues will be studied.

One of these is the meaning of the Camp David Accords agreed to by
-

3 -

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat,
Begin,

Israeli Prime Minister Menahem

and U.S. President Jimmy Carter in September,

peace treaty signed by Egypt and Israel in March,

1978 and the

1979.

Do they

indicate real progress toward an overall settlement involving all
parties?

Do they represent major changes in Israel's position on

major Middle East issues?
pressure,

The other issue.. is the role of external

particularly from the United States, in the formation of

Israeli foreign policy.
Before addressing these specific questions,

a brief discussion

of the background and the problems of the Middle East conflict is
necessary to obtain a general understanding of the situation.
The Setting
The establishment of the state of Israel and the manner in which
it was created have caused immense problems in the Middle East.

For

centuries a few Jews had chosen to make their homes in Palestine for
religious reasons,

but in the 1880's a different type of Jew began

to enter Palestine with the intent of agriculturally colonizing the
land.

They came largely because of Eastern European anti-Semitism

and because of their belief that the redemption of their people de
pended on transforming their lives from merchants and financiers into
hard working and self-sufficient pioneers.

Leo Pinsker's pamphlet

Auto-Emancipation was an expression of the thinking behind this im
migration,

stressing the impossibility of eliminating anti-Semitism

and the necessity for Jews to move away from the rest of _society.
1896,

In

the publication of The Jewish State by Dr. Theodor Herzl gave

rise to the establishment of the World Zionist Organization.
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Dr.

Herzl also felt that anti-Semitism was inherent in non-Jews and
encouraged Jewish immigration to Palestine.
gress met in Basle,

The first Zionist Con-

Switzerland in August 1897 and proclaimed its
The use of

goal of creating a Jewish refuge secured by public law.

the term "public law" meant that the Jews were going to seek auton-

3

omy in an area under protection of some great power.
and 1914,
80, 000.

4

Between 1881

the Jewish population in Palestine rose from 25, 000 to
Most Jews,

however,

were not motivated to move by the

Jewish nationalism of Herzl and the Zionists,

but by hardships

caused b y anti-Sem.Ltism.
. .
5
.

Seeking the protection of a great power was exactly Herzl's
intention as he bargained with the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire,
Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, and with Great Britain to achieve his
goal.

Herzl himself was unsuccessful,

but under the leadership of

Chaim Weizmann, the Zionists obtained from Britain the Balfour Declaration.

In this the British government stated that it viewed
with favor the establishment in Palestine of
a national home for the Jewish people and will
use their best endeavors to facilitate the
achievement of this object,

it being clearly

understood that nothing shall be done which
may prejudice the civil religious rights of
existing non-Jewish conunun ities in Palestine,
or the rights and political status enjoyed
by Jews in any other country." 6
The European backgrounds of the Zionists allowed them to present
their plan as part of the same national expansion movement that European countries had been pursuing themselves.
wish

Weizmann indicated his

to present Zionism within this perspective when he sent a note

to the British war cabinet during the Balfour Declaration discussions

-

5

-

which said he hoped "the problem would be considered in the light of
imperial interests and the principle for which the entente stands. 11

7

Dr. Maxime Rodinson explains efforts to carry out the Zionist plans
got under way because of a political decision made by Great Britain
under pressure from the Zionist Organization.

British reasoning in-

valved gaining support for the war effort from American and Russian
Jews plus serving its own interests in the Middle East.

8

Jewish immigrants to Palestine often purchased land from rich
Arab effendi (absentee owners)

and then evicted the poorer fellahin

who actually lived on the land.

This created the original Arab hos-

tility as social intercourse became non-existent and economic ties
rare and peripheral.

9

This hostility increased as the Arabs began to

feel that Jewish immigration was a threat to their national rights
and security.

It seemed to them that a foreign power, Britain, had

decided,- without their consent or participation,
sacrifice for the solution of the Jewish problem.

that they should
10

The Arabs saw

the Balfour Declaration as a breach of British promises,
Israel a product of colonialism.

�uropean

11

making

They saw it as an attempt of a

power to impose on them a new and foreign element thanks to

its victory over another European power.

This was substantiated by

British protection of Jewish immigration after World War I when
.
.
.
.
12
Britain was given th e mandate to govern Pa1estine.
In the 1930's,

this opposition surfaced in serious armed clashes

between Arabs and Jews.

Immigration had drastically increased be-

cause of Nazi persecution of Jews.
what during World War II,

This civil strife subsided some-

but became even more violent following the
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war,

with both Arabs and Jews engaging in offensive military

maneuvers.

Often,

the British Mandate forces were the victims of

this violence as both sides accused Britain of favoring the other.
These attitudes created basic problems that still exist today.
Arabs saw Israel as a project of British imperialism,
illegitimate imposition.

The Jews,

on the other hand,

The

and thus an
glorified

their military action as a fight against British tyranny and aroused
the public conscience with the sacred task of saving threatened
European Jews.

This pushed the Arab problem into the background,

distorting the true conflict.

Unable to deal with the situation or

to satisfy the demands of either side,

Britain decided to give up the

Mandate in 1947 and put the question before the United Nations.
Several months later,

on November 29,

plan to partition Palestine,

1947 the UN approved a

forming a Jewish and an Arab state.

The

Jews approved the partitioning but the Arabs rejected it and moved to
block its implementation by force.
tween Jews and Arabs.
May 14,

1948.

The state of Israel was officially declared on

The British mandate officially ended that day and Pal

estine was invaded by Egyptian,
forces.

This led to organized warfare be

Transjordanian,

Lebanese,

and Syrian

After months of fighting Israel had secured an even larger

share of Palestinian territory than had previously been allocated in
the UN partition.

The armistice lines set up at this time were not

declared as territorial boundaries,

but only to delineate areas be

yond which the respective armies could not move.
ing,

13

During the fight

many Arabs living in Palestine fled from areas controlled by

Israel into Syria,

Transjordan,

and the Gaza Strip,
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becoming refugees.

By 1949,

there were an estimated 940,000 of these refugees.

A

continuing problem. in the relations between the Arab states and
Israel is who caused and who is responsible for the refugees.

The

Israelis claim that Arab leaders encouraged their people to leave
in order to make it easier for the Arab armies to destroy Israel,
after which,

all the refugees could return to their homes.

The

Israeli government has consistently denied that their behavior in
the war caused the exodus of Palestinian Arabs.
Allon,

But General Yigal

a prominent Israeli military leader during the 1948 war,

"While planning the capture of the Arab part of Safed,

said,

it was not our

intention to prevent the flight of the Arab population."

And Is-

raeli battle plans show orders to push the- Arab population out of
14
certain parts of the country to establish defensive areas.

Also,

an example of how the Israelis spread panic among the Arabs with
force is the Deir Yassin massacre engineered by the terrorist group
Irgun under the leadership of the present Israeli Prime Minister
Menahem Begin.
women,

On April 10,

1948,

the Irgun killed 200 Arab men,

and children who had not fled the village.

mense impact on the people of the area,
cident.

This had an im

and was not an isolated in

Civilians expected to be annihilated if they fell into the

15
enemy's hands.
Also, there is no substantial evidence that Arab leaders
encouraged the evacuation of the refugees.
broadcasts of the period,

In a study of radio

Erskine Childers found that these broad

casts did not call on Arabs to leave and,

in fact,

advocated that

they remain rather than give up land to the Israelis.
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He believes

it was natural for Arabs to retreat with their troops or to leave
during attacks.

He says that Arabs were progressively pushed back

rather than fleeing the area immediately.

He supports his belief by

pointing out that many Arabs remain in Nazareth and in Galilee be
16
cause lightning attacks in these areas le� no time to flee.
It appears that the Israeli claim of innocence in the creation
of the refugee problem is unfounded and that the Arab belief that
fear of Israeli force and general rni�itary .activity were causes of
the Arab exodus is more likely correct.

The 196 7 war increased

Israeli responsibility for the refugees as their invasion of Arab
territory drove some refugees further away and extended Israeli ter
ritory such that it gained military control over much of the area
inhabited by the refugees.
The history of the establishment of the state of Israel created
two major problems that have plagued the Middle East ever since.

The

first is the nature of the state established which was largely deter
mined by the ideology of Zionism and the manner in which it was
achieved.

The dispossession of the Palestinians, the confirmation

of Arab fears about Jewish intentions to create a state in their ter
ritory, and a series of military defeats leading to the development
of a strong Jewish state in the Middle East, have damaged Arab self
esteem as well as deprived the Palestinian Arabs of the chance to
build their own nation and has led to uncompromising intransigence.
Many Arabs have refused to admit that Jews have any rights in Pales
tine.

They also claim that the state of Israel continues to base

its existence on the violation of the rights of Arab people and on
- 9
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the expansion of their territorial hegemon y .
The Jews , howeve r , have been determined t o deny that there are
logical , legitimate reasons for the Arab position and blame their
animosity on the Arab elite and Britain.

Israel claims that the

Arab elite has used antagonism toward Jews to distract their people ' s
attention from their poor conditions and to improve their power position within the Arab world.

It also accused Britain from yielding too

much to Arab demands and forcing the Jews to fight to achieve their
goa l .

17

Israel holds that its State is based on the historic rights

of the Jewish people to live in Palestine and that its position is
based on the right of the state to exist in peace.
The second important problem is the question of the Palestinian
Arab s , many of whom were made refugees by the creation of Israel.
This i s widely considered to be the crux of the Middle East conflict
and has been often discussed by the United Nations , the most recent
debate held in Augus t , 1979 .

Since Israel denies responsibility for

creating the problem, it also refuses to take responsib ility for
reaching the solution.

It believes that refugees should be perma-

nently settled in the existing Arab states where they would have a
common cultural link and opportun i t ies to improve their economic
pos ition.

The Israelis also do not wish to seriously discuss Pales-

tinian Arab rights until terrorist activities directed against Israel
are stopped.

The Arabs believe, howeve r , that Israel should re-

patriate and compensate the refugees or allow a Palestinian homeland to be created on territory now controlled by Israel .

They are

especially adamant about the land conquered by Israel in the 1967 war ,
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demanding its return to the countries it was taken from or its
conversion into a Palestinian entity.
These two fundamental disagreements form the basis of the Middle
East confrontation.

It is the purpose of this study to analyze how

the ideology, domestic political structure, and particular domestic
policies of Israel contribute to the creation, continuation,

and

potential solution of these problems.
Methodology and Sources
This study of Israel's domestic political scene is basically an
empirical one.

It relies on facts discovered through research to ex

plain what situation exists in Israel, how it operates, and why it is
that way.

These explanations are then analyzed as components of the
The empirical method was employed be

overall Middle East conflict.

cause it presents a more accurate and complete view of the issues
involved.

The Middle East conflict has been characterized by emo

tional charges and accusations.

In this clash of nations and cul

tures, it would be difficult to produce a meaningful analysis of the
situation based on a normative position of what ought to be.

There

fore, a determination of what is ,

through an empirical approach to

the subject, is most appropriate.

However, that does not mean that

this study will consist of a listing of facts.

Judgments have been

made as to what should be emphasized and facts have been interpreted
as to their full meaning.
This study cannot be confined to one area of political science
but must include structural,

behavioral,

and theoretical aspects.

This requires the use of both ptimary and secondary sources.
- 11
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In the

case of Israel, the unique development of the state necessitates the
use of an historical approach to some of the problems involved.

Some

statistical analyses from secondary sources will be used as will some
descriptions and examinations.of Israel's political structures and
institutions.

In all of these cases,

I will interpret the evidence

presented and sometimes rely on the interpretations of others, as it
relates to the subject under investigation.

In considering the de

velopment of Zionist ideology and its influence on Israeli policy,
historical analysis will be important.

The evolution of ideas put

forward by Zionist leaders is important for understanding the theo
retical foundations for the policy choices of Israel and the activi
ties of its leaders.

Ideology can limit policy alternatives, justify

actions of leaders, and affect election results.

In general, it pro

vides a theoretical f ramework for decision-making within the state.
The pattern of Zionist thought must be studied thoroughly and must be
related to policy choices made before and after the establishment of
Israel and to the structures created within the state.
ly includes fundamental tenets of Zionism,

This natural

but also involves revi

sionist ideas that gained dominance within the movement or were
rejected by the Zionist mainstream.

One important object of this

study is to determine which Zionist ideas did become predominant and
had the greatest effect on Israeli politics.

To do this, the works

of the most important Zionist leaders and thinkers have been studied.
Theodor Herzl,

Leo Pinsker,

Buber, Chaim Weizmann,

David Ben-Gurion, Ahad Ha'am, Martin

Golda Meir,

Menahem Begin and others have been

studied in an effort to understand all aspects of Zionism.
- 12 -

I have

chosen to emphasize the writings and statements of people engaged
in the actual creation of Israel rather than pure theoreticians be
cause as practitioners of the ideology,

they will give a more accu

rate view of the Zionist ideas that provide the basis for state
policies.

Secondary interpretations of Zionism and its leaders

have also been important in that they helped to focus my opinions
on the meaning and effect of Zionism.
The discussion of Israeli domestic policy also involves some
historical examination but, for the most part,
time period since the establishment of Israel.

is confined to the
Statistical informa

tion will provide evidence as to policy choices and policy perfor
mance in the Jewish state relating to such areas as land, labor,
education, political representation, economics, and others.

Par

ticular laws and regulations of the state also serve as a guide to
Israeli policy as do statements and reports of Israeli leaders.
Secondary works provide the major source of information in this
area, including sociological studies of the effect of Israeli poli
cies in addition to descriptions of the policies themselves.

News

papers, periodicals, and Israeli government publications were used
to report more recent developments.
The validity and objectivity of sources had to be considered in
weighing the evidence.

The Journal of Palestine Studies is published

by the Institute for Palestine Studies and Kuwait University and is
oriented to the Arab point of view.

It presents scholarly studies

of the issues, not emotionally inspired essays.

The same can be said

about the U.S. publication Conunentary which takes the Jewish position.

- 13 -

Middle East International, published in London,

combines news

presentations with essays by English and American reporters and
scholars.

It presents a pro-Arab view, but does include news stor-

ies written in the Israeli press.

The Palestine Digest and The Link

are both decidedly biased in favor of the Arabs and their information
is regarded accordingly.

However,

facts not available elsewhere.

they do present some documented

Current History and Foreign Affairs

are basically moderate in their approach to the Middle East.

Both

are scholarly and sometimes analytic journals with relative objectivity.

Being American publications using primarily American authors,

there is sometimes an apparent bias toward Israel as a U.S. ally.
As for· the political structure of Israel, secondary sources
have been the sole source of information.

Studies by Leonard Fein,

Michael Brecher, and W. F. Abboushi have been of prime importance
here.

18

This area includes examination of political parties and

their subsidiaries like the Histadrut labor union and the Jewish
Agency fund raising group, non-partisan political movements,
elections.

and

The effect of these groups and processes on policy will

be analyzed and put into the perspective of the entire Middle East
picture.
The use of these approaches and these sources should allow an
adequate investigation of the propositions previously stated.
Contribution to Political Science
The propositions being studied in this paper are relevant to
one of the most potentially explosive world situations.

The align-

ment of great powers, the presence of nuclear weapons in Israel, the

- 14 -

oil power of the Arab states,

and the appearance of the conflict as

one between the imperialist West and developing nations brings great
and complex forces into confrontation in the Middle East.

The crea

tion of a just and lasting solution is necessary to insure future
world stability.

Political scientists,

being students of the human

relations and structural conditions involved in social and govern
mental decision-making,

have a duty to present the relevant fact� and

interpret them in order to establish a foundation for the solution of
problems.
In this paper,

an attempt is made to study one aspect of the

Middle East situation in order to make a contribution to the complete
understanding of the problem.
tion,

To reach a truly comprehensive solu

the inunediate negotiating points must not be the only things

considered.

The reasons for animosity,

the ideological differences,

and the infl�ence of domestic structures and policies cannot be
ignored.

As stated earlier,

foreign policy initiatives and responses

are always conditioned by the domestic situation.

Policy makers

should be aware of this and consider it when making decisions.

Again,

the political scientist is in a position to aid policy makers by
presenting evidence and forming reasonable opinions based on it.
As a contribution to the science itself,

this paper may serve

as a practical study of the influence of domestic politics on inter
national relations.

It could also be an example of how an ideology

can come to dominate a system and have impact on its decisions.
addition,
parties,

In

it may show the importance of structures like political
legislatures, quasi-political institutions,
- 15 -

and election

systems in affecting policy makers; their view of the world, their
range of alternatives, and their decisions.
Possibly the most important contribution this study can make is
to dispel some myths about Israel in a general search for truth.
Israel has long been accepted as a bastion of freedom in an oppres
sive area; as the only democracy in the Middle East; and as a truly
liberal, almost utopian socialistic state that represents the Western
view of humanitarianism.

Perhaps it is because the West can relate

more easily to the European-oriented Israeli society than to the un
.
familiar Arabs, or because of a collective sense of guilt over the
inhuman Nazi persecution of Jews, or because Israel has consistently
allied itself with the Western bloc against the Conununists, that
Israel is accepted so readily.

The true nature of the state of

Israel and the ideology of Zionism have not effectively been
known to the United States public.

Knowledge about the realities of

Israel and Zionism is valuable for its own sake.
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Chapter 2

ZIONIST IDEOLOGY

Ideology is not a transitory thing which can be changed to fit a
situation.
ideology.

Social institutions and economic enterprises are based on
It exists in textbooks and in the minds of teachers,

shaping the minds of the young.

Political parties adopt philosophies

So an ideology is an important part of

that guide their behavior.
any political system.

thus

In the case of Israel,

Zionist ideology was

the reasoning and justification behind the existence of the state itself,

and is still an integral part of its political system.

It plays

an important role in determining Israel's posture toward its neighboring states and in the setting of domestic policies and priorities.
The Zionist movement was directed toward the single goal of
establishing a national home for all Jewish people to be located in
Palestine.

The ideology behind the movement was based on two funda-

mental tenets:
and

2)

1)

That Jews throughout the world constitute a nation;

That anti-Semitism is inherent in non-Jews and is incurable.

Leo Pinsker's Auto-Emancipation was an early and significant publication in the Zionist movement.

In it he said,

Judeophobia is a psychic aberration.
a psychic aberration,

As

it is hereditary;

as a disease transmitted for 2000 years
it is incurable

.

•

.

so fight against such

an hereditary form is in vain.
hate the Jews. l
Theodor Herzl,

who founded the Zionist organization and led the move-

ment in its early years,
Jewish State.

All people

presented similar ideas in his book,

The

He claimed that the Jews were one people and that

wherever they iived anti-Semitism would exist.

He said,

"Every

single one of the nations in whose midst Jews live are shamefacedly
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2
or brazenl y anti-senu.tic."
.
.

.

using the same ideas.

More recent Zionists have continued

Chaim Herzog,

Israeli ambassador to the UN

during the administration of Yitzhak Rabin siad, "I believe'that the
3
fundamental cause of anti-Semitism is that the Jew exists.11

Herzl

and other leaders felt that anti-Semitism could not be cured through
enlightenment or assimilation and that the only solution was a separate state for the Jews.

The historical,

religious,

and emotional

attachment of the Jewish people to Palestine made it the natural
choice to be their homeland.

In fact,

redemption of the Jewish

people depended upon reunification with the Land ?f Israel,
cially to Eastern European Jews.

espe-

Martin Buber described a funda-

mental relationship between Jewish people and the Land of Israel.
Fulfillment of commandments and settlement of the land are linked
together according to Buber.

He stated that,

"The world can be re-

deemed only by the redemption of Israel and Israel can be redeemed
only by reunion with the land.11

4

Herzl's ideal conception of this homeland was an admirable one.
He did not believe nations were ready for unlimited democracy but no.
member of the Jewish state would be discriminated against.

He was

opposed to theocracy and thought every person should. be free and undisturbed in his faith and his nationality.

Equality before the law

for people of all creeds and nationalities should be practiced.

5

This view of the state was expressed in Herzl's 1902 book Altneuland.
·
It describes a Palestine aided by modern technology and methods in
which a progressive,

cooperative society thrived.

interprets it,

- 18 -

As Walter Laquer

Women are fully emancipated,
free,

education is

criminals are not punished but re

educated.

There is a division of church and

state and full freedom of conscience.
Tolerance is the supreme principle on which
6
the state is based.
As to dealing with the Arabs in Palestine,
sentiments and ideas expounded by Zionists.
My testament to the Jewis� people:

there are many noble

Herzl put it this way:
so build

·your state that a stranger will feel con
tented among you

•

.

.

It would be immoral if we

would exclude anyone,

whatever his origin,

his descent, or his religion from partici
?

pating in our achievements.

Writer and historian Hans Kohn believed that Herzl thought that a
national,

chauvinistic party which wished to make Jews a privileged

e1 ement was a betraya1 of Zion.

8

.

the same type of state as Herzl.

Other Zionists seemed to envision
Yitzhak Epstein advised the Seventh

Zionist Congress to enter into an alliance with the Arabs and warned
that encroaching upon the rights of a proud and independent people
9
such as the Arabs would be dangerous.

David Eder, the first diplo-

matic representative of World Zionist Organization President Chaim
Weizmann, formulated a cooperative Zionist policy with four major
points:

1)

Jews must not segregate themselves from Arabs;

Aviv must not become a symbol of Jewish exclusiveness;

3)

2) Tel
Jews

should deal with the Arab world as a whole and show the same respect
for Arab national aspirations as they demanded for their own;

4)

As an Oriental people, Jews should abandon their pretensions to be
Europeans.

10

Even so staunch a Zionist as David Ben-Gurion,

Is-

rael's first Prime Minister, told the Anglo-American Committee of
Enquiry on Palestine in 1946,
- 19
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We will have to treat our Arab and other
non-Jewish neighbors
as if they were Jews
but make every effort that they should pre
serve their Arab characteristics, their
language, their Arab culture, their Arab
religion, their Arab way of life, while
making every effort to raise their standard
of life.11
.

.

•

Weizmann, who was also the first president of Israel, expressed it
simply when he said,

"The world will judge the Jewish state by what

it will do.with the Arabs.11

12

This general view of concern for Arabs and Arab rights was expressed in extreme form by a wing of the Zionist movement known at
different times as Brit Shalom (1925) , Kedmah Misraha (1936) , and
Ihud.

It included such thinkers as Abad Ha'am, Martin Buber, Judah

Magnes, and Ernest Simon.

These groups wanted to give up the idea of

a Jewish state for a binational one in which Jews and Arabs would
enjoy free development along with full political, social, and civil
rights.

Their thinking was based on Western humanism rather than

the colonialist approach of some of the Zionists.

13

Some of their

ideas originated with Moses Hess, a contemporary and follower of
Marx, who posited the link between the Jewish people and Palestine
before the existence of any Zionist movement.

Hess thought a Jewish

presence in Pale'stine could reconcile modern Occidental culture with
Oriental culture,

rather than serve as Herzl stated,

as a "wall

14
.
.
against Asia."

To Ahad Ha'am, Zionist writer and philosopher, the

creation of a state was merely a way to reach the. goal of Zion, which
15
was to revive Jewish cultural values.

Therefore, any violation of

Arab rights would betray the ultimate goal because it would not fit
Jewish values.

He also thought Palestine was unsuitable for the
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solution to the Jewish problem because it was inhabited by others
with national interests and the Jewish historical right to Palestine
did not override the tangible right of the Arabs, based on genera16

tions of life and work on the land.

Buber disagreed with Ha'am

here, emphasizing the link between Palestine and the redemption of
the Jewish people.

However, both believed protection and respect for

Arab rights was essential in making Israel an authentically Jewish
state.

These men were interested in solving the more abstract prob-

lem of Judaism rather than simply solving the particular problem of
Jews.

Political activity was not sufficient for this.

It had to be

accompanied by the moral strengthening of the Jewish consciousness.
However, the views of these groups were attacked by other
Zionists and were not incorporated by the majority of the movement.
Other Zionist leaders held negative attitudes toward the Arabs, ranging from invisibility and indifference to hostility based on feelings
of Jewish superiority as well as a desire to achieve their goals.
When the Zionist movement was beginning, most Jewish attitudes
toward Arabs were based on invisibility and indifference.

They did

not often recognize the existence of Palestinian Arabs and did not
see the importance of the problems that could come from confronting
them.

Many early Zionist writings reflected racial prejudice based

on 19th century nationalistic concepts and the general view of European supremacy.

To most Zionists, Palestine provided a land without

people for a people without a land.

For example, Zionist leader Max

Nordau, upon hearing from Herzl that there were Arabs living in Palestine said, "I didn't know that.
- 21 -

.
.
.
17
. .
We are comnutting an in]ustice.
"

Zionists saw Palestine as an empty, barren land and saw themselves as
representing the apogee of civilized development.

18

During this

period, Zionists were emphasizing immigration, land purchase, and
political maneuvering to gain support and protection for their plans.
Their attention was primarily directed to the Turks; Germans, and
British rather than dealing directly with Palestinian Arabs.
were hardly concerned with Arab reaction to their activities.

They
Objec-

tion to J�wish colonization was seen by the Zionists, not in terms of
the rights of existing residents but as a collusion of political
powers.

19

For example, in their writings, Weizmann and Begin never

recognize the legitimacy or significance of Arab opposition or national aspirations.

Weizmann could not understand pro-Arab decisions

under the British mandate because he thought that what the Jews
wanted should always come first and was blind to the British obligation to the Arabs.

Begin barely acknowledged Arab nationalism, ex-

cept to say it was initiated by the British, whom he saw as the major
opponent to the Jewish state.

In general, the early Zionists, being

Europeans, followed the national chauvinism of 19th and early 20th
century Europe in not seriously considering an area's existing population and the effect of their actions on them.
After the establishment of the state, some aspects of this
invisibility concept still remained.

It led to the idea that the

Jews were entirely responsible for the development of Palestine.

Many

·'

first generation leaders, including Golda Meir and David Ben-Gurion
retained the concept for a long time.

As late as 1969, Meir said,

.
•20
. .
.
"Th ere is
no sueh th"ing as Pa1 estinians.'
- 22 -

In 1976, Yitzhak Rabin

stated that Arabs in Israel had no national characteristics of their
own .

21
When Zionists did recognize the existence and aspirations of

Arabs ,

more blatant racism often occurred and many extremists asserted

Jewish superiority to the Arabs .
ist Congress ,

said Jews are

Max Nordau,

in a speech to the Zion-

"more industrious than the average Euro-

22
.
not to mention
the moribund Asiatic
an d A frican . "
.

pean,

.

.

Ziff ' s 1937 book,

The Rape of Palestine ,

William

contains many racist comment s ,

depicting Arabs a s barbarians and using stereotypes about the physical
appearance ,
Arabs .
dards ,

sexual habits,

violent nature ,

and lack of intelligence of

He described the Islamic world as having "debased moral stansuperstitions ,

or, · intelligent,

and

and bigoted ignorance , " while Jews were superi"the best colonizing material in the world . "

He

also claimed a lack of racial consciousness among Moslems and a willingness to accept anyone · into their religion has made the Arabs
motley assortment of peoples ,
who speak the Arab tongue . "

"a

low in the scale of human development ,

23

The 1967 war and the subsequent takeover of territory by Israel
forced the ultimate recognition of the Palestinian s .

But the Israeli

attitude was that Palestinian nationalism was artificially created by
a reaction to Zionism and was not a true national movemen t .
this recognition o f the Palestinians , Jews
their land with two points :

1)

After

justified taking over

The Jewish need was greater ;

and 2)

that Jews are superior to Arabs .

Often this was done by creating a

J.

L. Talmon said in Israel Among the

negative image of the Arab s .
Nations that Arabs are

"terribly inhibited and handicapped by neurotic
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. .
.
diments
.
.
d susceptibl.
. lities
i.mpe
and overstraine
."

24

Creating these

negative images was part of an attempt to undermine the Arab position as irrational.
that,

Robert Alter said in a 1968 issue of Commentary

"The Arab position in Israel.

.

•

has been blind, fanatic, self-

deceptive, self-destructive, harshly inflexible, in many respects
morally obscene."

25

These ideas indicate an extremely poor view of

Arabs who are seen as barbaric, neurotic, as incapable of having a
real nationalism, as being duped by their irrational leaders, and
whose decisions are therefore, not to be taken seriously.
M:>re prominent Zionists also displayed attitudes about the
cultural and social inferiority of the Arabs.

Weizmann wrote in his

autobiography that the Arab national movement was "crude in nature,
which tries to work up the hatred of the British and the Jews, looks
to Hitler and Mussolini as its heroes, and is supported by Italian
money."

26

David Ben-Gurion, who epitomized Israel and the Zionist

movement for many years, is especially illustrative of racist attitudes.

It is easy to find statements by Ben-Gurion expressing concern

and sympathy regarding Arabs.

But he has also indicated many times

his disdain for Arabs and their culture.

His actions (including

organizing strikes where Arabs were employed)
there was no place for Arabs in Israel.

showed he believed

Ben-Gurion once said,

" faith

in my fellow man makes me confident that the wretched and degrading
effect of the Arab heritage will not last forever. 11

27

Ben-Gurion

despised the Arab way of life and warned publicly against the danger
that Israel might become another Levantine country.

The word "Levan-

tine" is often used in Israel as a derogatory term indicating a lack
- 24 -

of culture and intelligenc e .

Ben-Gurion believed i n attaining a

purely Jewish community and thought for this purpose the fewer Arabs
living in Israel the better.

He learned Spanish for the sole reason

of reading Don Quixote in the original but never bothered to learn
In his first ten years

Arabic, which is closely related to Hebrew.

as Prime Minister , Ben-Gurion never . visited an Arab town or received
.
28
an Arab del egation.

Besides having a low opinion of Arabs , Ben-

Gurion also had an inflated view of Jews .

He declared,

" I believe

in our moral and intellectual superiority and our capacity to serve
as a model o f redemption for the human race . "

29

Ideas of that kind led some Zionists to call for eliminating the
Arab presence in Palestine through land expropriatio n , land. purchase,
and force.

Josef Weitz ,

former head of the Jewish Agency Coloniza-

tion Department , said in 1940 and repeated in 1967 that,
Between ourselve s , it must be clear that there
is no room for both peoples together in this
country
We shall not achieve our goal of being
an independent people with the Arabs in thj s
small country.
The only solution is Palestine ,
at least Western Palestine, without Arabs .
And
there is no other way but to transfer the Arabs
from here to the neighboring countries; to
transfer all of them; not one village , not one
3
tribe should be left. 0
.

.

•

The idea of removing Arabs from Israel in order to form a Jewish state
is not a modern one .

Herzl himself once said,

"the penniless popula-

tion" of Palestine should be "spirited across the borders ." and "denied employm�nt in our country . "

He also said,

"We must expropriate

31
.
.
gent 1y the private property" of Pa1 estinian Arabs .
.

But Revisionist

Zionist Vladimir Jabotinsky and his followers saw no need for gentility in their actions .

The Arabs were not invisible to Jabotinsky ,
- 25 -

who described them as
rags . "

32

"a yelling rabble dressed up in gaudy ,

He said in 1930 that a Jewish state meant

Jewish majority in Palestine

savage

" first of all a

so that under a democratic rul e ,

Jewish point o f view will always prevail .

11 3 3

the

Jabotinsky and the

Revisionists knew that creating this majority would bring inevitable
Arab opposition and believed they would have to fight politically and
They supported mass immigration,

' militarily to overcome it.
expropriation,
their goal.

disregard of Arab rights ,

and violence to achieve

This view was opposed by Weizmann and his followers,

who favored less aggressive policies,
tion with the Arabs .

hoping to reach some concilia-

But Jabotinsky ' s view became extremely popula r ,

causing the Zionists to adopt a more violent approach.
1947,

In fact ,

according to a former President of Hebrew University,

Magn e s ,

land

by

Judah

the entire movement had accepted Jabotinsky ' s view about the

necessity of forc e .
Jabotinsky,

Ben-Gurion,

held an attitude

who had been a bitter enemy of

scarcely different than his regarding

the Arabs and eventually realized most of his aims .
This narrower Revisionist Zionism is not drastically different
than moderate or sympathetic Zionism.

Racist ideas have been ex-

pressed by nearly every Zionist thinker and leader,
Weizmann ,

and Ben-Gurion .

including Herz l ,

Jabotinsky differed from the others in

style and bluntness more than in substance.

Opposition to Jabotinsky

was based on the existing political configuration and fears that his
tactics would upset diplomatic efforts.

It was not because of any

ethical considerations or because of a desire to make brothers of
the Arab s .

The precepts of Zionism and the way they have been
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interpreted in light of existing political realities can be construed
as racist.

The views of later Zionists are logical developments of

earlier Zionist thought.

The desire for creating a purely Jewish

state meant that there would necessarily be conflict with the exist
ing Arab population.

In order to achieve their goals and j ustify

their actions, it was inevitable that racist ideas would appear and
then dominate within the Zionist movement.
Naturally, the creation o f a Jewish state could not become a
reality without land.

Once the acquisition of land in Palestine by

Jews had begun, it was inevitable that the land under Jewish control
would increase.

The Zionist movement has always had an expansive

tendency in the sense that it sought from the first to acquire ter
ritory that it did not initially possess.

It cannot be seriously

questioned whether the Zionists always intended to exercise complete
control in a Jewish homeland.

The creation of a cooperative, bi

national state with the Arabs was not part of Zionist plan s .

It

was always intended that a Jewish majority be established to allow
for Jewish dominance in decision making.

These intentions are widely

documented in the writings and statements of Zionist leaders.

For

tactical reasons, the goal o f the Jewish state was not always clear
ly expressed and loudly pronounced, but a study of Zionist statements
and actions leaves no doubt that a separate state was always their
goal.
In 1917 , Ben-Gurion stated that,

"We must create a Jewish

majority in the Land of Israel in the next twenty· years.
central issue in this new historical situation . 11
-

27

-
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That is the

Later he wrote ,

At the present time ,

we speak of

colonization and only of colonization.
It is our short term objective .

But

it is clear that England belongs to
the English,

Egypt to the Egyptian s ,
In our country

and Judea to the Jews .
there

is room only for Jews .

say to the Arabs :

' Move over ; '

We will
if they

are. not in agreement ,

i f they resist,
we will push them by forc e . 35
Besides Ben-Gurion,
Pinsker ,

Herz l ,

nearly all important Zionist

Bube r ,

Weizmann,

leaders ,

including

and Jabotinsky emphasized Jewish im-

migration to Palestine in order to build a Jewish majority as a foundation for the Jewish state.
The 14 , 920

square kilometers granted to the Jewish state by the

United Nations in the 1947 partitioning of Palestine was not what
the Zionists had originally hoped to gain.

36

It appears that most

Zionists wanted the Jewish state to embrace a much wider area to
accommodate the influx of a large number o f Jews .

Martin Buber

claims that one of the reasons the Zionists preferred Palestine as
the site for their state was that it offered the possibility of ex37
.
.
.
pansion into
a greater Pal estine
.
Israel Divided ,

Rael Jean Isaac ,

reports that before British pressure,

author of
the Zionists

agreed among themselves that the future Jewish state should claim
territory greater than that controlled by Jews in ancient periods,
in order to incorporate the areas where past invasions had come
from.

38

The Israel of Herz l ' s Altneuland extended to the Euphrates

River and in�luded Beirut and other parts of Lebanon.

Similar

boundaries were suggested by the Zionist Organization of America in
1917.

The Zionist delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919
- 28 -

called for the inclusion of Transjordan and southern Lebanon.
Appearing before the Palestine Royal Commi ssion,

39

Vladimir

Jabotinsky presented a plan for Jewish development that included
both sides of the Jordan River and asked the British to open Jordan
.
40
. h penetration.
to Jewis
similar plan,

In the mid-1930 ' s ,

Ben-Gurion presented a

transforming the entire ancient Land of Israel on

.
. h state. 41
.
both si
. des o f the Jordan Rl.ver into
a Jewis

Ben-Gurion

stated his ideas on Israel ' s boundaries clearly at a military parade
in 1948 when he said,
victory will not be consummated until the
pioneering effort of our nation in Israel
and the Diaspora gathers all the exiles
into the liberated homeland - until the
desolation of this country is reclaimed
to its maximum extent. 4 2
Earlier i n that same year h e had stated that "a nation declaring its
independence does not have to define its boundaries" and reasoned
that land captured through military victories would be added to the
state .

43

Subsequently,

the National Administration voted 5 - 4 i n favor

of Ben-Gurion ' s position and decided not to
Israel ' s Declaration o f Independence.

44

include boundaries in

This seems to be a clear

indication that Israel did not intend to place permanent limits on
its territory.

Israel ' s current Prime Minister Menahem Begin de-

clared in The Revolt that ,
the partition of the homeland is illegal .
It will never be recognized . . . It will not
bind the Jewish people .

Jerusalem was

and will be forever our capital .

Eretz

Israel will be restored to the people o f
Israe l .
All of i t .
And foreve r . 45
In 194 4 ,

the convention of the Zionist Organization of America
-

29 -

adopted a resolution calling for a Jewish Commonwealth which
embrace the whole of Palestine ,
same

"shall
The

undivided and undiminished. "

stand was adopted by the World Zionist Conference in 1945 .
This commitment to the concept of Eretz

46

Israel , an emotional

attachment to all of Palestine where all Jews would be united to form
a great civilization,

tral task of the state,

as defined by law is not to protect or im-

prove the lives of its citizen s ,
ethical way of life;

The cen-

is actually official Israeli policy.

or to foster and exemplify a more

but is to gather in all the

"exiles11 •

47

Jews

not living in Israel are considered to be exiled in the Diaspora and
it is the prime purpose o f the state of Israel to bring them there .
This policy means that Israel has always planned to expand in order
to accommodate this

ingathering.

firmed this part of Israeli

Israeli leader Yigal Allon con-

ideology in 1968,

saying,

"Our duty to

populate Greater Israel is no less important than in the past,

when

it was a mandate and the rally of the Beisan ;

he who doubts this truth

.
.. 48
.
.
.
doubts the entire Zionist
conception.

the

the state of Israel and the

So,

"central task" of

"entire Zionist conception" depend upon

immigration and the population of additional land areas .
The effect of such an ideological base could easily have been
predicted.
torial,

It has made Zionism appear to be a threat to Arab terri-

political,

and cultural sovereignty in Palestine .

The Zion-

ists have j ustified their acquisition of land and effective
establishment of political control over it in a variety of ways .
Some pointed out the discrimination against Jews in liberal Western
nations and persecution of them in . less liberal nation s .
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It was

felt

that the only way for Jews to achieve freedom was to create their
own state, and that need was so great that negative consequences of
their actions could be ignored.

Some cultural Zionists believed a

Jewish homeland would revive a morally and intellectually valuable
culture that would be of great benefit to the world.

The religious

argument has been expressed by Martin Buber in this way,
With however little or much right in each
case the nations can accuse each other of
being robbers, their charge against Israel
is totally unjust because it acted under
authority and in the confident knowledge
of their authorization.
the faith in it,

The revelation,

and the action following

from this faith are what differentiate
Israel from the other peoples,

not merely

'religiously, ' but also historically
no
other people has ever heard and accepted
•

.

•

the corcmand from heaven as did the people
of Israe1 .49
After the birth of Israel, even more reasons for expansion were
cited by the Zionists.

The security of their newly constituted state

surrounded by hostile neighbors led Israel to expansionist moves in
order to gain strategic advantage, to obtain foreign policy momentum, or to keep their adversaries on the defensive.

But regardless

of the justification offered, it is undeniable that achievement of
the Zionist movement's goals depended upon taking over land that was
not originally theirs and that continued adherence to Zionism necessarily commits Israel to further expansion.
The ideology of Zionism was the driving force behind the effort
to create Israel and still guides the policy decisions of the current
Israeli government.

Therefore, it is an important factor in deter-

mining the nature of the Jewish state.
- 31
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Logically developed, the

ideas presented by a wide variety of Zionist leaders and theoreticians
lead to the conclusion that Zionism is both racist and expansionist .
The United Nations has defined racial discrimination as
any distinction , exclusion, restriction,
or preference based on race , colour,
descent , or national or ethnic origin
which has the purpose or effect of nul
lifying or impair,i.ng the.· recognition,
enjoyment, or exerci s e , on an equal
footing, of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic ,
socia l , cultural or any other field of
public life. SO
The Zionist doctrine is one which calls for a state that places
Jews in a superior position in the society in order to protect the
Jewishnes s of the state.

Also, the comments of Zionist leaders re-

veal racist tendencies , varying from indifference and invisibility
to a disregard for Arab rights and a belief in Jewish superiority .
As

Noam Chomsky , MIT linguistics professor and student of the Middle

East said,
If Israel is to be both a democratic state
and a Jewish state , then non-Jews must be
expelled . . . the respects in which the state
is ' Jewish ' will be the respects in which
non-Jews are denied equal rights .
Thus ,
democratic principles are violated when a
state discriminates between two categories
of citizen s . 51
A state which seeks to acquire territory from others in order to provide for the mass influx of a large number of people must ne'cesaarily
be expansionist.

In the case of Israe l , the mystical notions of

attachment to the Holy Land make expansion more likely as a method
to achieve national purpose and unity.
A complete analysis of Israel ' s dome stic politics requires
-
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discussion o f the policies carried out by the state .

The way in

which Zionism is actually implemented in the Jewish state is of
more significance to the situation than the ideology itself.
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Chapter 3

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ZIONISM IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL

After examining Zionist thought and drawing conclusions as to
its ultimate implications ,

it

validity of those conclusion s .

is

necessary to test the practical
The most meaningful test,

If Zionism

i s to view the actual conditions in the Jewish state.
really is racist and expansionist ,
raeli social

this should be refiected in Is

structure and dome stic policy,

the occupied territori e s .

including activities in

Zionism i s a complex ideology with varying

wings and subject to varying interpretations .

However ,

will show which wings and which interpretations are ,
phasized by the

o f cour s e ,

society and the government.

this chapter

in reality ,

em

The transformation of

ideology into practice and the situation that has been created more
clearly define the nature of the state and allow a more accurate
j udgment on the foreign policy ramifications o f domestic conditions.
Theoretically,

for the Zionists to create and maintain a truly

Jewish state in an area where Arabs were a great majority,

either the

Arabs had to be expelled or a regime of occupation giving Arabs
second class citizenship would have to be installed.

Israel has

practiced both approaches in order to increase Jewish control in the
state.

Legal structure,

institutional structure ,

and administrative

practice must be studied to determine i f discrimination against non
Jews is practiced in or by the state.

Also ,

a study of Israel ' s

policies with regard to land and territory is necessary to make a
j udgment on its expansive nature.

These

issues will be addressed by

analyzing the purpose and effect of various domestic polic i e s ,
studying historical examples of Israel ' s attempts to expand its
- 34 -

and by
area

of control .
Citizenship,

Immigration,

and Emergency Regulations

Israeli citizenship laws give advantages to Jews while making
citizenship difficult for native Arabs to attain.

The

"Law of Return "

grants Israeli citizenship to any Jew living anywhere in the world.
.
But Arabs born in what is now Israel and who fled during conflicts
This

are not allowed citizenship unless they are naturalized.
naturalization process can be very difficult.
by proving birth in Israel ,

residence there for three out of five

years preceding application for citizenship,
settle there ,

It is only possible

intention to permanently

and sufficient knowledge of Hebrew.

these requirements ,

Even after meeting

the Minister of the Interior still has discretion

1
•
• t izens
to grant or re fuse ci
hip.
.

This has resulted in the denial o f

citizenshi� to about one fifth of the Palestinian Arabs living in
Israel .

2

These laws appear to be discriminatory since they auto-

matically grant to the world ' s Jews rights which are withheld from
part of the native population o f non-Jews .
Israel ' s Declaration of Independence establishes the
of the exiles" as the fundamental purpose of the state.

"ingathering

Any Jews

living outside Israel are considered to be in the Diaspora and exiled
from their natural homeland.

So the

state has actively sought to

stimulate Jewish immigration to Israel while discouraging the return
of Palestinian Arabs to land they had left during military conflicts.
Count Folke Bernadotte,

a UN mediator for the Middle East,

1948,
It would be an offense against the principles
of elemental justice if these victims of the
-
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said in

conflict are denied the right to return
to their homes while Jewish imrnigrants
flow into Palestine,

and indeed offer at

least the threat of permanent replacement
o f the Arab refugees who have been rooted
in the land for centuries . 3
Israeli immigration policy has been aimed a t ,

and has effectively

accomplished this goal of permanent replacement.
the establishment of the Jewish state on May 14 ,

Between 1918 and
1948,

the Jewish

population in Palestine rose from ten per cent of the total population to thirty per cent.

4

In 1 9 7 6 ,

. popul ation
.
Israe1 i
was Jewis
. h

5
•

it was reported that 85 . 1% of

Such a drastic increase was made

possible by a strong commitment to attracting Jews and to discourag�
ing entrance by non-Jews .

In fact ,

a variety of tactics that will be

discussed in detail later were used to encourage the migration of
Palestinian Arabs out of Israel .

Sociologist Alex Weingrod explains

that once this migration of Palestinians started,

the Israeli

authorities did little to stop it because they saw it as a quick way
6
.
to so 1ve the prob lem of Arab presence in a Jewis
. h state .
Gurion admitted,

David Ben-

"in the matter of immigration that the law distin-

guished between Jews and non-Jews . "

7

A policy to allow for discrim-

ination in immigration would appear necessary to fulfill the Zionist
Such discrimination may not appear

goal of creating a Jewish state.
racist,

but

further study shows that it i s .

First,

Zionists have

always regarded Jews as a race with identifiable characteristics deserving of nationhood .
race.

More practically,

Therefore,

non-Jews must belong to a different

immigration practices provide better service

and more favorable treatment to immigrants from the United States and
Europe than to those

from Asia and Africa.
-
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In order to attract

immigrants who will fit culturally into the Western-oriented
Israeli society and who will bring needed skills ,
leve l s ,

and capital into the country ,

ticularly Russian)

educational

American and European

(par-

immigrants are usually provided with better

housing and jobs in more convenient and prosperous areas of the
countr y .
between

8

An example of the policy in action is the distinction made

"northern" and

"southern" French immigrants .

In

distinction is not based on place of birth or residence ,
racial heritage .
who ,

fact,

but on

"Northern" French are people of European origin

upon immigration,

are normally settled in urban area s .

em" French are those of· North African origin,

"South-

and they are usually

sent to distant development towns where the quality of life
as high.

the

is not

9

Immediately following the establishment of the state of Israel,
Arabs already living in the country were made subject to a number of
Emergency Regulations ,
areas .

including military governing of Arab dominated

During the mandate period,

Jews complained of the injustice

of the restrictive British policies .

However ,

after gaining inde-

pende�ce ,

the regulations were lifted only for Jews ,

in effect

for Arab s .

10

while remaining

Regulations were especially strict in areas

close to borders or where there were suspicions of espionage or sabotage activities.

Military governors were superimposed on the regular

.
.
administrators in
Arab area s .
d1str1ct
.

.

house arrest ; bandishment,
court.

12

11

These governors could order

and administrative arrest without going to

They could also subject people to police supervision,

them access to their own property,
- 37 -

deport them,

deny

and confiscate or

destroy their property .

13

Gaining political and economic control

over Israeli Arabs was easily accomplished through these regulations .
Until 197 3 ,

many Arabs were required to have passes in order to move

the country.
wi
. thin
.

14

Potential political leaders and suspected

troublemakers could be controlled by placing them on a pass blacklist.

In addition,

occupational opportunities were severely limA person ' s professional life,

ited under such restriction s .
relations with othe r s ,

his

his entire livelihood could be controlled

through the use o f these regulations.
Military government also had a cultural impact by separate
administration of the Arab sector with separate advisory offices
minorities .

Arabs could get a

for

feeling of only partial participation

in such a system while the view of Arabs as a distinct and potentially dangerous part of the population could be reinforced.

These

regulations undoubtedly had impact on other areas such as occupation,
education,

social status , and political participation.

Military government and the pass system in Israel proper have
been eliminated,

but their meaning and impact should not be minimized.

Although j u�tified in the name of security,

added results were to

limit Arab opportunities at the crucial time of the state ' s establishment and to set the pattern for the future relationship between
Jews and Arabs in Israel.
ritorie s ,

Also,

in the Israeli-occupied Arab ter-

the same Emergency Regulations are presently employed.

15

Economics
Israeli economic policy has,
following three principles :

since 1948,

Socialism,
-

38

-

revolved around the

protectionism,

and dualism.

These were the result of conscious choices designed to

fulfill the
A So-

purposes of Zionism and to meet certain needs of the state.

cialist economy was thought to be appropriate in the Zionist state
where all Jewish people were to work together to achieve salvation
and prosperity for their nation.

Other reasons for choosing so-

cialism were to attain a . high degree of social j ustice among the
population and to build a sense o f community and national togetherness.

Also,

considering the importance o f economic success to a

newly created nation,

the planning and control allowed in a public-

ly managed economy seemed necessary.
Towards these ends ,
the nation ' s economy .

the Israeli government plans and administers

It controls the flow of capital inve stment ,

deciding the locations and purposes

for which it is to be used.

Ad-

ministrative regulations over wages and prices were extensive until
the 1 9 7 7 victory of Menahem Begin ' s Likud bloc ,

which is committed

to moving Israel toward a more free enterprise economy .
sponsored housing,
tors

agriculture ,

Government

and industry are determining fac

in economic development nationally and regionally.

16

Social

and demographic conditions can be vitally affected by the government under an economic system of this type.
An especially

important part of Israel ' s economy is the kibbutz ,

a cooperative agricultural settlement.
Israeli socialism,
tion,

simplicity ,

These are the symbol of

fostering the values of public service ,
egalitarianism and the dignity of labor.

Kibbutzim are based on a communal
equipment and tchniques are used.

coopera17

life style but modern agricultural
The government often prefers to

settle new immigrants in kibbutzim to inculcate the values of this
- 39 -

pioneer ethic into them, as well as to strengthen the system and
.

.

.

improve agricultura1 productivity.
.

18

Immediately following independence, Israel instituted a policy
of protecting its industry from foreign competition.

Protection was

necessary to create viable industrial and commercial sectors in the
country .

Complete reliance on imports could eventually damage the

nation ' s security.

Continuing that reliance could also lead to an

imbalanced economy and massive trade deficits that could inhibit the
growth of incomes , prevent substantial improvements in the standards
of living, and generally slow economic development.

So a protective

policy was used to promote the replacement of imports with an eventual

shift to exports .

19

The principle of dualism had its beginning in the mandate period.
Jews made a great effort to be economically independent and in doing
this, excluded Arabs from participating in their sector.

The Arabs

were helped by British-created employment and public service and had
their main economic connection with neighboring Arab states.
these years , Jewish immigration forced
land.

many

During

Arab fellahin off the

Trends established then showed that the eventual Jewish ma-

jority would create an isolated sector removed from the Arab economy
and characterized by a growing disparity of economic leve l .

After

the creation of Israel , the government faced the task of administering a nation of both Jews and Arabs .
maintained.

But the dualist concept was

·This is not exactly separate development in the South

African IrOld, but areas have been developed differently according to
the type of inhabitants.

Arab regions can be identified by their
- 40 -

It is primarily agricultural and uses

economic structure.

traditional techniques of production in sharp contrast to the more
.
.
20
advanced and more rapi
Jewish regions .
. dly expanding
'
A variety of strategies and plans have been employed to carry
Israel has relied heavily upon the use

out these three princip l e s .
Total

of foreign capital.

foreign capital has averaged about . 15 to

20% of Israel ' s Gross National Product ,
Between 1950 and 1960 ,,

foreign capital inflow was equal to total in-

vestment in the country,

indicating the tremendous importance of

foreign money to the IsraeLi economy .
to the present ,

U.S.

the highest in the world.

21

From Israel ' s establishment

aid to Israel has am::>unted to $ 14 . 5 billion,

with an additional $4 . 3 billion in private contributions and $ 2
billion worth o f Israeli bonds in

U.S.

accounts .

22

Foreign money

was absolutely necessary to stimulate and make pos�ible the economic
growth necessary for a small ,
lives o f its citizens,
position,

legitimize its authority,

raise

its world

and provide for its security.

From 1948 to 1964 ,

the Israeli government emphasized

agricultural development .
values ,

newly created nation to improve the

23

This was done to promote Zionist

to meet basic needs of the people,

employmen t ,

to provide necessary

and to ease the absorption process for immigran t s ,

especially those from Africa and the Middle East.

Industrial

enterprises were gradually developed to reduce the importance o f
imports with ;plans

for further expansion.

Protection of the com-

petitive position of these industries was provided in government
policy.

This proved to be a very successful period in Israel ' s
- 41 -

From 1950 to 1 9 6 5 ,

economic history .

in the non-Soviet world.

GNP rose by 11 . 4% ,

During this t i me ,

the highest

Israel ranked between

sixteenth and eighteenth in per capita GNP and became one of the
world ' s thirty most affluent nations .

24

In 1 9 6 4 ,

a big balance of

payments deficit led the government to plan a recession to slow
inflation and reduce the deficit .

After the 1967 war,
characterized by
.
construction,
25%

25

Israel experienced an economic boom

full employment with increased tourism,
26
.
and prosperity.

exports ,

from 1968 to 1969 .

27

building

The country ' s GNP grew

The 1968 government plan was designed to

take advantage of these good conditions and reduce reliance on
capital import s ,

reduce the trade deficit ,

Doing this would require

independence.

industrial expansion.

furthe r economic growth and

Since this type o.f activity had normally been

accomplished with foreign capital ,
economic independence.

and to attai.n economic

it conflicted with the goal of

The clash between the desire

for self-

sufficiency and the necessity of outside assistance seems inherent
in the Israeli economy .
\

Problems with these policies began to surface in 1971 ,
consumer price index rose 2 5 % while hourly wages
to 15% .

Again,

when the

increaaed only 12

a balance of payments deficit occurred and the

government devalued the currency by 20% to make imports more ex
28
.
pensive
.
However ,
War of 197 3 .

the most damaging economic crisis came with the October
In monetary terms ,

of one year ' s GNP ;

Since then,
- 42

this war cost almost the equivalent
Israel has been spending about 40%
-

of its budget and one third of its annual GNP on national defense .
This is compared to 6% of

GNP

spent by the U . S .
30

8% by most industrialized nations .

on defense and 4 to

Loss of life and manpower have
In addi-

, made the costs of the war and its consequences even higher .
tion,

29

Israel has been unable to substantially reduce its reliance on

outside assistance because of its defense posture.

The defense

burden also includes loss of production through reserve duty and
the higher costs of border settlements that are established for
security reasons without regard to economic feasibility.
this situation,

the Israeli government took drastic measures .

passed an austerity budget,

devalued the Israeli pound by 40% ,

duced subsidies on foodstuffs,

and raised taxe s .

these decisions were staggering .
in 1 9 7 4 .

31

It
re

The results of

The consumer price index rose 60%

This was broken down for specific categorical increases

as follows :
155%;

To combat

foodstuffs increased 8 5 % ;

electricity 1 1 7 % ;

and water 1 1 5 % .

gasoline 85 % ;
32

natural gas

These changes led to a

rapid and drastic decline in Israeli living standards .
But the government continued to follow the same general
direction.

In October ,

1975 policy decisions were made to further

devalue the pound by 10% ,

increase consumer prices by 2 2 % ,

adopt a new 10% sales tax.
be moving at a 30% rate ,
3i .

34

And in 1977,

less than in � l9 7 3 .

35

33

B y 1976 ,

inflation was estimated to

while unemployment remained low at only

real disposable income was estimated to be 15%
One apparent consequence of these conditions

was a decline in immigration .
(18500)

and to

1975 statistics showed emigration

nearly equal to immigration
- 43 -

( 20000) .

The

figure of people

moving into Israel was down from 31970 in 1974 and 58886 in 19 7 3 .
In this way,

36

economics was damaging the effectiveness of the Israelis

in achieving the central task of the Zionist state,
of the exiles.

the ingathering

The centrality of defense in Israeli thinking and

spending that has been obvious since the inception of the state is
probably the single most important fact in causing these economic
troubles.
With the election of the Lik�d government,
substantial economic change.

Israel underwent

The new conservative leadership of the

country was committed to moving Israel away from socialism into a
free enterprise economy.
were eliminated,

Most government imposed economic controls

the pound was floated on the world market,

foreign cur·rency regulations were dropped.

Despite these changes,

basic ideas on solving immediate problems remain similar.
government imposed a 1 2 %

and most

value added tax in 1977 .

37

Again,

The new
the

purpose was to make Israeli products less expensive internationally
and to increase exports.

Exports increased by 25% in 1 9 7 8 ,

of that was arms sales to Chile,
.

.
South Africa,

but 20%

.
38
.
and Nicaragua.

Begin's policies increased foreign investment in Israel by 58% in
1978.

39

These policies would also leave less money in the hands of

Israelis as a way to decrease imports.

However,

the Begin govern-

ment has not made any effort to reduce government spending on defense,

welfare,

victory,
is up,

or social services.

pubxic expenditures are up,

In fact,

since the Likud

the number of public employees

and wages have risen higher than productivity and inflation.

Inflation ran at a 50% rate in 1978 and was near 100% in 1979 .

- 44 -

The

1978 Israeli budget was higher than national output ,
budget was only slightly less.

while the 1979

The 1978 balance of payments defi

cit was one quarter of the nation ' s

GNP

for that year.

40

Despite Israeli efforts to reduce its dependence on foreign
capital ,

the amount flowing to it has been increasing.

billion in U . S .

Of the $14 . 5

aid given to Israe l , . $10 billion has come since 1 9 7 3 .

The Camp David accords provide
financial assistance,

for $ 2 . 8 billion per year in U . S .

and will cause Israel to depend on the U . S .

41
.
.
.
and Egypt for suf ficient
01
.
· 1 suppl ies
to meet its
nee ds .

so ,

neither the policies o f the Labor governments or the Likud government have had major success in solving Israel ' s most pressing
economic problems or in increasing its self-sufficiency.
There are consequences of Israeli economic policy that reveal
more about the country ' s
nature.

internal conditions ,

its purposes,

and its

The economic situation and treatment of Arab residents in

Israel and of Jews of Asian and African descent, known as Oriental
Jews ,

are direct evidence as to the government ' s commitments and

priorities.
tion,

Information on the extent of poverty, income. distribu-

and possession of durable consumer goods is valuable in this

analysis.
It is widely acknowledged that the economic differences between
these groups is a problem Israel
created.

inherited and imported rather than

The important issues are whether the Israeli government

is committed to eliminating this gap and what progress has been
achieved since the establishment of the state .

Also important is to

determine i f economic conditions have been used to build and maintain
- 45 -

a dominant -. position within the state for European Jews .

Zionists

have continually claimed that they have improved living conditions
However , this would

for Arabs more than had the Arab leadership �

not justify the possibility that Jewish advantages in technology,
financial enterprise s , and industrial establishments have contributed to making Arabs and other racial groups second-class citizens .
In income distribution, the Israeli record is a varied one .
The annual income of Arab families in 1976 was about two thirds that
of Jewish families , despite the fact that Arabs have more wage
earners

( and accordingly,
.
more mouths to feed ) per fami' l y .

42

A

related statistic is that Arabs spend 60% of their income on food
and shelter compared to 49% for Jews .
However, information about Israeli families native to the
country, of European origin, and of Asian-African origin are more
.
significant in determining income distribution along racial line s .
I n 1951,

four years after establishment of Israel,

Israelis o f

Asian-African origin earned about 61% of that earned by families
of �estern origin.

By 195 7 , this figure was 41% .

Also signifi-

cant in that year, it was found that Israeli-born children of
Eastern parents earned only 68% of that earned by Israeli-born
.

.

.

chi
' ldren o f European-American origin.

43

In 1960 , the income of

Asian-African families was 4 5 % that of European-American s , in
1963-64 it was 5 1 % ,

and in 1970 it was 55% .

44
·

Important to con-

sider in judging these figures is that the average Oriental family
is larger than the average Western family.

In 1968-69, the dif-

ference in family size was 4 . 7 for Orientals to 2 . 9 for Westeners.
- 46 -
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That made real Sephardi income only
income .
the

44%

that of Western family

These figures seem to show a decline in relative income in

1950 ' s

with a closing of the gap appearing in the

1960 ' s .

The following table , based on information collected by the
Horowitz �ommittee on Income Distribution and Social Inequality,
under the auspices of the government of Israe l , shows the change
in income distribution over time .
Indices of Relative Income by Area of Origin
Continent of
Birth of Head
of Family
All Families
Asia-Africa
Europe-America
Israel

1951

1954

100

100

•

46

19 59 -

1963-

1960

1964

1970

1973

100

100

100

100
70

88 . 8

76.2

75 . 7

63

69

101 . 2

107 . 9

1 12 . 1

124

126

102 . 9

103 . 7

111 . 5

125

119

According to these figures , there has not been steady progr�ss
toward income equalitr in Israe l .

However, from

1963

to

1970,

Asian-African families had a larger increase than other groups .
This could indicate a trend toward more equality.

The Horowitz

Committee concluded that the standard of living of Oriental families improved in the

with higher income , better housing, and

l960 ' s

possession of more consumer durables.

47

However, the relative

position of Oriental families in the area of income seems to have
declined overall since

1950

despite improvements in the

Also important to note is that of the

20%

1960 ' s .

o f Israel ' s population

*Data for 1963-64 and 1970 reflect an adjustment for family size and
are thus not directly comparable to date for previous years .
Similar
adjustments for earlier years would presumably have increased rela
tive differentials to about the level of the later years.
- 47 -

that was below the poverty line in 197 3 , 90% were Oriental s .

48

Possession of durable consumer goods is another indicator of
relative economic conditions .

The following list presents informa

tion on this indicator for 1960 and 1970.

49

% o f Families Possessing
Selected Product

Product and Origin of Head
of Family

Electric Refrigerator
Asia-Africa ·
Europe-America
Gas Stove
Asia-Africa
Euorpe-America
Electric Washing Machine
Asia-Africa
Europe-America
Television
Asia-Africa
Europe-America
Car
Asia-Africa
Europe-America .

1960

1970

17
69

92
97

43
75

89
88

8
21

46
42

2
2

48
55

4
14

8
19

These figures clearly show that in the area of consumer goods ,
the position of Asian-African Israelis has markedly increased,
virtually closing the gap completely.

This occurrence, coupled

with the increase in Oriental family incomes in the late 1960 ' s ,
seems to support the Israeli claim that living standards have improved for citizens of Asian and African origin.
One factor in j udging Israel ' s commitment to racial equality is
the distribution of government aid to individuals and communities in
Israel.

Between 1948 and 1975, the Jewish Agency spent $ 1 . 2 billion

to develop Jewish settlements .

Arab villages have no access to

these funds and Israeli government aid to Arab villages has averaged
- 48 -

about $1 million per year.

so

In 1971-72,

the Arab sector received

1 . 1% of all grants to local authorities with no loans to cover
deficits in local authoritie s '
. .
o f de f icits
.

51

Nazareth Mayor Tawfig Zayad reported that his city ,

a major Arab center of 45000,
raeli budget ,

budgets and no money for repayment

received $ 3 1 million in the 1976

while the new Jewish settlement of Upper Nazareth ,

with a population of 16000,

received over $40 rnillion.

43 of 105 Arab villages had electricity,
stages .

53

Is-

52

In 1972 ,

with 20 ItX>re in the planning

A study in the same year reported that 20 of 94 Arab

villages sampled had acceptable levels of rnodernization.

54

Major results of these unequal policies have been to create an
unbalanced economy and to transform the nature of the Arab sector in
the country .

The study j ust cited and a report by Hebrew University

in the same year both found that Arab villages were more developed
under the B�itish mandate than in present times.
that since 1948,

Both reports said

the Arab region has declined as a produc e r .

struction of factories ,

55

expansion of agriculturai production ,

development of local services

Conand

in Arab areas have not increased ,

fore-

ing many Arabs to leave their villages or farms to work in the Jewish
sector;

56

This pattern of economic development supported by govern-

ment expenditures has created an economy in which the Jewish sector
is predominant in production and management while the · ·Arab
sector functions as a labor supply for Jewish enterprises.

The

Israeli government has taken the position that their development
policy has

stimulated aggregate investment,

of this would be beneficial to all regions .
- 49 -

assuming that the effects
However,

economist

Gunnar Myrdal rejected this theory in his 19S7 work , Economic Theory
on Underdeveloped Region s .

H e stated that unbalanced economic de-

velopment produces even greater imbalances .

Continued investment

in more developed regions attracts labor and capital away from less
developed region s , reducing their potential for development.

S7

So ,

the impact of Israel ' s spending policy is much greater than simply
the difference in regional expenditures .

Fred M . Gottheil predicted

in the early 1970 ' s that present development policy would make the
Arab region Israel ' s Appalachia , although increased incomes would
give its inhabitants a higher standard of living.

SS

It is possible

that the economic fabric of the country has been transformed since
the mass Jewish irranigration to make the economic and social development of the settlers a direct function of the underdevelopment of
the native s .

Although the existence o f Israel has brought increased

wealth to the country ' s Arabs , it has served to put Jews in control
of the economic structure and provide them with superior benefits .
Nowhere is this type of relationship more clear than in the
occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza, as described by Dutch
economist Brian Van Arkadie .

He explains that since the initial

policy decisions were made to employ Arab labor from the territories in the Israeli economy , to open the territories to the inflow
of Israeli products , and to allow the sale of selected territorial
products in Israel following the 1967 war, economic relations
.

with Israel have become the predominant ones for both area s .
West

Bank and Gaza are affected by tariffs ,

The

exchange rate ad-

justments , and fiscal and monetary policies framed to meet Israel ' s
- so -

needs .

Because Israel has exercised complete control over these

policies with no participation in their shaping by either West Bank
or Gaza inhabitants , there has been no possibility of modifying them
to meet local needs.

Control of these policy decisions allows Is-

rael to determine production , consumption , and employment patterns
in the two areas .

Dominance of trade by Israel may cause the terri-

tories to lose opportunities to develop markets outside Israe l .

The

combination of economic control and trade dominance could stunt the
potential for economic growth in the territories and reinforce the
existing structural imbalance .
It is true that West Bank and Gaza Palestinians working in
Israel earn incomes substantially above what could be earned in the
territories.

However, these short-term economic gains do not elim-

inate the disadvantages involved in placing Palestinians in the
specialized role of poor working class in Israeli society.

Also,

extensive withdrawal of labor from the territories creates problems
for the local economies, with the possibility that the West Bank and
Gaza could become dormitories for manual labor in the Israeli economy, intensifying the bias in the structure and in the skills of the
Palestinian people.

5�

Itzhak Ben-Aharon, former Secretary General

of Israel ' s Histadrut labor union has said that, "Israel was building
Zionism on the backs of hired labor from the occupied territory. 11

60

There is a danger that this imbalance could concentrate Palestinian
workers at the lower end of the wage scale without the same possib11 1t1es for growth as in recent years .
.

·

·

.
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The description of econom-

ic development in the occupied territories shows how the government of
- 51 -

Israel has used its powers to place Jews in a superior position to
Arabs , both in terms of economic well-being and economic power .
.r-bshe Sharett, who served as Foreign Minister under Ben-Gurion, went
as far as to say in 1957 that Israel had tried to buy the national
birthright o f the Arabs with economic and social progress.

62

But the economic and social progress of Israel ' s Arabs does not
I

seem to be equal to that of Jews and it appears that its price may
have included roore than their n�tional birthright .

This is shown in

the occupational distribution of Israel ' s workers and in the government ' s labor policie s .
During the early Jewish immigration to Palestine from the 1880 ' s
to about 1913, the Jewish sector of the economy was based primarily
.
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on hired Arab labor.
Near the end of that period, a movement emphasizing self-reliance among Jews emerged and became dominant.

This

feeling manifested itself in many way s , including the exclusive use
of the Hebrew language and the development of strictly Jewish defense mechanisms .

Another result of that trend was the practice of

using only Jewish labor within the Jewish economic sectors.
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Ac-

cording to Knesset member and newspaper editor Uri Avnery , the
struggle for Hebrew labor was the real beginning of the Arab-Israeli
war.
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Hebrew labor meant, necessarily, no Arab labor.

To many of

this movement ' s supporters , strikes and violence were j ustified to
force employers to hire only Jews .
Hebrew l:abor , more than anything else, created the gulf between
the two peoples living in British and Turkish Palestine.

The devel-

opment of two separate economies was a major step toward the
-
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development of two nations .

Reduced economic relations meant

greatly reduced social contact between Arabs and Jewish immigrants .
The implementation of the Hebrew labor principle was strong evidence to Palestinian Arabs that the Jews had not come to Palestine
to live with them, but had come to displace them.
After the establishment of Israe l ,
continued.

the Hebrew labor policy was

The Jewish National Fund stipulates that on land it owns ,

"It shall be a matter o f principle that Jewish labor be employed. "
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This is extremely important when considering that the JNF owns 90%
of the inhabited area in Israe 1 .
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The extremely close ties of the

Histadrut to the ruling Labor party made Arab exclusion even rrore
significant.

A decision to allow Arabs into the Histadrut with

equal rights was a legal departure from Hebrew labor ide a s ,

but did

not lead to a major change in Israeli occupational distribution .
1966,

In

the label "Jewish workers " was officially dropped from the

full title of the Histadrut .
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This marked the end of the Hebrew

labor policy as it had originally been defined.
In present day Israe l ,

Arabs are no longer excluded from

participation in the Jewish economy but are concentrated at the
lower end of that economy .

JNF regulations prohibit non-Jews from

opening businesses on their land.
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In Upper Nazareth where the JNF

has acquired land and developed industries,
Jewish owned ,

the businesses are all

although the area is inhabited by a majority of Arab s .

Arabs have been employed i n Upper Nazareth factories i n primarily
menial jobs.
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I n fact ,

over half of Israel ' s Arabs are employed

.
72
outsi
. de the Arab region.

Also,
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Israel ' s Arab workers make up over

half of the unskilled and semi-skilled in the country while being
only 9 . 8% of the work force .

In 1944, before the creation of Is-

rae l , Arabs were 33% of those employed. in the commercial , banking ,
public service, and personal services sector s .
dwindled to 1 7 . l t .
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cultural employment.

By 1968, this had

Arabs have also experienced a decline in agriArab population growth , the founding of new

Jewish rural communities , and Arab use of traditional farming methods
Farm employ
have resulted iri a shift of Arabs out of agriculture .
.
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ment o f Arabs decreased from 50% in 1950 to 31 . 5% in 1969.
The
labor surplus this created contributed to the phenomenon of thousands of landless Arab workers who work in the citie s , living in
shanty towns during the week , and traveling home by bus on weekends .
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Many Israeli employers consider Arab workers to be a bonus

because they have high productivity , can be easily dismissed, make
no demands , and are more willing to accept industrial jobs than are
.
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Jewish workers .

.
An example of employers ' perceptions of Arab

workers is this excerpt from a circular distributed in the Gaza
Strip published in the newspaper Haolam Hazeh:

"Fixed Price s :

One

Hour ' s Labor - 12 . 50 Israel Pounds , One Hour ' s Arab Labor - 5 . 0
Israel Pounds . "
Again, the more important issue to understand is the distribution
of Israeli workers along racial rather than religious lines .

Native

Israelis and citizens of European-American origin make up a decisive
majority and ·are represented far above the national average in academic , scientific, executive, administrative , and clerical positions.
People with Asian-African origins are employed in these professions
- 54 -

lower than the national average.

The opposite is true for positions

of semi-professional skills and manual labor.
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In 1969, more than

half o f all Asian-African workers were employed as industrial or
service workers , compared to one third of European-American and native Israelis.

17% of the Asian-Africans had jobs in the high paying

scientific , technical, administrative , executive, managerial, and
clerical professions .

This compares to 38% for European-Americans

and 44% for native Israelis .
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Workers of Asian and African origin constitute 34% of Israel ' s
work forc e .

Yet they make up 5 3 % of construction workers, 41% o f

industrial workers, and 48% of those in service jobs.

They are

heavily concentrated in unskilled and semi-skilled jobs , low in
prestige and payment.

They represent only 16% of the professional

work force and 19\ of the total white collar employment.

They hold

j ust l . 2% of government positions although . 40i of all gove rnment
. her education
.
.
workers do not have hig
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Yoram Ben-Porath attributes the occupational imbalance to the
following causes :

differences in imported characteristics of

European-American and Asian-African immigrants to Israe l ; differences
in initial job allocation upon immigration; differences in learning
and mobility processes over time in Israe1.
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Although Israeli

policy cannot be blamed for differences in imported characteristics,
the other two phenomena are within the scope of government policy
decisions.

Initial employment allocation of immigrants has been and

continues to be strongly affected by Israel ' s absorption policies.
Geographic placement of immigrants by the government is a
- 55 -

determining factor in the employment opportunities available for
the immigrants .

Also,

assistance from the government and political

parties to immigrants in finding employment is often an essential
part of the job placement process .
Learning and mobility processes in any country are greatly
affected by the entire spectrum of government social policie s .
education ,

health,

affirmative action ,

Wel

fare,

housing,

public employ

ment,

and other government policies are all related to employment
In Israel ' s socialist oriented economy

patterns and opportunities .

where there are such strong relationships between the government,
political parties ,

and economic organizations like the Hist-adr:ut and

the Jewish National Fund,

the government ' s ability to affect employ
In Israel ,

ment and occupational distribution is more pronounced.

there is no equality in occupational distribution along religious
or racial lines and no sign of a trend toward equality.

This cannot

be totally blamed on differing characteristics of the racial groups
involved.

Israeli government policy must ,

in large measure ,

be held

responsible for employment inequality and for contributing to racism.
Land and Residence Policies
Policies and practices relating to residenc e ,
ownership also indicate Israe l ' s character.

land use,

and land

These policies began

with the Emergency Regulations discussed previously.

The military

administration of Arab regions allowed the government to determine
the area of residence

for Arab s ,

cate their land and property .
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control their movement,

and confis

'
The Land Acquisition Law gives the

Israeli government power to take over land that is declared abandoned
- 56 -
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.
or whose owner is dee 1ared absente e .

The use of the Emergency

Regulations and the Land Acquisition Law gave the government much
power in converting land to its control after the state was established.

Another important tool in this effort was the Law of

Prescription, passed in 195 8 .

This law required anyone claiming

ownership of land to prove continuous possession of the land for
15 years or forfeit it to the government .

This was often impossible

for many people since no land was registered during the British
Mandate, which had ended twelve years earlier.
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In addition to Israel ' s confiscation of private land, residence
and the use of land are also controlled in a discriminatory fashion.
According to Israel Shahak, a professor at Hebrew University and a
member of the Israeli League for Human and Civil · Rights , the towns
of Carmel , Upper Nazareth, Hatzon , Arad, and Mitzpeh-Roman prohibit
non-Jews from living there by law.

As discussed earlier, the Jewish

National Fund denies to non-Jews the right to acquire housipg or open
a business on their land.

The situation in Upper Nazareth was cited

to explain one effect of these practices.

But the joint implementa-

tion of labor and land policies in Upper Nazareth is only part of a
consciously designed government plan to achieve a major Zionist goal .
In order to continue progress toward totally transforming Palestine
into a Jewish state, the Israeli government introduced the "Judaization of GaliJ,.ee" program in 1975.

Galilee is the major Arab region

in Israel and includes Nazareth, the largest Arab city with a population of 45000 .

The purpose of the Judaization of Galilee was to

change the dell¥)graphic composition in the area into Jewish majority.
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So ,

the government invested heavily in busi�ess, hous1.ng, and

recreational development to attract Jews to the area .

But a con

comitant occurrence has been to deprive the Arab majority of some of
their land and o f equal rights to ownership, employment , and resi
dence on land controlled by Jews.

Arab land was expropriated in

various ways by the JNF to accommodate Jewish development and Arabs
cannot own businesses or live on that land.

This program , which is

still being implemented, illustrates how Israel ' s commitment to in
creasing the Jewishness of the state means violating the rights of
non-Jews .
Education
An

essential basis for improving the position of any group within

a given society is equal education.

The commitment of the Israeli

government to providing such education to Arabs and Oriental Jews is
then, a crucial test of the state ' s intentions.
Arab population, Israel has failed that test .
15% of Israel ' s population .

In regard to the
In 1975, Arabs were

At the elementary school leve l , Arabs

made up 20% of all school children.

By secondary schoo l , this figure

drops to 7 . 7% and then to 2% at sub-university institutions.

In Is

raeli universities , Arabs amount to only 1 . 8% of the student popula
tion.
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Also, only 6 . 3% of financial assistance to university stu

dents goes to Arabs, and 0 . 2% of students receiving aid are Arabs .
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David Ben-Gurion offered the typical Israeli explanation for such
differences when he stated that Arab education had not reached the
Jewish level because the Arab population and authorities had not
shown the same interest in fostering education and in taking on the
- 58 -
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.
.
necessary financial burdens.

It is pointed out that every

recognized Arab settlement has a school bu•
; ld•
; ng
·

5

Arab children between the ages of
schools where Arabic is used.

88

and

14

87

and that all

go to state primary

While it is true the Israelis have

made efforts to improve Arab education,

their success in providing

equal education cannot be demonstrated statistically.

Also,

the

lower income and larger family size of Arab households prohibits them
from undertaking the

financial burdens Ben-Gurion claimed to be

necessary.
Another important factor is that the educational system is
biased against Arab students ,

Arab chil-

making progress difficult.

dren must attend the state secular schools while Jewish children have
the option of attending the secular or rel�gious school s ,
supported.

89

all state

Israeli high school is incredibly difficult,

student taking about

14

subj ects ,

with each

going to school six days a week,

and preparing four to five hours of homework each day.
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Few chil-

dren from underprivileged backgrounds could be reasonably expected to
do well under such a system.
favors Jewish students.
the Bible as the Koran .
English in that order .

The curriculum in Israeli schools also

Six times as many hours are spent studying
91

An Arab child studies Arabic,

A Jewish child studies Hebrew ,

i s then given a choice of Arabic or French.

92

Hebrew,

English ,

Actually,

only

Israeli university students have Arabic as second language .

93

has created a language barrier within the educational system.

and
and

4%

of

This
Arabs

claim that their schools must teach Zionism from a Jewish perspective ,
that Arab children learn their history through a negative perspective
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and that school books are biased in favor o f the Jewish position on
political issue s .

94

There is also the claim that Arab school facil-

ities and teachers are inferior.
average pupil/teacher ratio is
25 to 1 .
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Also,

For example,

31

to

1,

in Arab schools the

while in Jewish schools it is

half the teachers in Arab regions of Israel are un-

.
.
96
.
.
trained compared to l6 % in
Jewish
regions.
In addition to inequalities in the education system,
factor must be considered.

another

Ben-Gurion was at least partially correct

when he stated that Arab families were less interested in education
than Jewish ones.

A major reason is that the achievement of a com-

plete education by Arabs is not often seen to be worthwhile economically.

An Arab with education equivalent to a Jew cannot compete

equally in the Jewish controlled econQmic sector or in government
because of cultural,

lingui stic ,

and social differenc e s ,

even without

An Arab youth may not complete his edu-

considering discrimination .

cation because he must get a job to help his economically disadvantaged family or because the limited economic benefits he may derive
from education are not
equal education system.

worth

the struggle through the biased and un-

It can be seen that in Israe l , th�re has been

created a cycle of discrimination in education,

employment,

and

standard of living that forces Arabs into the role of second-class
citizens within the Jewish state .
Not only Arabs ,
discrimination .

but Oriental Jews also suffer under this

The Compulsory Education Act of 1949 provided for

free and compulsory education for all children 5

to

13.

Tuition

was charged for secondary schools which were not compulsory.
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This

made secondary school attendance difficult for Orientals,
their lower incomes and larger families,
grants were available.

considering

even though some tuition

The examination system also creates problems

for disadvantaged children.

At 14 ,

a nationwide exam is given,

sue-

cess on which entitles students to benefit from the tuition grants .
Those who go on to complete secondary school must take a matricula.
. fy for hig
tion
exam at age 17 to qua 11
. her e ducation.
.
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The system is

a very selective one in which only the IIKJst qualified students can
succeed.

Those not passing the qualifying exam for secondary school

can go on to a vocational or agricultural school .

Howeve r ,

the aca-

demic secondary school is the main avenue to white collar occupations
while the vocational
pational levels.
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schools tend to prepare children for lower occuIn

1957-58,

43% of the students

from European and

American backgrounds attained the highest level on the secondary
school exam,

30 . 4% of the Israeli-born did,

African students did.
the lowest category.

and 16 . 8% of Asian and

63% of the Asian-African students

fell into
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Recognizing these problems,

the Israeli government instituted

many reforms in the early 1960 ' s designed to improve education for
Oriental Jews .

These included subsidizing nursery programs ,

ing the compulsory age
families,

lower-

for kindergarten children from low income

extending the school day for low income childre n ,

estab-

lishing seventy special classes to help children with difficulties
due to psychalogical-social background ,

developing a special program

of aid and scholarships through the Jewish Agency,

increasing

extracurricular activities in slum areas , providing selective
- 61 -

intensive aid to children of low socio-economic status or in remote
areas , setting up 16 boarding schools to mitigate the effects of an
unsupportive home environment , lowering standards for Oriental students to increase their eligibility for state aid in post-primary
education, and grouping for particular subjects while maintaining
. . 101
. 1 unit
the c 1ass as a socia
The net effect of these reforms has been limited.

For example,

in 1966, after the reforms , 75% of students with Western parents
passed the secondary schools ' placement test while two thirds of
Oriental students failed it.
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Between 1963 and 1970, the per-

centage of 14 to 17 year old students of Asian-African origins increased from 27% to 44% while the corresponding ra�e for EuropeanAmerican went from 60% to 76% showing that the gap was not substan103
.
. 11y decreased during
.
that time .
tia
Israe1i. citizens
who are i· 11 iterate
.
. .
·

Oriental Jews make up 84% of

104

In 1975, Oriental Jewish

children made up 63% of all children entering kindergarten .

At the

eighth grade level they constituted 42% of the student population
and were 28% o f those that graduated from 12th grade .

Orientals

were about 19% of those that entered universities , and made up 7%
of students receiving bachelors degrees, 5% of those earning masters
degrees , and only 3% of the doctorate degree recipients .
The Israelis explain these continuing differences by lack of
motivation, intellectual inferiority, an Oriental preference to
purchase consumer goods rather than pay for education, and a lack
of community leadership and commitment .

They also claim that budget

problems , teacher shortages , and lack of adequate facilities have
- 62 -

.
s 1owed imp
1 ementation
.
o f the re forms .
Jews face the same problems
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However ,

the Oriental

in dealing with the education system as

The lower income and higher housing overcrowding among

do Arabs .

Orientals contribute greatly to educational difficultie

� . 107

The

schools in development towns and slum areas inhabited by Oriental
families are inferior to schools in the established towns and suburbs .
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The curriculum is heavily slanted toward Europeans and

teachers are predominantly of Western origin.
75% of all teachers are Western
Western.

110
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In secondary schools

and in the universities ,

are

99%

The highly selective nature of the education system,

the expenses involved,

and the Western domination of it

discriminate

against both lower income people and those from Eastern cultures .
Reforms in education policy have not really improved the relative
situation of Oriental Jews in Israe l .

This cannot be completely

explained by the social and cultural inadequacies of the Orientals .
Inequality in income and occupations contribute to this condition .
Students from Asia and Africa have succeeded in other countries ,
there is no inherent reason why they cannot succeed in Israel.
instance ,

,

so
For

there are 15000 North African Jews on the faculties o f

schools in France .

In Israe l ,

there are

111
.
. .
students in
the universitite
s.
.

fewer North African Jewish

The statistics and the type of

system in place both indicate the existence of discrimination in
education on the basis of race ,

since it affects both Arabs and

Jews of Asian-African origin.
Political Representation
One consequence of the educational and economic inferiority of
- 63 -

both Israeli Arabs �d Oriental Jews ,
Lipset,

according to Seymou� _ Martin

is an inability to politically organize around their needs

and interests.
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This is especially critical ,

since Lipset real-

ized that political participation and power are the only ways to
113
.
' society.
o f Israe l i
bring
a
.
the strati
' fication
'
.
.
bo ut changes in
It is correct that Israeli Arabs and Oriental Jews have not
organized e f fectively within the Israeli political
are not equally represented in the government.

framework,

and

The small number of

Arabs and Oriental Jews holding gove rnment employment has. already
been cited.
In 1 9 7 6 ,
ters .
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The situation regarding elected positions is similar.

Arabs had six seats in the Knesset and no Cabinet minisA correct porportion according to their weight in the

population would have been 18 Knesset members and 3 ministers.
fac t ,

no Arab has ever held a Cabinet position in Israel.
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In
Also ,

Arabs are not nominated to serve on the Knesset standing committee
116
.
.
on de fense and foreign a ffairs .
The position of Oriental Jews in the Israeli political system is
not much bette r .

They participate in politics about a s much as Euro

pean Jews but receive less

for their efforts .

117

Orientals make up

13% of the Knesset membership although they represent 60% of the
population .

118

Leonard Fein has concluded that Jews of Eastern ori-

gin have never been e ffectively incorporated into the system,

primar-

ily because Westerners have a monopoly on the positions of leaqer119
.
ship.
It is not simply educational and economic inferiority that has
created this situation.

Jews in Palestine were better prepared for
- 64 -

self-government than Arabs through the· training they received under
the British mandate.

Jews were allowed to set up a Community Gov-

ernment which was given authority over the Jewish community ' s internal affairs.

The system consisted of an elected Assembly,

as the legislature;
sessions;

a National Council,

serving

which acted between Assembly

and an Executive Council which performed administration for

the Community Government.

Over 20 political parties participated in

the four Community Government elections under the mandate,

establish-

ing the tradition of proportional representation before the existence
of Israel.

Also,

tax in 1927,
programs.

enabling it to carry out public services and social

120

date years.

the Community Government was granted the power to

Arabs were allowed no such institution during the manThis gave the Jews a great advantage,

having control

over a quasi-govern.mental institution at the time Israel was created.
The type of political system and actions of political parties
also serve to restrict the political opportunities of Arabs and
Oriental Jews.

In Israel's proportional representation system,

l�tical parties are the only vehicle to elective office.
parties,

po-

Jewish

dominated by Europeans, were in a superior position in

Israel's early years due to their mandate experience and because of
the use of Emergency Regulations to restrict the activities of Arab
political leaders.

Established Israeli political parties also act

as social agencies in assisting their members to obtain housing,
ployment, and' other services.

em-

Parties use this power along with

distributing their own newspapers and adjusting their positions on
issues to attract ethnic groups to their ranks.
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These advantages

and powers have contributed to the fact that there is no party
primarily oriented toward the interests of Oriental Jews .
also no independent Arab party in Israe1.
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About 50% of the

Oriental population is a ffiliated with the Labor Party,
the ruling Likud bloc,
In this

situation,

There is

30% with

and the rest divided am)ng smaller parties .

Arabs and Orientals must vote for candidates

chosen by the established political parties which are not closely
aligned with their interests and do not often choose candidates of
their race .

Even when Arabs or Orientals are

elected to the Knesset ,

the parliamentary system forces them to follow the positions of their
party .

Since all the major parties except the Communists are domi

nated by Europeans and strongly committed to Zionist ideal s ,

it is

unlikely that an Arab or an Oriental or a person expressing radical
ideas could rise to a high party position.

With the Zionist· princi

ple of the Jewish state dominating politics in Israe l ,

it is not

clear i f an Arab should be allowed an important government position,
and the Israeli government has not tested that question yet.

In

essence, the governmental system has made it very difficult for Arabs
and Oriental Jews to form political parties of their own ,
the established Zionist partie s ,

and within

they are co-opted into instrumental

participation without real influence in decision making.
Israel and its supporters have countered such arguments by
claiming �hat the proportional representation system takes longer to
respond to cnanges in the electorate ' s composition,

but that Arab

and Oriental participation in local government i s an indication of
coming change .

For example ,

in

1948
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there was only one non-Jewish

By 1968, there were 45 Arab and Druze local counc i l s ,

local council .

4 8 self-governing Bedouin tribes .

75% of the non-Jewish population

lived under its own local government compared· to 27% before 1948.
Also,

�he number of Orientals among Jewish members of local govern

ment councils

increased from 15% in 1950 to 44% in 1 9 6 7 .

figures represent significant gains

,

local government .

However,

Israel ' s

122

These

for Israeli ethnic groups in
centralized government and pro-

portional representation system limit the effect of these gains .
Since the national government controls public spending and administers social programs ,

local government is not in a position to

ercise significant powers.

Also,

ex-

the proportional representation

system allows parties rather than geographic areas to choose national
representative s .

Participation and achievement i n local government

are not as effective a vehicle for obtaining national office under
the proportional representation system as they are in a
tern.

federal sys-

The increased representation of Arabs and Oriental Jews in lo-

cal government does not necessarily mean they have or will have increased influence on policy making or administration�

Again,

it

probably serves to co-opt them into the existing system and reduce
their demands
Political

for change .
rep resentation seems to follow the discriminatory

pattern visible in nearly all areas of Israeli life.

The system in-

hibits meaningful participation of Arabs and Oriental Jews by the
advantages that exist for European Jews .
simple coincidence .

This pattern cannot be a

The policies o f the state o f Israel are con-

sciously designed to follow the ideas inherent in Zionist ideology
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and have resulted in the creation o f racist institutions.
Culture and Public Attitudes
Underlying this institutional discrimination is the belief in
the cultural inferiority of both Arabs and Oriental Jews.

Zionist

attitudes toward Arabs are typical of those felt by all colonial
powers toward the native population.

The European immigrants that

formed the state of Israel have always considered themselves part of
the Western world and established institutions and social structures
based on Western values .

The economic success o f the Zionists in

Israel made them feel they had achieved progress and brought benefits
to the area that the existing Arab population was incapable o f .
the Arabs

found themselves a minority in a society vastly different

than their traditional way of life ,
easily .

When

they did not adjust quickly or

The inherent racial bias in the institutions and structure

of Israeli society discussed previously contributed greatly to Arab
problems .

Combining these attitudes and occurrences has allowed

Israel to create a myth of Arab inferiority and to dehumanize their
culture .

Negative stereotypes regarding Arabs have been internal-

ized bv Israeli society.

For instance , the expression "Arab ' s work "

is a coll'II1¥)n derogatory statement in Israel describing incompetence or
lack of

skill

in the performance

of task s .

123

A 1971 survey by

Yochanan Peres showed that 80% of the sample of Israeli Jews agreed
that "Arabs will not reach the level of progress of Jews . "
ferred to see

·

90% pre-

fewe r Arabs in Israel and 90% agreed that "Arabs under-

stand only force . "

124

Opinion polls by Louis Harris and local organ-

izations continually show that the majority of Israeli Jews regard
- 68 -

Arabs as inferior people .

125

The components of the social system

reinforce these negative feelings by preventing Arabs from gaining
access to the good things in the society while giving d«ninant Jews
an ideological defense for their assumed superiority.
A statement by Israeli Jew Vitold Yadlitzky explains much about
this relationship .

He said,

I am a Polish Jew and a former Nazi
prisoner.
I went through some of the
worst experiences of the Holocaust .
My quite salient memory of those times
is the memory of popular anti-Semitism
in Eastern Europe . Some typical expres
sions of this popular anti-Semitism
were , for instance, the stories of Jewish
mentality, expressions , such as , ' the
Jew understands only the language of
money , ' or 'the Jew understands only the
language of force , ' or ' the Jew is the
fellow you cannot trust. • · All these
things I hear again and again in this
country , with the exception that this is
not in Polish but in Hebrew, and instead
of the word ' Jew ' , the word '·Arab'
appears. 126
There are several current manifestations of the Jewish attitude
of superiority toward Arabs other than opinion polls .
.
. · 1 marriage or divorce
.
I sreal .
there is no civi
in
.

127

.

For example,
Allowing only

religious marriage means that a Jew cannot marry a non-Jew, prohibiting Arabs from joining the mainstream of society through marriage .
The establishment of the Ministry of Minorities and of Arab departments in all government agencies has tended to strengthen the Arab
feeling that

�hey

are somehow different than Jews .
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Also, Arabs

are not allowed to serve in the Israeli Army because they are not
trusted to be loyal.

129

This combined with memories of the military
- 69 -

government , further adds to the separation of Jewish from Arab
culture in Israe l .

Government policy and public attitudes have

inevitably become a self-fulfilling prophecy by doing little or
nothing to foster a positive Arab orientation toward Israe l .

In

fact , they have created hostility among Arabs toward Jewish society
because it regards them as strange and rejects them from a major
role in the society .

The feelings of envy and inferiority among

Arabs result from their lower economic status and from what is considered to be a lower cultural status.

This is especially dangerous

considering the former majority position of the Arabs in what is now
Israe l .

Zionist ideology and Israeli government policy are major

factors in deteriorating the relationship between Jews and Arabs in
Israel.
However, this relationship has not developed merely along
religious lines , but also along racial lines .

Oriental Jews are

also viewed as inferior by those of European-American origin.

Uri

Avneri, newspaper editor and former Knesset member , has written
that the inferiority of Oriental Jews is a familiar attitude in Is.
130
rael i. conversation.

American anthropologist Raphael Patai sum-

marized the feelings of Western Israelis toward Oriental Jews in
this way :
In addition to instability, emotionalism,
impulsiveness, unreliability and incompetence,
the Oriental Jew is accused by European
born Israelis of habitual lying and cheating,
la.iiness , uncontrolled temper, superstitious
ness, childishness, lack of cleanliness and
in general ' primitivity' and ' lack of
culture . • 131
The term "cushi ' is often apJ?.lied to Oriental Jews in much the same
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way

II

• n the United state s .
is used i

•

nigger 11

•

132

•

Since the society is

dominated by the values and customs of the Western world,
tions of the Oriental Jews are viewed as strange.
religious rituals .

the tradi-

This even affects

The rituals practiced by Western Jews are con-

sidered by the government to be the official· and proper �ne s ,

while

those practiced by Orientals are considered deviations that the
government allows to take place under the principle of religious
dom.
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Golda Meir once said that ,

"Anyone who doesn ' t speak Yiddish

(the traditional dialect of European Jews)
fect Jew . 11
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free-

is not a complete or per

This means that in the opinion of a former Prime

Minister that at least 60%

of Israel ' s population cannot be con-

sidered "complete or perfect Jews " .
One result of this attitude is the attempt to absorb Oriental
Jews into the society through assimilation.

Patai. and others have

stated that a major aim of Israeli absorption policy is to completely
reeducate Orientals to shape their social life along the lines of the
.
135
.
.
existing
va1ues and institutions
in
the European image .
.
.
.
.

One

reason for this is to minimize potentially disruptive effects caused
by the mixing of cultures .

The fact that Orientals outnumber the

Europeans constitutes a threat to the cultural foundations established by the Zionists.
according to Patai .

This policy has been fairly successful

The Orientals have given up traditional cul-

tural practices such as polygamy ,

d

itinerant pe dling,

child marriage ,

and traditional handicrafts .

female illiteracy,
The patriarchal,

extended family concept is on the way out and fertility is being
controlled more than in the past.
-
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The use of old costume s ,

utensils,

folk medicines , amulets, and folk arts have virtually disappeared .
Western forms have replaced the traditional features o f Oriental
culture.
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Howeve r , some have claimed there is more to the reeducation o f
the Oriental Jews than just to stabilize the society and eliminate
outmoded practice s .

I t can b e interpreted a s part of the overall

scheme to place and maintain Western Jews in a position of superiority within Israel.

·Remodeling the Oriental Jews to conform to the

society shaped by the early Zionists perpetuate s the institutions and
values that were created for and function to the benefit of Western
Jews .

It is ironic that the early Zionists considered assimilation

into existing societies as an unacceptable alternative because it
would not provide equal opportunities for Jews and would destroy
their . culture .

Yet this same unacceptable policy is now being used

by Israel in its treatment of Oriental Jews .
exactly what the early Zionists predicte_d .

The result has been
Oriental Jews have not

gained equal opportunities in any area of Israeli society and their
culture has been radically changed.

This has caused much resentment

among Orientals who have conformed to the dominant group as they were
expected to but have not been able to derive benefits accordingly.
Now , the objective factors of inequality are continuing to forge an
ethnic identity in Israel that the absorption policy sought to
eliminate .
�

In every aspect of Israeli society, racial discrimination exists .
Arabs and Oriental Jews are in an inferior position to Jews of Westem origin.

The policies and practices of the Israeli government and
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other maj or institutions have not worked to address these racial
differences and move toward equality .

Present racial inequalities

cannot be sufficiently explained by initial differences in the
characteristics o f the racial groups in the society .
The intention o f Zionism was always to create a state under Jewish
control and the movement was always dominated by European people
who negotiated and fought with European nations to implement that
plan.

The policies of the government of Israel have been designed,

in the most p ar t , to protect and maintain the Jewishness o f the
state and to continue and enhance its connection to the Western
worl d .

The result has been that non-Jews and non-Westerners , who

usually face an initial comp e t it ive qisadvantage because o f their
backgrounds , are necessarily relegated to second class citizen
status in order that the aims o f Zionism be carried out .

Israeli

ideology and policy work consciously to insure that to be a Jew from
Europe or America is ipso facto to be a member of a more prestigious
group than others in the society .

This is the true implementation

o f Zionism and serves to protect the position o f the existing
dominating e l i t e .
Early Zionist Land Gains
In order for the Zionists t o achieve the goal of establishing a
Jewish state, i t was , o f course, necessary for them t o acquire land.
This became especially essential when mass immigration to Palestine
began.

In 1900, it is e s t imated that 5 0 , 000 Jews lived in Palestine.

By 1 9 1 8 , the figure rose to 7 0 , 000 and by 1939 , to almost half a mil
lion, which accounted for 30% o f the population o f Pales tine.
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This

percentage remained stable up to the time o f Israel ' s
. hment.
establis
them,

13 7
·

.
To obtain the land necessary to accommodate

Jews used a variety of means .

The most common method was

to purchase land from large landowner s ,
owners,

many of them absentee

and then evicting the resident farmers.

It purchased its first land

Jewish National Fund was established.
in 190 5 .
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During the British mandate period,
increased from under 50 to over 250 .
only

To this end, the

6 . 6%

the number of Jewish villages
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Howeve r ,

o f the total land area in Palestine .
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by 1 9 4 7 ,

Jews owned

This amount was

not sufficient to furnish all Jews in Palestine with the kind of
independence and self-sufficiency envisioned by the Zionists .

But

a 1917 document indicates that the Zionists were interested in more
than a homeland to provide self- suffic iency for Jews .

The "Outline

of the Program of Jewish Resettlement of Palestine in Accordance
with the Aspirations of the Zionist Movement"
ish government said,

submitted to the Brit-

"The suzerain government shall sanction a for-

mation of a Jewish company for the colonization of Palestine
the Jews . "
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the British ,

The

fact that the Zionist movement was supported by

through the Balfour Declaration,

onization even more.

made Arabs fear col-

Chaim Weizmann admitted that the Zionists

. h ai
. d because they were
sought Eng 1 is
Avnery stated that

for

.
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.
"superior co 1 onizers . "

Uri

"Zionism was essentially a colonizing movement . "

One indication of Zionist intentions and attitudes is that acquisition of land in Palestine by Jews has always been described as
"redeeming" or "liberating" the land.
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The implications of these

143

terms were humiliating to the Arabs and increased their su9picions
regarding Zionist intentions .

Prior to Israel ' s creation, Zionist

claims used to j ustify Jewish immigration to Palestine and the
eventual development of a homeland there were typical of other colonial powers .

When Arabs protested the increasing Jewish presence

in Palestine, the Zionists responded by saying that they were bringing civilization to the land, that the natives had neglected the
land, that discriminatory acts were only temporary until equality
could realistically be established, that the natives were not interested in politics, and that native unrest was artificially agitated.
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The pattern of mass immigration, support of a Western power,
acquisition of land, and justification of actions seen in the Jewish
movement to Palestine is typical of most colonial movements and set
the basis for the type of state Israel was to be.
Expansion and Consolidation of Zionist Control ,
On November

27;

1947,

the United Nations resolved to partition

Palestine into two states, one Jewish, one Arab .
allocated

The Jewish were

square kilometers and the Arab state ,

1 4 , 920

k1' lometers . 145

1947-1967

11 , 000

square

It is evidence o f the r�markable political power of

the Zionists that they were allocated such a large share of Palestine when Jews comprised only
6 . 6%

o f its land.

30%

of the population and owned only

The Jews accepted the UN resolution but the Arabs

did not, and'the result was military confrontation .

The war af-

forded the Zionists an opportunity to gain land that they had been
unable to acquire through purchase.
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David Ben-Gurion claimed that

Arab opposition t o the UN resolution partitioning Palestine
eliminated Israeli obligations to stay within the borders set in
1

.

the reso ution.

1 46

In fact, Israel did not , adding 2500 square

miles of territory to that assigned by the UN to the Jewish state .
Also, Jordan acquired 2200 square miles and Egypt obtained the Gaza
strip as a result of the fighting.

Over one million Arabs were dis-

placed by the war with 450 , 000 incorporated into Jordan , 150 , 000 remaining in Israe l , and 600 , 000 bec.oming refugees .

Of the refugees ,

56% went t o Jordan, 1 1% to Syria, 1 1% to Lebanon , and 22% to Gaza.
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As discussed in Chapter 1 , Israel has continually claimed that

it is not responsible for the Arab displaceme n t .

Howeve r , i t appears

that in the process o f expanding the area under Zionist control , the
Israelis took deliberate actions designed to remove Arabs in order
to clear the way for Jewish settlement .

The massacre at Deir Yassin,
Later in

also noted in Chapter 1 , is one example of such actions.

1948 , similar incidents took place at the villages of Ramle and Lydda .
However , these cases were slightly different in that instead o f being
carried out by a radical splinter group such as Begin ' s Irgun , these
were conducted by official Israeli forces o f the Haganah .

In fact,

the forces involved were under the general supervision of Yigal
Allon , with Moshe Dayan in direct command .

In both cases, Dayan ' s

forces attacked by driving directly into city stree ts .

The panic

and terror caused by such. tactics led to the departure of all villagers from the area.
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Nathan Choshi , an Israeli p ionee r , said in

Jewish News letter in 1959 tha t ,
We old Jewish settlers in Palestine
who witnessed the flight could tell
- 76 -

him how and in what manner we Jews forced
the Arabs to leave cities and village s , . . .
some of them were driven out by force;
others were made to leave by deceit , lying,
and false promises.
It is enough to cite
the cities of Jaffa, Lydda, Ramle , Beersheba ,
Acre, from among numberless others. 111 49
Zionist intentions and actions during the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49
were consciously designed and carried out to expand the area under
their control and reduce the number of Arabs in that area.
Following Israel ' s defeat of Arab forces and the establishment
of the state, it embarked on a plan to increase Jewish control of
land within its boundaries .

A series of government action and legis-

lation combined to form a policy of land expropriation that transferred much of the land owned by Arabs to Jewish ownership.
In 1948, Israel _started setting up machinery to deal with
unoccupied land by appointing a general custodian of absentee property.

In 1950 , the Knesset established a development authority.

The Development Authority Law stipulated that the Authority could
release property under its control only to the State, to agencies
representing Arab refugees within Israel , or to local governments,
with the condition that it first be offered for sale to the Jewish
National Fund.

In 1953 , the general custodian of absentee property

turned over all land under his control to the development authority .
Much of this land, along with some "state land" was then sold to the
JNF.

State land was land seized by Israel that was .considered not

to belong to 'anyone.

Later, all state land and JNF land was de-

clared to be national land.

This completed a complicated process by

which about 92% of the total area of Israel has come to be .owned by
- 77 -

the government and the

A United Nations Cormnission estimated

JNF .

that over four million dunums of Israeli land was originally the
property of Palestinian refugees, although there is not enough de. f ormation to mak e an exact estimate. 150
tai1 ed in
.

·

.

Another indication

as to the extent of Israeli land acquisitions is that of the 803
Arab villages in Palestine in 194 5 , only 104 existed in 1971.
350

o�

Also,

370 new Jewish settlements established from 1948 to 1953 were

on absentee property.
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All of this land was not acquired by taking control of abandoned
areas.

Israel devised and implemented a legislative program that

enabled the government to expropriate Arab land.

The Absentee ' s

Property Law of 1950 transferred the property of absentees to the
custodian mentioned earlier.

The significance of the law is in the

following definition of "absentee:"
the period between

.

•

.

A person who, at any time during

November 2 9 , 1 9 4 7 , and the day on which a

declaration is published

•

.

.

that the state of emergency declared

by the Provisional State Council

.

•

.

on May 1 9 ,

1948 has ceased to

exist (the state of emergency is still officially in effect to
this day) was a legal owner of property situated in the area of
Israel or enjoyed or held it, whether by himself or through another,
and who, at any time during the said period- i) was a national or
citizen of Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan, Iraq,
or the Yemen, or ii)

was in one of these countries or in any part

�

of Palestine outside the area of Israel, or iii)

was a Palestinian

citizen and left his ordinary place of residence in Palestine a)
for a place outside Palestine before September 1 , 1948 or- b ) for a
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place in Palestine held at the time by forces which sought to
prevent the establishment of the state of Israel or which fought
against it after its establishment.

The dates used in the defini-

tion mean that virtually all Ar� villages eventually occupied or
annexed by Israel were in an area that could be included under the
definition.

The definition also meant that any Arabs forced out

by circumstances of war or who left for a trip to a neighboring
village could be declared an absentee and have their property confiscate
.
d by the custodian.
'
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The custodian has the power to issue

certificates as to who is an absentee,

and such certificates have

the effect of law unless it can be proven to be incorrect.

Also,

the law provides that custodians cannot be questioned about the
sources of information involved in issuing a certificate.

Another

article of the law says that
any transaction made in good

faith between

the custodian and another person,

in re

spect of property which the custodian con
sidered at the time to be vested property
shall not be invalidated and shall remain
in force even if it is proved that the
property was not at the time vested prop

erty . 153
So,

even if the custodian was proven incorrect in designating prop-

erty as absentee,

the inj ured party could not reclaim his land if the

custodian has sold,

transferred,

or disposed of it in any way.

It

was possible for land owners to obtain a release o f their property
by making a �equest and securing the consent of a government cornrnittee.

However,

. h success.
wit
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this was a complicated procedure which seldom met
As stated previously,

the custodian of absentee

property turned over the land under his control to the development
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authority in 195 3 , insuring that it would be used for Zionist
purposes and not be returned to its original owners.
Another law used in land expropriation was Article 125 of the
1945 Defense Regulations .

These regulations were part of the mili-

tary government used in Israel until 1966.

Article 125 allowed

military governors to declare areas "closed" for security reasons .
Once such a declaration was made , access to the area was restricted
to those with written permits approved by the army chief of staff or
the Minister of Defens e .

The Article gave Israel great power in pre-

venting Arabs who had fled or been expelled from their villages dur
ing the fighting from returning home .
The Emergency ( Security zones)

1 55

Regulations of 1949 were also

important in the military government procedure, and were extended to
1972.

This law gave the Minister of Defense the powe r to designate

"security zones " with approval from the Foreign Affairs and Security
Committee of the Knesset .

The security zones differed from closed

areas in that , not only was access restricted by permi ts , but pe rmanent residents could be required to leave by the authorities .

A

special committee was set up to hear appeals of orders to leave .
However , the appeals committee has never reversed a military order
removing residents from security zones.

It is interesting to note

the areas that were designated security zone s .
Galilee

Almost half o f

( a northern section o f the country where 60% of Israel ' s

Arabs live) , ·all of the Triangle

( a central section which is the

home for 30% of the Arabs) , an area near the Gaza strip, and an area
156
.
zone s .
between Jaff a and Jerusa 1 em were made security
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It seems no coincidence that the zones were placed around Arab
population centers, but part of the overall Israeli plan to expropriate Arab lands to make room for Jews .
An example o f how these regulations were used. is . the village o f

Ikrit , the first village they were enforced against.
were removed from Ikrit on November

5,

1948

authority and told they could return in

15

The villagers

under the security zone

days .

That

15

days

lasted three years , leading to a series of appeals to various admininstrative offices and to the courts by the villagers .

In

1951,

the

Supreme Court ruled that there was no reason to prevent the return
of the villagers to Ikrit.

The military authorities failed to imple-

ment that decision and the villagers again appealed to the Supreme
Court, who agreed to hear the case in February ,
Christmas Day,

195 1 ,

195 2 .

However , on

the Israeli Army blew up every house in the

157
.
.
· 11 age, whic
" h was popul ated by Ch ristian
vi
Arabs .

The government

subsequently announced the expropriation of all the v.illage ' s
1and .
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The case of Kafr Berem is quite similar .

The village

was evacuated by the army at about the same time as Ikrit.
September,

1953,

In

the Supreme Court ordered the authorities to give

reasons for preventing the return of the villagers.

About two weeks

later, the infantry and air force attacked the village and completely
destroyed it.
government.
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The land of Kafr Berem was also taken over by the
In

197 2 ,

former residents of Ikrit and Kafr Berem

�

again appealed to be allowed to return home and were again denied
that right by the Meir government.

160

I

The fourth in the series of expropriation laws is the Emergency
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Regulations

(Cultivation of Waste Lands)

Ordinance of 1 9 4 9 .

This

allows the Minister of Agriculture to
assume control of the land in order to
ensure

its cultivation in cases where

he is not satisfied that the owner has
begun,

is about to begin ,

or will con

tinue to cultivate the land. 161

So,

at the Minister ' s discretion ,

he could seize any land in Israel .

Article 24 allowed the Minister to approve expropriation that resulted in the cultivation of untilled land,

even where it had been

taken without permission or before the law was passed.

The period of

time the Minister can hold this land has been extended to last as long
as the state of emergency exists ,

which is to say permanently.
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The Emergency Land Requisition Law of 1949 also assisted in
Israel ' s efforts to gain more land.
seize property when neces sary for
tion of inunigrants ,
vali
' ds . "
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This allowed the government to

"the public services ,

the absorp-

or the rehabilitation of ex-soldiers or war in-

This was used primarily in urban areas and was applied

.
164
. 1 y to housing.
main
Since these four laws never actually transferred land ownership,
but only affected who could use the land,
plete.

Israel ' s plan was not com-

The Land Acquisition Law of 1953 was passed to empower the

Minister of Finance to transfer the ownership of any expropriated
165
.
1and to the state of Israe l through the deve1 opment authority.
'
Article 2 stated that ,
nance,

with a certificate

from the Minister of Fi-

showing that the property was not in the possession of the

owners on Apri l ,

1952 ,

and that between May 1 4 ,

1948 and that date

"it was used or assigned fc;>r purposes of essential development ,
- 82
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settlement or security , " and ".is..: still needed for any of these
purposes , " l.
• t could be turned over to the deve1opment authority.
.

166

The Knesset rej ected a proposed amendment allowing owners who could
prove the certificates false to request annulment of the trans fer.
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This law completed the expropriation mechanisms of the Israeli government by taking the final step of transferring the actual ownership and by legalizing previous land acquisitions .
To make sure that, once �cquired, land would continue to be held
by Jews , the Knesset passed the Basic Law:

Israeli Lands in 1960 .

The two essential principles of this law illustrate clearly Zionist
intentions in regard to land.

They are as follows :

1 ) Jewish prop-

erty is inalienabl e ; land controlled by the state, the development
authority, or the JNF cannot be transferred to any non-Jew ; and
Only Jewish labor can be employed i n Zionist colonies.

2)

The purpose

of this whole series of legislation was to permanently expropriate
Arab land to serve the purposes of the Jewish state.

This is consis-

tent with the Zionist goal of providing a home for Jewish exiles in
the Diaspora.

However , it presupposes that Jews have a greater right

to property than non-Jews and creates a disc�iminatory system.

The

land gains of the Jewish immigrants and their control over its use
show how remarkably effective the Zionists have been in achieving
their goal s .

They also demonstrate that the state of Israel i s based

on the concept of colonialism, as Jewish inunigrants to Palestine have
built their society by dispossessing the native Arab population.
An extreme example of Israeli expansionism is the 1956 invasion

of the Sinai Peninsula by Israe l .
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When Egyptian President Nasser

Ill
announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal ,

Great Britain and

France used military intervention in an attempt to prevent that.

!;
.I

Israeli forces moved across the Egyptian border into the Sinai two
days before the Anglo-French invasion began .

The reasons behind

Israel ' s actions have never been made clear.

In 1956 ,

Israel was

facing no threats from any Arab state and had not been directly proVOked .

168

Some have theo rized that Israel intended to topple or at

least discredit Nasser.
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In any case,

Israel offensively attacked

a neighboring country without provocation.
Near unanimous world opposition to the military action was soon
made clear.

However,

only U . S .

pressure and the threat of economic

1 70
.
. thdraw its
.
forces .
sanctions convince
.
d Israe l to wi
tions ,

the Sinai campaign confirmed suspicions about the expansive

character of Israe l .
war,

To Arab na-

Israel demonstrated this character i n the 1949

expropriation of Arab land within Israel,

and in the Sinai in-

vasion of 1956.
The 1967 War and Its Consequences
It would be fruitless to evaluate the causes of the
War with the intention· to lay blame

1967 Six Day

for aggression on either side.

The Israelis claim that their air strikes and invasions were defensive actions to protect themselves from what they viewed as an imminent Arab attack on Israel .
threatening statements ,

Arab troop movements ,

military pacts ,

and the closing of the Straits of Tiran seem

to support that position .

However,

some believe that Israel real-

ized it was not threatened by attack because of their superior military position and that Arab actions were propaganda measures and not
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seriously aimed at an invasion of Israe l .

Vitold Yadlitzky, an

Israeli humanist, claims that Air Force Commander Ezer Weizmann,
Minister of Housing Mordechai Bentoff , military analyst Mattetyahu
Peled, and Chief o f Staff Chaim Bar-Lev all admitted that the General Staff did not fear an attack in 1967.

In fact, Weizmann (now

Defense Minister) , stated that Israel was pursuing "our legitimate
.
,1 71
.
.
the neighboring territories
.
interests
in
.'
.

.

In any case, the issue of who started the war has little bearing
Israel gained 2 6 , 000 square miles of Arab territory

on its results.
in the war.

172

Until 1979, it refused to return any of that land.

The area still held by Israel in Syria and Jordan coincides closely
.
173
.
.
. l desires
.
wit
. h the origina1 territoria
o f the Zionists.
.

.

Much of

this territory , especially the West Bank of the Jordan River and
Jerusalem, hold religious significance for Jews and is included in
the concept of "Eretz Israel " , referring to land supposedly promised
to Jews by God and which supposedly made up the ancient Jewish Kingdom in Palestine .

Former Minister of Interior Elisha Efrat de-

scribed the occupied territories as forming "part of the land of Is.
.
.
."
rae 1 in
its
natural boundaries
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To avoid the appearance of ex-

pansionism, Israel has claimed that holding the occupied territories
is neces sary for security reason s .

However, American Colonel Merill

A. McPeak wrote in Foreign Affairs that,

" Israel does not have a

strong case, on the narrow argument of its own physical security for
retaining any of the territory occupied after June 1967. 11

He ex-

plained that no set of borders was a great deal more secure than
those of pre-1967 and that security would be better found through
- 85 -

peace.
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The crucial test in determining Israel ' s expansionist

tendencies is its actual policies within the occupied territories
and its intentions for the future .

An impoq:ant indication of this

is the enforcement of the previously discussed military regulations
against the population of the occupied territories .

These allow

detention without trial , punitive curfew, deportation, destruction
176
.
.
of land .
of house s , and expropriation
The Sunday Times of London , June 19, 1977 reported on the use of
torture on Israeli prisoners in the territories , concluding that
"Torture is organized so methodically that it cannot be dismissed as
a handful of ' rogue cops ' exceeding orders .

It appears to be sanc

tioned at some level of deliberate policy . "

17 7

In addition t o violations of individual right s , Israel has been
accomplishing a de facto annexation of much of the occupied lands
through a variety of means .

It has been estimated that 15 , 000 homes

in the territori.es ;1ave been dest royed since 1967.

Israeli journal-

ist Ammon Kapeliouk reported in Le Monde May 1 5 , 1975 that 10 , 000
farmers and Bedouin had been driven off by Israeli soldiers, their
homes bulldozed and dynamited, their crops destroyed, and their wells
filled.
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The Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights reports

that from June 1 1 , 1967 to November 1 5 , 1969, 200,000 Arab homes in
Gaza and the West Ban
k were

dynamited
.

179
•

The villages of Yalu,

Anwas , Beit Nuba , and Nusairat , and camps at Jilik and Jericho were
�

destroyed by Israe l .

180

.
The effect of such actions on the

population in territories is not surprising.

During a five-month

period in 1968, 16 , 000 people left Gaza for the East Bank.
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Arab

181

Jordanian figures showed that in
East Bank.

Also,

between

1967

1970 , 428 , 669

and

1971,

Strip declined from

389 , 700

to

381 , 0 0 0 .

tion decreased from

740 , 000

in

1949

to

refugees fled into the

the population of the Gaza
In the West Bank ,

6 2 5 , 000

in

197 1 .

popula-

These fig-

ures are more significant when considering that both areas have birth
. hest .
rates among the wor ld ' s hig
have been similar.
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Israeli actions in Jerusalem

The Washington Post reported in

1977

that

Arabs had been evicted from the old city of Jerusalem since
make

room for Jews and to restore the Jewish Quarter there .

Dean of S t .

6 , 500
to

1968
183

The

George ' s Anglican Cathedral in Jerusalem criticized evic-

tion of Arabs and demolition of their homes in
was an indication that the Israelis

claiming that it

"will not tolerate the existence

of a single Arab family in the Jewish Quarter . "
Despite all this evidence ,

197 7 ,

184

Golda Meir maintained in her

autobiography that Arabs had not been mistreated in the territories .
She stated that there is no death penalty there ,
had been jailed,
been blown up,
were expelled.

only the houses of Arabs sheltering terrorists had

and only Arabs inciting and encouraging terrorists

185

As to expansionism,

entitled to dictate borders after the
The removal of population
opening to expropriate more
About

10 ,000

that only terrorists

Meir claimed that Israel was

1967

war.
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from the territories gave Israel an

land for the use of Jewish settler s .

Israelis now live in the occupied territories .

In

1975 ,

the Labor Government approved a plan . aiming at a Jewish population
there o f
tory in

30 , 000
1977

by

1982

and

60 , 000

by

1992.
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The Likud bloc vie-

brought in a new government that revised this plan
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somewhat.

But Minister o f Agriculture Ariel Sharon stated that

"the government will

first of all carry out the settlement plans

that have already been decided. "

His plan called for 2 million

settlers by the year 2000 and generally followed Labor ' s plan for
their placement .
River,

That was to consolidate the strip along the Jordan

populate the western slopes of Samaria,

and widen the Jeru-

188
'
sa1 em corridor .
The result of these policies has been the establishment of 65
settlements in the West Bank,
. ghts . 189
Golan Hel.

26 in the Gaza Strip,

' ts cont ro1 ,
In the two years of l.

and 26 in the
the Begin
.
govern-

ment has been responsible for 2 1 West Bank settlements,
t1 ements,

190
.
.
and one in the Golan Height
s.

4 Gaza set-

To compare the record

of the Labor government to the Likud in the territories ,

an average

of about 9 settlements per year were created in the 10 years of
Labor control,

while Likud has averaged 1 3 per year.

The Begin

government also took the important steps of legalizing the settlements and approving the Sharon plan.
In terms of land,
the West Bank alone ,
land,

191

Israel has made substantial acquisitions .

Israel has expropriated 4 2 5 , 200 acre s .

In

O f this

50% was acquired through taking over public domain lands

formerly belonging to Jordan ,

20% was declared absentee property ,

10% was expropriated by designating land as closed areas ,
was purchased.

and 20%

192

The actions of Israel in enforcing the Emergency Regulations ,
taking over land,

establishing settlements,

and facilitating popula-

tion transfers violates several international agreements and has
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been condemned by the United Nation s .

UN resolution 194 o f

..

December, 1948 called for the return of Palestinian refugees to
their homes , which Israel has continually prevented .

Their ac-

tions clearly violate the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

Article 49 states that ,
Individual or mass forcible transfers,
as well as deportations of protected
persons from occupied territory to the
territory of the Occupying Power or to
that of any other country , occupied or
not are prohibited, regardless of their
The occupying power shall not
motive .
deport or transfer parts of its own
civilian population into the territory
it occupies.

And Israel has also violated Article 5 3 , which reads ,
Any destruction by the Occupying Power
of real or personal property belonging
individually or collectively to private
persons , or to the state , or to other
public authorities , or to social or
cooperative organizations is permitted.
On June 14 , 196 7 , the UN passed Resolution 237 , calling on
Israel to
ensure the safety, welfare , and security of
the inhabitants of the areas where military
operations have taken place and to facilitate
the return of those inhabitants who have fled
since the outbreak of hostilities.
In no way has Israel complied with this resolution, and in fact , its
activities have worked to achieve opposite result s .

The UN Security

Council, with U . S . concurrenc e , expressed this view November 11 ,
1976, saying it "strongly deplores" Israeli policies in the occupied
territories , calling them "an obstacle to peace " .

It expressed

"grave anxiety and concern over the present serious situation in the
- 89 -

occupied territories as a result of continued Israeli occupation . "
The statement called on Israel to comply with the Geneva Convention
in administering the territories.

The Security Council also said,

"the measures taken by Israel in the occupied Arab territories that
alter demographic composition or geographical nature and particularly the establishment of settlements are strongly deplored. "

It

also termed the expropriation o f land and the transfer of popula.
'
.
tions inval id.
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Israel has also used direct means to facilitate its control
over occupied Arab territory.

Its manipulation of the economic re-

lationship with the West Bank and Gaza was discussed,
viously.

in part,

pre-

Israeli economic policy in the occupied territories,

particularly the West Bank,

seems to be aimed at exploiting their

various economic sectors to suit Israeli needs and a t increasing
their reliance on Israel for economic health.

For example,

the

number of Palestinian Arabs working in Israel increased from
in

1968

to

75 , 000

in

1974.

This means that about

1/3

6 , 000

o f the labor

' .
194
.
.
.
. d territories depends on Israel for a l iving.
force in
th e occupie
A contributing factor in this transfer is that Israeli land expropriation has forced many farmers to seek other work.

Th9se remaining

in farming work under regulations issued by Ministry of Agriculture
directing West Bank farmers to pJ..ant crops for the Israeli market .
Seven agricultural committees were set up to supervise production so

.

as to prevent competition and to meet Israeli market demands.

195

A

major result of this was to increase the West Bank's usefulness to
and dependence upon the Israeli economy.
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To extract benefits from

other sectors, the government allows Israelis opening new businesses
in occupied lands to qualify for loans of up to 50% of working capital at 9% interest

(low in Israel) and requires investors to put

up only 20% of the total capital.

This has increased industrial pro

duction, but primarily for the benefit of the occupying power.

196

The "Guidelines for Regional and Physical Planning" by Elisha
Efrat of the Interior Ministry illustrate Israel's intentions
clearly.
The underlying ideas of the Master Plan
development of agriculture for ex
are:
port, the urban development of Jerusalem
and its satellites with a proportional
growth of the various other towns in the
area and their adequate industrialization;
the settlement of the unpopulated Jordan
valley and the Dead Sea area and making it
arable; the expansion of agriculture wher
ever possible; utilization of available
groundwater resources; the clearance of
slums and refugee camps; the development
of the economic . rural functions of the
bigger villages ; the improvement of inland
and air communications; the utilization of
the tourist potential of the area for the
benefit of the entire country; and the de
velopment of the periphery of Samaria and
Judea the West gank so that it may become
integrated with the rest of the country.
Obviously, Israeli policy is to expand its borders permanently
by a wide variety of tactics.

Military action, land expropriation,

population transfer, and economic control form a comprehensive policy

that cannot be coincidental.

A crucial point in this is not

simply the e�ansion itself, but the way in which it is occurring.
Israel's methods are typical of the pattern set by the great colonial powers.

The facts show that Israel is expanding the area under
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its control ,

and doing so in colonial style .

The Refugee Problem
The refugees created by the 1948 and 196 7 wars are the
responsibility of all the parties to the conflicts.

It has been

explained that Israel i s role in creating this problem was substantial and was part o f a deliberate government policy.

It is

also clear that Israeli policy has been aimed at preventing the
return o f displaced Arabs to their home s and has actually increased
the displacement.

However ,

Israel ' s position on the refugees re-

mains that stated by Ben-Gurion,

who said the state of Israel

9
bears no responsibility for the mass flight of Arabs . 1 7
That being the government contention ,

it logically follows that

Israel should not accept responsibility for solving the refugee
problem.

Mass inunigration,

Emergency Regulations ,
cupied territories,

military action ,

land expropriation,

enforcement of the

settlements in the oc-

and statements of government leaders all show

Israeli determination to avoid that responsibility and prevent the
return of any Palestinian Arabs to their original home s .
confirms that Israel has maintained that after 1948,

the

Uri Avnery
"imaginary"

Palestinian nation ceased to exist and its conflict was solely with
the Arab state s .

198

However ,

the UN has not agreed

prin9iples or policies in this matter.

Following the 1948-49 war,

UN resolution 194
Resolved that the refugees wishing to

return to their homes and live at peace

with their neighbors should be permitted

to do so at the earliest practicable date ,
and that compensation should be paid for
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with Israeli

the property of those choosing not to
return and for loss o f or damage to
property which , under principles o f in
ternational law should be made good by
the government or authorities respon
sibl e .
And Resolution 242 ending the 1967 war called for a "just settlement
of the refugee problem . "

Also, in 1967, the . UN Security Council

adopted a resolution calling on Israel to insure the safety and well
being of the inhabitants of the occupied areas and to help return
those people who had fled during the fighting to their home s .

Al-

though a member of the UN, Israel has not complied with these resolutions .

Israel can argue with accuracy that Arab nations have not

taken adequate steps to accommodate refugees but this does not relieve it o f its responsibility.

This is particularly true since it

was Israel who expropriated their land , destroyed their home s , prevented their return, and brought in Jewish immigrants to replace
them.
Vio.lation of human rights in Israeli occupied territories have
been documented and protested by many organizations .
more prominent ones include the following:

Some of the

UN Special Committee ,

1968-197 8 ; International Committee of the Red Cross , 1969; Amnesty
International , 197 7 ; U . S . Department of State , March 1977 and
February 1978;

Sunday Times of London, June 197 7 ; Swiss League of

Human Rights , July 19 7 7 ; and the International Inquiry Commission of
the United P�ace Counc il , 19 7 5 .

Such a wide variety o f groups agree-

ing on this issue lends credibility to the argument that Israel is
systematically following a policy of violating human right s .
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The laws , government policie s , economic conditions , and social
circumstances discussed in this chapter have more clearly defined
the way in which Zionism has been implemented in Israe l .

In short ,

the goals of Zionism were to create a Jewish state and to accomplish
the "ingathering of the exiles " into that state .

This chapter has

shown that to create a Jewish state, Israel has violated the rights
of non-Jews and placed them in an inferior position.

Also, in order

to accommodate Jewish immigration into Palestine, Israel has system
atically expanded the land area under Jewish control and displaced
Arabs in the process .
This chapter has also pointed out that discrimination is being
practiced against Oriental Jews , indicating the Western orientation
of the state .

The description of Israeli policy in the occupied

territories shows that Israel was extracting economic and security
benefits from the areas without allowing equal fX? litical representa
tion or providing equal benefits to the existing population .
The evidence presented in this chapter indicates that Zionism,
as implemented in the state of Israe l , has placed Jews in a superior
position to the original population, has created a system biased in
favor of individuals with Western origins , and has expanded the ter
ritory under the state ' s control .

These characteristics make Israel

and the Zionist movement resemble the European colonial powers of
the past, in both methods and results .
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Chapter

4

POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTIONS IN ISRAEL

The political structure of a nation is comprised of the matrix
of institutions through which decisions are made and applied.
ten,

Of

structure is as important as behavior in a political system

and is equally influential in the decisions that are generated.
This is particularly true in Israel where parties are the focus of
nearly all political activity.
between parties are major
Israel .

The relationships and interactions

factor� in determining public policy in

Only Zionist ideology and an occasional strong individual

.

personality can rival the power of parties

in the political system.

Political parties and their companion organizations
Agency and the Histadrut)

( the Jewish

form the most important structural insti

tutions in Israe l .
One important characteristic o f the Israeli
multi-party makeup .

system is its

The large number of parties is partly the re

sult of heterogeneity of the Jewish people who have historically
been divided over issues of religion ,
foreign policy,

socio-economic principles ,

and territorial claims .

tion also contributes to multiplicity,

1

Proportional representa

in allowing many parties to

participate in the Knesset without achieving broad support.
indication of the

strength of party diversity is that no party has

ever gained a majority in Knesset elections .
established pattern.
saying,

One

2

Coalitions are the

David Ben-Gurion described the situation by

.
"Our electoral system has caused an exaggerated degree of

fragmentation and the creation of many small factions tha t ,
together ,

form a majority in the knesset . 11
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3

ta.ken

A major function of most political parties is to nominate
candidates for office.

In a proportional representation system,

where voters choose parties rather than individuals, their power
is even greater .

Israeli parties control the placement o f candi-

dates on election lists and the governing coalition controls
Cabinet positions after elections .

The manipulation o f election

lists is an important tool for Israeli parties.

Representation

of various factions on the party list of candidates can be used
to bring them into the party without giving them real power .

For

example, although Arabs are not allowed to be members of Israel ' s
Labor Party, it sponsors companion Arab election lists as a device
to gain Arab votes .

4

The co-optation of some members of the Arab

elite does not mean true representation.

Since anyone aspiring to

most local government post s , a Knesset seat , or a Cabinet position
depends upon party leaders to be placed on an election list, their
allegiance will be owed not to the people , but to the party.
is an encouragement to party discipline within the Knesset.

This
Use of

the parliamentary system also does this, in that losing a vote of
confidence means the removal of the current government and holding
new elections .

Discipline is also reinforced by the competitive

nature of the multiparty arrangement .

To gain and maintain support ,

Israeli parties must take specific stands on issues and have an
established and recognizable political perspective .

This insures

that most members will have general support for that party ' s posi..

tion.

Leaders have always had strong positions in Israeli parties .

Party founders set their basic positions and then move to attract
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supporters rather than altering their stands to please the
membership.

Traditionally, Israeli party leaders have also con

trolled the party ' s finances, giving them great power.

5

Israeli parties have functions not related to elections or
public policy making that are equally important in attracting sup
port, co-opting factions , and encouraging party discipline .

par

ties have acted as agencies for the absorption of new immigrants.
They use patronage and other employment services to assist immi
grants in finding jobs, they help them find hous ing, and they
publish their own newspapers to attract newcomers .

These services

are sometimes used to draw active elements among immigrants into
positions within the party in order to influence the rank and
file .

6

Parties are also involved in establishing agricultural

settlements and cooperative s .
and funds to operate on.

Some provide kibbutzim with credit

The Kibbutzim then provide money and

support to the party, becoming integral parts of the apparatus .

7

In addition , many parties set up banks and insurance agencies to
serve existing s upporters and attract new one s .

Other services

provided by parties include youth clubs , medical care , and recre
ational facilitie s .

8

So , parties have assumed many of the roles

nonnally performed by private interests or the government as a
whole.

As such, they are often seen as instruments for attaining

economic benefits as well:as for the achievement of political goals .
They are also major vehicles for socialization and integration in
Israeli life.

In a situation in which an individual may live in

party housing, work at a job provided
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?Y

the party, be a member of

a party trade union, and read the party newspaper, it is clear that
breaking with a party can mean a serious change in life.

The de-

velopment and operation of political parties in Israel has involved
them in non-political functions that provide services to people and
provide them with additional tools with which to exercise and in- -

-

crease political power.
Two other organizations have functions which are similar to or
compliment those of the political parties.
Jewish Agency.

One of these is the

It acted as the government of Zionism before the

creation of Israel and was recognized in Article 4 of the mandate
agreement.

9

In this capacity, it became the w0rldwide spokesman for

the Zionist cause and was heavily involved in international policies.
Now the J.A. is a federation of political party secretariats that
divides and distributes ironey raised outside of Israel.

With no

public control, the J.A. finances youth organizations, educational
activities, and propaganda agencies to sustain the apparatus of
Zionist parties.

Its most important functions, however, are in

organizing immigration, absorbing inunigrants, establishing new set
tlements, and sustaining old ones.

10

This agency gives parties

control over vast amounts of money to use for their own purposes,
independent of democratic processes.
As important as the Jewish Agency is, it is not nearly as
powerful as the Histadrut, Israel's General Federation of Labor.
The Histadrut is controlled by the Labor Party, which totally dominated Israeli politics until the Likud bloc victory in 1977.

The

government, the Jewish �gency, and the Histadrut together constitute
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the public sector of the Israeli economy which accounts for 2/3 of
.
t
he country ' s economl.c activity.
.

.

11

The Histadrut also predates

the existence o f Israel .
As a labor union,
organizing workers.

the Histadrut is primarily interested in

Throughout its existence,

workers have been membe r s .
19 5 9 ,

about 75% of Jewish

It agreed to allow Arab members in

and about 1/2 are now members .

12

The Histadrut consists of

about 40 national unions which act as departments in the federation.
It is organized with local workers '
.

committees,

council s ,

the General Council ,

the Histadrut convention,

utive Committee,

the Executive Bureau,

regional labor
the Exec-

and the Secretary Genera l .

13

The Histadrut has functions other than organizing and
representing workers.
in the country ,
popu1ation.
.

14

It operates the largest medical organization

with its health insurance fund covering 3/4 of the
In fact,

the Histadrut health fund has a bigger bud-

. .
of Hea1th
get than th e Ministry
workers

are memb ers

•

15

Howeve r ,

.
.
in
the insurance
program.

only about 1/3 of Arab
16

It provides other

social services such as social security benefits,
a pension fund,

a fund for invalids ,

and youth organizations .

a widow ' s fund,

worker ' s training programs ,

It also owns a publishing house and prints

the country ' s largest morning newspaper,

Dava n .

17

A subcommittee of the Executive Committee operates as an
entrepreneur

for the union .

The General Cooperative Association of

Jewish Workers finances and runs many economic enterprises such as
construction firms and heavy industry.

By 1960,

half of the heavy

industry in the country was the result of Histadrut actions .
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Early

in its history,

the

federation was involved only in ventures based

on cooperative principle s ,
rnents .

like the collective agricultural settle-

In fact , most of these settlements are affiliated with the

Histadrut.

Today ,

it also acts in a capitalist fashion and is

directly involved in almost every aspect of the economy .
contributes in

joint ventures with private capita l ,

It also

including

.
18
foreign capital .
.

The importance of the Histadrut lies in the facts that it
performs many important social and economic

functions normally car-

ried out by governments or private .enterpris e ,
trolled by a political party.
a dominant role in Israeli

and that it is con-

This allows the Labor Party to play

life and to assume the position of gov-

ernmental institutions even when it does not control the governmen t .
Such a powe rful role contributed to Labor ' s near complete domination
of the Israeli political

system.

The following tables of election results show the extent of
Labor ' s success�9

Only the current government ,

led by the Likud bloc,

has been formed without Labor participation.
First Knesset Election - January 25 ,

1949
% of

Party

Vote s

Mapai

35 . 7

Mapam (includes Ahdut Haavoda)
Herut

United Religious Front

(National

Party and Agudat Yisrael)

Religious

Progressives

General Zionists
Communists
Arab Lists
Others

( affiliated with Mapai)
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Knesset
Seats
46

14 . 7

19

11 . 5

14

12 . 2

16

4.1

5

5.2

7

3.5

4

10 . 1

4

3.0

2

Second Knesset Election - July 30 ,

1951

%

of

Knesset

Party

votes

Mapai

37 . 3

45

Mapam (includes Ahdut Haavoda)

12.5

15

6.6

8

He rut
Torah Religious Front
and

Seats

(Agudat Yisrael

Paolei Agudat Yisrael)

3.6

5

8.3

10

Progressives

3.2

Communists

4.0

4

National Religious Party

Arab Lists

(affiliated with Mapai)

Others
Third Knesset Elect 1on - July 26 ,

5

4.7

5

0.7

0

1955
% of

Knesset

Party

Votes

Mapai

32.2

Mapam

7.3

9

Ahdut Haavoda

8.2

10

12.6

15

Herut
Torah Religious Front

40

(Agudat Yisrael

and Poalei Agudat Yisrael)
National Religious .Party
Progress ive s
General Zionists

6

9.1

11

4.4

5
13

(affiliated with Mapai )

Other
Fourth Knesset Election - November 3 ,

4.7

10 . 2

Communists
Arab Lists

Seats

4.5

6

4.9

5

1.9

0

1959

%

Of

Knesset

Party

Votes

Mapai

38.2

47

Mapam

7.2

9

6.0
13.6

7
17

Ahdut Haavoda

He rut
Torah Religious Front (Agudat Yisrael
and Poalei Agudat Yisrael)

Seats

4.7

6

National Religious Party

9.9

12

Progressives .

4.6

6

General Zionists

6.1

8

Communists

2.8

3

Arab Lists

(affiliated with Mapai)

Other
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3.5

5

3.4

0

Fifth Knesset Election - November 2 ,

1965
% of

Knesset

Party

Votes

Mapai

34 . 7

42

Mapam

7.6

9

Ahdut Haavoda

Seats

6.5

8

13 . 7

17

Agudat Yisrael

3.7

4

Poalei Agudat Yisrael

l.9

2

National

Religious Party

9.8

12

Liberals

(Progressives and General Zionists)

13.6

17

4.1

5

3.5

4

0.7

0

He rut

Communists
Arab Lists

(affiliated with Mapai)

Other
Sixth Knesset Election - November 2 ,

1965

%
Party
Labor

Of

Votes
Alighment

(Mapai ,

Ahdut Haavoda)

Rafi
Mapam
Gahal (Herut and Liberal)
Agudat Yisrael
Poalei Agudat Yisrael
National Religious Party
Independent Liberals

Knesset
Seats

36 . 7

45

7.9
6.6

10
8
26

21.3
3.3
l.8
8.9
3.8

4
2
ll
5

2.2

3

Arab Lists ( a f filiated with Labor)
Hao lem Hazeh (New Force)

l.2
3.3
l.l

l
4
l

Other

1.8

0

New Cormnunist List

( Rakah)

Israel Cormnunist Party

(Maki )

Seventh Knesset Election - October 2 8 ,

1969
% of
Vote s

Party
Labor Alignment (Mapa i ,
Mapam, and Rafi)
Gahal

Ahdut Haavoda,

(Herut and Liberal)

Agudat Yisrael

Poaeli Agudat Yisrael
National Religious Party

Knesset
Seats

46 . 2

56

21. 7

26

3.2

4

2

1.8
9.7

12

Independent Liberals

3.2

4

New Cormnuni s� List ( Rakah)
Israel Communist Party (Maki)
Arab Lists ( affiliated with Labor)

2.8
1.2
3.5

3
l
4

Haolem Hazeh

1.2

2

1.2
3.l

4

(New Force)

Free Centre
National List

l.l

Other
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2

0

Eighth Knesset Election - December 3 1 ,

1973

%

Party

of

Knesset

Votes

Labor Alignment
Mapam,
Likud

(Mapai ,

Ahdut Haavoda,

and Rafi)

( Gahal ,

State List, Land of

Israel Movement,

Independent Centre)

Agudat Yisrael and Poalei Agudat Yisrael

46 . 2

56

32.5

39

National Religious Party
Independent Liberals
Arab Lists

( affiliated with Labor)

New Conununist List
Moked

(Conununists)

Seats

(Rakah)

4.2

5

8.3

10

3.3

4

2.5

3

3.3

4

o.a

Civil Rights Movement

1

2.5

Ninth Knesset Election - May 1 7 ,

3

1977

%

Of

Knesset

Party

Vote s

Labor Alignment

24.6

32

33.4

43

11 . 6

15

3.4

4

Likud·
Democratic Movement for Change
Agudat Yisrael
Poalei Agudat Yisrael
National Religious Party
Democratic Front for Peace and· Equality
Shelli
Shlomzion
Flatto-Sharon
Independent Liberals
Citizens Rights
Arab Lists
Other
One of the most obvious

1.4

l

9�2

12

4.6

5

1.6

2

1.9

2

2.0

0

1.2

l

1.2

( a f filiated with Labor )

Seats

l

1.4

l

2.5

0

characteristics shown in these tables

the merging and separating of parties and

factions .

is

But there is a

basic set of parties involved in the system which have drawn a generally consistent number of votes throughout Israel ' s history .

Most

�

of these par ies developed around their positions on issues and have
merged or separated for a wide variety of reasons .
Mapai has been the dominant party in Israel and currently is the
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major faction in the Labor alignment which includes Ahdut Haavoda
and Mapam.

Mapai was formed out of the political elite of the

Zionist immigrants in Palestine prior to Israel's existence, led by
20
.
.
David Ben-Gurion.

They are basically a social democratic party

21
.
on domestic issues.

As previously mentioned, the party controls

.

the Histadrut union.

Ahdut Haavoda and Mapam are both Marxist

oriented parties on economic and social issues, and their inclusion
in the Labor alignment forces Mapai to move slightly leftward.
h as

a.

.
22
h istory
.
of concern for the Arab m.l.nority.
.

Mapam

One of Mapai ' s

strong points has been its ability to absorb different groups and
retain power.

Much of this flexibility is due to its early dominance

of the entire society.

It controlled the economic system through

government investment and the Histadrut, it was responsible for
economic expansion and rising living standards, and it maintained
.
23
an interna 1 cohesion
of lead ership.
.
.

Success in these areas led

many people to see Mapai as the political embodiment of the state
and the natural party to support.
cessful in these areas,

Also, as long as Mapai was sue-

it was easy to accommodate divergent inter-

ests and dismiss opposition challenges.

Troubles began to surface

for Labor in 1965, when Ben-Gurion and Moshe Dayan left the party
and formed Rafi.

Differ�nces between Ben-Gurion and Premier Levi

Eshkol created the split.

Ben-Gurion wanted Mapai to discontinue

the alliance with Ahdut Haavoda, and favored single-member district
elections over proportional representation.
leaders rejected these demands.

24

Eshkol and other Labor

Although Rafi subsequently won

only 10 Knesset seats in the election of 1965 and Labor increased
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its total from 42 to 45 , the incident was the first major split of
Mapai ' s ruling consensus .

This division became sharper as Rafi

strongly criticized Eshkol for his actions during the 1967 crisis.
Eshkol was forced by the criticism to name Dayan as Minister of Defense.

25

The end of the war brought a new set of problems to Israel

and to the Labor party in dealing with the occupied territories .

No

consensus could be reached in the party about whether to integrate
them into the country , return all of them, or bargain for the return
of some portions and keeping others .

In the general conciliatory

post-war atmosphere , Labor returned to its history of accommodation.
In late 1967, both Rafi and Ahdut Haavoda completely merged with
Mapai.

26

Upon Eshkol ' s death in 1969 , Golda Meir was chosen Prime

Minister.

She was not committed to any particular position on the

territories

as

were some of the other potential choices , but was a

27
.
.
popu�ar
o ld guard Zionist
,
.

In effect, the Labor party had decided

not to push decisions of substance in order to maintain unity .

While

the divisions within the party reflected the diversity in public
opinion, official party positions did not.
through the 1969 and 1973 election s .

This policy continued

This led the party to boycott

28
.
.
serious
peace e fforts during
.
this
'
time
.

Even after the 1973

October War, Israel ' s position did not change substantially.

Public

disenchantment with Labor appeared to some extent in the December,
1973 elections as Labor lost five seats and Likud bloc made a strong
showing, receiving more seats than any opposition party had previously.

Since that time, Labo r ' s basic position has been a willing-

ness to negotiate with Arab countries and Palestinian groups that
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would recognize

Israel and renounce terrorism.

That position meant

no dealing with the 'Palestine Liberation Organization,

the largest

and most popular group representing the Palestinian people.

Labor

was prepared to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza unde r favorable
conditions .

It stated that it was not committed to extension o f

settlements i n the occupied territories and was against the enlargement of Jerusalem.

29

This position led to a static,

though rela-

tively tranquil period in Israeli history.
Several events contributed to ending this tranquility in 1976.
First ,

the election of Jimmy Carter who was more sympathetic to the

Palestinian position than previous

U.S.

Pres idents and who seemed

determined to make a Middle East initiative rather than accept the
status quo ,

concerned Israel and Labo r leade r s .

of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was

Then the government

forced to resign in December ,

.
.
30
.
a Knesset vote over a nu.nor issue .
1976 after 1osing
subsequent elections were held,

several scandals

cial dealings of top Labor party leaders ,
31
.
publ ic .

Before the

involving the finan-

including Rabin,

became

Rabin resigned as a candidate for Prime Minister but re-

mained on the Labor election list.

32

He was replaced by Shinrin

Pere s , but the party had been severely damaged.
The Labor alignment was already in trouble because of its
appearance of weaknes s and ineffectiveness in a variety of areas .
Lack of progress in foreign policy,

vacillation on the issues of

settlements and the handling of the religious groups trying to
establish them,
put e s ,

and its inability to deal with domestic labor dis-

social problems,

and economic troubles had all caused public
-
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disenchantment .

In response to this disenchantment and to scandals

in the Labor Party ,

university professor Yigael Yadin formed the

Democratic Movement for Change.

This party made inroads

into

Labor ' s base of support by presenting new faces with clean reputations ,

not connected with old style politics.

The DMC focused on

reforming the electoral process while staying in the mainstream on
.
.
and foreign
domestic
.
'
po l icy
issues.

33

Many observers thought the

DMC would be a major factor in the elections and would be the only
party with a chance to unseat Labor .
bloc won the May

17

But Menachem Begin ' s Likud

elections and became the

first party to obtain

more votes than Labor .
The base of the Likud is
opposition party.
economy ,

Herut,

the traditional conservative

Herut opposed government intervention in the

favoring a free enterprise system.

34

However,

its major

emphasis has always been the Jewish historical right to the Land Of
Israe l , which to them is both conceptual and territoria l .

The con-

cept is that a state for Jews in Palestine is the only way for the
Jewish people to achieve fulfillment and keep their covenant with
God.

They believe the boundary of this state should coincide with

the territory granted to Jews in the Old Testament and which was
contained in the Biblical state of Israel.
the West Bank and parts of Jordan .

35

For them,

this includes

The Herut ideology is based

on the revisionist line within the Zionist movement led by Vladimir
Jabotinsky .

Other consitent planks in the Herut platform included

the rejection of a peace treaty with Jordan because it contained
"unredeemed" territory,

support for peace treaties with other Arab

- 107 -

nations ,

acceptance of Arabs as Israeli citizen s ,

the creation of any Palestinian state.

36

and opposition to

Herut also supported France

in the Algerian revolt because ties to France were more important
than idealistic cause s .

Herut has been a strong supporter of South

Africa and its apartheid policies bec�use it

is

friendly to Israel

and because of the presence of Jews and Jewish interests there .

37

Herut w�s one of the top four parties in all elections up to
1965 and was

second in 1955 ,

195 9 ,

only real opposition party since
gove rnment coalitions .

It was perceived as the

and 1961.

it had never participated in any

In this capacity,

it attracted many voters

who were generally dissatisfied with the system.
of Herut

38

forced Labor to adopt a more aggressive,

.
eign
pol icy
than it
might
.
have otherwise.
.
'

39

The popularity
expansionist for-

Its constant

.

demand for

widening borders to create the land of Israel also contributed to
Labor ' s difficulties

in building a consensus on the issues o f the

occupied territories and Jewish settlements there.
In 1965,

Herut was j oined by the Liberal Party to form Gahal .

40

The Liberals were oriented toward the private sector but accepted
some government activity in the economy.

41

They were also more in

line with the Mapai position on foreign policy and the merger brought
.
some moderation in
Herut statements .
.

the 1965 and 1969 elections ,

42

Gahal won 26 seats in both

which was less than their combined

total as separate parties in all previous elections .

war,

Gahal entered a unity government ,

ruling coalition.

its

After the 1967

first participation in a

But it withdrew in 1970 after the government ac-

cepted the Rogers Plan for a Sinai agreement.
-
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In

19 7 3 ,

Gahal brought some minor conservative parties into its

alliance to form Likud.

The Parties

involved were the State List,

the Land of Israel Movement and the Independent Centre .
elections of that year,
This was

13

the Likud received

more than Gahal received in

ponent parties totaled in
Labor in Israel ' s history.
Herut ,

favoring a

1969,

39

1969,

very clear.

In the

in the Knesset.

5 more than the com-

and more than any - party other than

The Likud followed the same line as

free enterprise economy and rej ecting territorial

concessions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
election s ,

seats

44

Prior to the

1977

the Likud made its position on the occupied territories
The western part of the Land of Israel

was not to be partitioned.

The solution to the Palestinian problem

had to be found east o f the Jordan Rive r .
tiate with the PLO.

( the West Bank)

Israel should not nego-

There should be no withdrawal

from any occupied

territories without peace agreements and no peace agreements without

.
direct negotiations
.
.

45

After the

his position had not changed.

Samaria,

electio n s ,

Begin made it clear

When asked about the future of the

occupied territories , he replied,
mean Judea ,

1977

"What occupied territories?

and the Gaza Strip ,

If you

these are liberated terri-

tories and an integral part of the Land of Israel . "

46

The Likud ' s

continued refusal to seriously negotiate Israel ' s withdrawal

from

the West Bank and its record on settlements there indicate it has
not deviated much

from this position.

The Begin governmen t ' s proposals for Palestinian autonomy are
consistent with its general stance and do not include any maj or

.

.
Israe 1 i concession
s.

47

The document ' s orientation i s made clear by
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its t i t l e , "Proposal o f Principles for Full Autonomy for the Arab
Residents o f Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Distric t , and for the
Maintenance o f the Jewish Settlement in These Areas . "

Two central

aspects of this plan are that Israel will never allow the e stablishment of a Palest in i an state and that after the transitional five
years of the autonomy plan, Israel will demand sovereignty over the
occupied territories.

An aide to Begin stated the position clearly ,

saying, I assure you, i f anything comes out o f the negotiation s , i t
will not b e a Pales t inian s t a t e .

I f that ' s denying them the- right

o f self-determination , then so be i t . "

Begin ' s plan- would· create an

1 1 -member council elected by West Bank and Gaza residents that would
I

administer hospital s , schools , social services , and municipal services .

The council would not be granted any legislative functions

and it would derive i t s authority solely from the Israeli military
government of occupation.

This implies that Israel could dissolve

the council i f i t did not follow its charter or administer properly
the laws and regulations passed for it by Israe l .

Also, the Israeli

army would retain responsibility for security and public order and .
would act as an overseer o f Palestinian autonomy .

To this end, the

army would not leave the occupied territoties but would be redeployed
from maj or urban centers to new emplacements in s t rategic rural areas .
Tilis is inconsistent with the Camp David Framework for Peace which
says that, "The Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a sel f-governing authority has
been freely elected , " that, "a strong local police force" is to be
created , and that a joint Israeli-Jordanian force will insure
- 1 10 -

security.

In regard to West Bank land,

Begin ' s plan represents

little change in the power presently enj oyed by the military govern
State lands,

ment.

formerly Jordanian public property,

under Israeli control,
ments,

and could be used for security needs,

or refugee rehabilitation.

tered in private ownership,
for security needs,

would remain
settle

Land which is not legally regis

but is privately cultivated could be used

including settlements.

Privately owned land not

in cultivation could be requisitioned by Israel for the same pur
poses.

Privately owned and cultivated land would not be subject to

government takeover unless unavoidably required for security or road
building needs.

If these principles were accepted,

Israel would be

able to expropriate any land in the occupied territories,
sary for security reasons.

if neces

Israel would retain the right to build

settlements anywhere in the West Bank and Gaza with all settlers sub
ject ·only to Israeli law under Begin's plan.

It would allow Israeli

citizens to purchase land in the occupied territories and Arabs to
buy land in Israel

if they become Israeli citizens.

A crucial point

is Israel's retention of control over water sources in the West Bank
and Gaza which presently provide water to Jewish settlements and to
parts of Israel proper.

The proposal states that Israel will plan

water usage with the Palestinian council.

The overall autonomy plan

illustrates Likud ' s intention eo remain faithful to the ideology of
Herut.
O f course,

Likud is not a majority party and depends upon a

coalition to maintain its control of the governmen t .

1977

After the May,

elections, both Labor and the Democratic Movement for Change
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refused to join the government and Likud barely formed a majority in
conjunction with the National Religious Party, Agudat Yisrae l , and
Paolei Agudat Yisrael.

Moshe Dayan also voted for the coalition in

exchange for the Foreign Minister portfolio.

48

The National Religious Party has been a member of every
government coalition in Israel ' s history.

It compliments the high

priority of the major parties for foreign policy with a low one ,
49
.
.
emphasizing
primari
.
.
· 1y domestic issue
s.
.

Its position on economics

is similar to that of the old Liberal Party, favoring private control while accepting a degree of government intervention .

But its

distinguishing feature is its vision o f Israel as a theocracy.

so

The NRP runs its own education system, and owns two banks and other
economic enterprises .

51

Agudat Yisrael is the ultra-orthodox Jewish

party with Poalei Agudat Yisrael as its affiliate representing orthodox Jewish workers .

52

These parties have been able to gain conces-

sions from Labor and Likud on religious issues relating to activities
on the Sabbath, kosher traditions, marriage , and women in the army
by supporting their foreign policies .

Another factor in their sue-

cess is the government ' s wish to avoid any religious confrontations
.
53
.
.
that mig
. ht tear Jews apart and create serious
interna
1 di ssension.
In Israel ' s political system, avoiding these internal splits is
a constant preoccupation.

No party has ever had a majority , govern-

ments have all been coalitions , and each major party consists of
factions or interests that must be accommodated .

The emotional nature

of many important issues in Israel complicates the situation.

Such

a system faces constant strain and requires delicate b�lancing to
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avoid either political eruptions or stagnation , which would reduce
a government ' s effectiveness and legitimacy.

It is not surprising

that Israeli governments have not always been able to succeed in submerging these differences.

An example of that is the conflict be-

tween the Land of Israel Movement and the Peace Movement.

The prin-

ciples involved in this conflict have divided Zionists and Israelis
throughout their history.

The division crosses traditional party

lines and relates to Zionism ' s fundamental purposes and practices and
Israel Eldad, a leader in the

to the nature of the Jewish state .

Land of Israel Movement and former member of the extreme underground
Stern Gang , spoke of these differences as a basic conflict in I sraeli society.
The existence of the partition of the
country is a function of the division
of the existential soul of Zionism in
its different layers .
In these layers ,
from the beginning, there was a deep
fragmentation, with guilt feelings toward
the cosmopolitan ideals of socialism and
liberalism, which were to liberate the
world from nationalism - maybe even from
the plague of the nation states - and
which will liberate the Jews entirely
from their separate unique existence . . .
This is a typical schizophrenia.
We have
guilt feelings that we presumably have
betrayed these universal ideas by turning
to Zionism, which is of necessity ' re
actionary ' for . it is a return to sometimes
irrational roots . . . Had it . only at least
been possible to implement ' utopian Zion
ism' in • ways of peace ' through convincing
the Arabs that we bring blessings to them
too , and social liberation and progress !
But in vain ! To go on with psychological
language, what is left is frustration the feeling that perhaps Zionism is after
all a reactionary movement. 54
The Land of Israel Movement first surfaced as a party in the
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1969 elections .

It articulated the traditional ideology of Zionism,

favoring more immigration, widening Israel ' s borders , and insuring
the maintenance of Israel as a completely Jewish state .

It s�pported

whatever political, economic, or military policies that would achieve
This especially included. establishing settlements in

these goal s .

the occupied territories , carrying out the central task of the Zion
ist state .

Its membership came from the Labor Party, former under-

ground organization s , right wing kibbutzim, and some . religious
groups .

55

The Peace Movement never officially formed a party , but has been
an active proponent of views diametrically opposed to the Land of Is
rael Movement.

It believes that in order to exist securely, Israel

must cooperate with the Arabs and obtain their consent.
not sufficient to guarantee security.

Strength is

While certainly not anti

Zionist, the Peace Movement favors modifying the character of the
state and deviating from the original precepts of Zionism to bring
peace.

It advocates territorial concessions, withdrawal of Jewish

settlements in the occupied territories, and internal change .

These

changes would include complete separation of church and state and
equal rights and opportunities for Arabs .

They describe the Land of

Israel Movement as a "dangerous mixture of religious mysticism and
national chauvinism , " which sees war as a glorious mission.

56

Its membership came generally from Mapam and left wing kibbutzim.
Also , Labor Party leaders Pinchas Sapir, Abba Eban, and Yigal Allon
took Peace Movement positions without officially aligning themselves .

57
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Between 1967 and 1973, the Labor government tried to
simultaneously use policies o f both movements .

It labelled both

as extremists and presented itself as the moderating forc e .

The

Peace Movement ideology was favored by a majority in the government , in that it provided the flexible approach to negotiation the
government wanted to achieve progres s .

One step· taken by the gov-

ernment reflecting this position was its participation in the Jarring talk s , indirect negotiations through the UN , within the frameThis implied an agreement to withdraw from

work o f Resolution 242 .
the occupied territories.

I t also began using the Peace Movement ' s

"stages to peace" concept by withdrawing from the cease fire lines
of 1970 to permit the opening of the Suez Canal , providing Egyptian
troops did not cross it.

58

However , many Labor Party leaders did

not support these concessions and forced the government to take other
actions not consistent with the Peace Movement .

Prime Minister Golda

Meir and Minister o f Immigrant Absorption Israel Galili favored allowing Israelis to purchase land in the occupied territories,

fur-

thering Jewish settlements there , and considerable modification of
borders.

In 196 8 , Moshe Dayan proposed integrating the economies

of southern Israel and the southern West Bank and suggested that Israel act as the established government in the territories while giv�
ing Arabs voting rights .

Sapir opposed these ideas , fearing the

results of incorporating a large Arab populous into Israe l .

Eban

was also strongly opposed to this, saying it would be dominating
Arabs against their
·
wi· 11 and amounted to aparthei· d .
·

59

The government proceeded generally along the lines proposed by
- 115 -

In 19 7 2 ,

Meir and Galili with some concessions to Dayan.
Knesset

"reaffirm (ed)

and confirm(ed)

the

the historical right of the

Jewish people over the Land of Israel . "

60

By 1973,

the government

had moved firmly toward the position of the Land of Israel Movement.

It had established 44 settlements in the West Bank,

Heights ,

and the Sinai.

It had enlarged Jerusalem ' s boundaries and

made plans for the Judaization of Gaza.
'

the territories had begun and overa l l ,

Economic

majority of the Labor Party

tion.

Although the

still claimed it opposed the proces s ,

it had nevertheless occurred.

oric,

integration of

the basis for incorporating

the West Bank into Israel had been laid by 1973 .

of occupied land,

Golan

Public opinion opposing the return

the Land of Israel Movement ' s inflanunatory rhet-

and Dayan ' s personal popularity all contributed to this situaAlso,

steps taken according to Peace Movement principles did

not achieve the progress expected.

Following the Land of Israel

Movement made the government appear strong and active ,

61
.
its
popularity.
.

In typical Israeli

fashion,

increasing

the government tried

to follow two policies at once to accommodate all interests .
it found this impossible to do and by 197 3 ,

But

had embarked upon a

·
policy of annexation without officially accepting the ideology behind
it.

This coincides

closely with the earlier Zionist decision to fol-

low revisionist Zionism advocated by Jabotinsky in establishing Israe l ,

while claiming to follow more moderate Zionism.

Both movements

offered policies based on traditional conceptions of Zionism applied
to current realities and the government chose to implement the basic
principles of the Land of

Israel Movement .
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The Arabs also interpreted Israeli action this way and the
result was the Yorn Kippur war of October 1973.

The war showed the

Land of Israel Movement that hostility still existeq and that the
maintenance of expanded boundaries had allowed Israel to survive
under a surprise attack , government bungling, inadequate preparation, and still recover to penetrate to within striking distance o f
Cairo and Damascus.

But the Peace Movement argued that the so-

'

called defensible borders had not prevented war as its program of
returning territories and recognizing Palestinian national rights
would have .

62

The government ' s first action was t o scrap the Galili

document which had set up a four-year plan for building settlements
and acquiring land.

It seemed to admit that added territory did

not protect the country as well as Arab acceptance.

It began to

return to the Peace Movement idea of trading territory for guaranteed peace .

However, the Peace Movement opposed the government ' s

step by step program of interim agreements engineered by U . S . Secretary of State Henry Kiss inger on the grounds that they were frittering away bargaining power for minor concessions .

It favored a

broader territorial offer in exchange for an overall settlement .
But the government would not accede to this demand for fear of
dividing the party and the country.

The Land of Israel Movement ,

which by this time had joined the Likud bloc , opposed both approaches,

claiming they would increase defense needs at the same time the

willingness o f the U . S . to help meet them would be decreased by oil
consi
. deration s .
.

63

The 1973 election in which Labor lost support

and the Likud gained, increased tension within the government even
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more.

Although its leaders still proclaimed support for a moderate

approach based on Peace Movement principle s , it was not in a strong
position to take decis ive action.

Any dramatic territorial conces

sions could have created serious internal rifts with the potential
for bringing down the government.

The government was again trying

its tightrope act , attempting to satisfy everyone .

This explains

its unclear position on settlements and the lack of progress achieved
from 1973 to 197 7 .

Then came the Labor Party scandals and the Likud

victory o f 197 7 .
The Likud government which included the Land o f Israel Movement ,
began immediately to implement its position by legalizing existing
settlements in the occupied territories and committing itself to the
establishment o f more .
actions is quite clear .

Its record on this, both in statements and
The Camp David agreement is consistent with

the Land of Israel Movement , but includes some things to please the
Peace .Movement .

The Begin government must also submit to the system

by accommodating diverse points of view with its policie s .

The re

turn of the Sinai to Egypt , while not pleasurable to Begin, is ac
ceptable within the context of the Likud position and the Israeli
political system.

It allows him to meet Peace Movement demands for

territorial concessions and shows him to be flexible on this issue,
capable of ma.king progre s s .

But at the same time , it does not really

violate Land of Israel Movement principles .
iously claimed sovereignty over the Sinai .

Israel has never ser
It was the easiest ter

ritory to relinquish because it was not part of the historical Land
of Israel.

Returning the Sinai may also contribute to Likud ' s master
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plan for maintaining control of the West Bank and Gaza by separating
Egypt from the rest of the Arabs .

Begin ' s Palestinian autonomy plan

indicates he has no intention of giving up the West Bank and Gaza.
The vagueness of the Camp David agreement and its lack of time
specificity allows

Israel and the Likud tremendous leeway in meeting

its conditions , while it eliminates Egypt as a potential military
threat.
The key points to understand in looking at Israeli political
parties are that despite their public differenc e s ,
of policy is

their execution

similar and that the system of coalitions and factions

reduces the .differences even further .

All maj or political parties

.
.
.
are Zionist
and are oriente
d toward the Western wor· 1 d . 64

Only the

Conununists and the ultra-religious parties oppose the concept of
Zionism.

The major parties refuse to deal with the PLO or accept

a Palestinian state .

The main public difference between parties,

particularly Likud and Labor ,
Gaza.

is over the. return of the West Bank and

Labor and the parties supporting its position claim they are

willing to return portions of those lands under certain conditions,
while Likud has consistently stated that they are legitimate parts
of Israel.

Howeve r ,

Labor accepted the construction of Jewish set-

tlements in the occupied territories and began a process of integrating the territories into Israel and making them dependent on it.
And Likud is the first government to return any land to the Arabs and
is now negotiating over the Palestinian question which they had
earlier claimed had to be solved east of the Jordan Rive r .

Both

parties have remained firm on the most crucial issues of opposition
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i
nto resettling refugees in Israel and the creation of a Pal:es t..in:L..

state .
In economi c s ,

the parties have a variety of positions ,

Marxism to . a belief in completely free enterprise .

from

The dominance of

the Labor Party allowed them to set economic policy for most of Is
rael ' s history following a socialist-oriented position.
of Likud brought some major change s ,
government spending ,

The election

but Begin has not moved to cut

either in defense or social service s .

Again,

it is seen that party positions as reflected in actual policies do
not differ greatly.
Elections in Israel have not brought about major policy changes .
Labor ' s domination of the political process

for 30 years meant that

division and differences within the party had more impact on policy
than public preferenc e s .

Labor showed itself to b e adept a t accom

m::>dating diverse interests without altering its policies more than
was absolutely necessary .

The division of support among the parties

remained amaz ingly consistent in the first thirty years of Israel ' s
existenc e .

Some of this could b e explained a s a consistent division

of public opinion, but the use of non-political functions by parties
to attract and maintain support contributes much to this phenomenon .
When election results are so consistent,
also remain consistent.

it is natural that policy

The system itself plays a major part in Is

rael ' s policy consistency .

The multi-party ,

proportional representa

tion system in which obtaining a majority in the Knesset is virtually
impossible ,

forces parties to depend on one another for support .

The

resulting �rade-offs and compromises do not make major policy changes
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likely.

Since no party represents the maj ority, no party can feel

comfortable in imposing its position on the coun t ry .

Also, within

the parties the leadership must form compomises between all the
factions to av�id the possibility that disgrun tled memb ers could
leave the party and form a new one.

And as with the Land of Israel

and Peace Movement s , many differences can cross party line s .

So

internal party compromises· tend to mitigate the · differences b e tween
parties as well.

In Israel , the importance o f Zionism to the

country and the commitment of the maj o r parties to i t further
reduce the d i fferences between them.

In a system with these char

acteristics, i t is unlikely that maj or policy shifts will occur
within parties or as a result of a change in governments after an
election.

This has p roven to be true in Israe l .

-

12 1 -

Chapter 5

LEADERSHIP IN ISRAEL

The preceding two chapters provide a basis for beginning a
discussion of the nature of Israeli leadership .

Chapter 3 showed

that Jews of European-American origin have obtained superior posi
tions in economics , politic s , and in virtually all aspects of life
in Israel over the rest of its citizens .

The functions and powers

of political parties described in Chapter 4 allow party leaders to
control jobs, housing, and placement on election lists of their
members.

The system itself tends to perpetuate the existing division

of power in the state , contributing to policy consistency .

·

These

characteristics have produced a country in which those reaching top
positions must generally meet the conditions of belonging to a par
ticular racial group , following the orders of existing party leaders ,
and accepting an established policy line .

The dominance of govern

ment and political parties over all parts of Israeli life and their
close relationship with other majo.r institutions means that these
conditions apply throughout the society and are passed on through
the socialization proces s .
The historical development o f Israel can explain much about the
creation of the elitist society.

During the period of 1882 to 194 8 ,

in which much o f the Jewish immigration to Palestine occurred, nine
out of ten immigrants were European and most of the native-born Pal
estinian Jews were of European origin.

Zionism began in Europe and

was influenc�d by the European concept of nationalism.
life style in Palestine became that of the Europeans .

The dominant
According to

Leonard Fein, author of a comprehensive study of Israeli politics,
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"In education and aspiration,

in political organization and content,

in family life and consumption,
mattered . "

1

on Zionism,
.
.

it was the Western tradition that

The values of this group of European inunigrants cente.red
socia
. l ism,
'

' c. 2
and the pioneer
eth i
.

perfect manifestation of these ideals.

The kibbutz was the

Jews establishing collective

agrarian settlements in the Holy Land was the fulfillment of many
Jewish desire s .

In many case s ,

kibbutz leaders became national lead-

Their status a s creators and practitioners of a n ideology made

ers.

kibbutz leaders the embodiment of Zionism.

By emphasizing particular

values and elevating to leadership the spokesmen for those values ,
the kibbutz

system helped establish an elitist social pattern . 3

The nature of the Jewish national movement also contributed to
elitism.

It has always been involved in semi-legal or illegal work

that required secrecy.

This club mentality was the result of engag-

ing in politics against Czarist Rus s i a ,
mandat e ,

hiding from Naz is ,

operating under the British

creating an underground army ,

taining the security of the state .

4

In such condition s ,

information was available only to a select
ones

capable of decisive action ,
When the state was forme d ,

kibbutzim,

important

who became the only

thus reinforcing their elite status .
this group of leaders from the

the political organizations,

rulers of the state .

few,

and main-

and the military became the

It was a homogeneous group with strong ideo-

logical commitments and conunon experiences .

The success of this

group in leading the Zionist movement to the accomplishment of its
goals

reinforced their elite status even further.

ideology,

common sacrifices,

Their strong

and success led the elite to a point of
-
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view that public opinion was not important.

5

The elite ' s

interpretation o f Zionism and how to implement it became the basis
for policy rather than a public consensus .

The political structure

they established included no formal channels for communicating pub
lic will.

6

They detached themselves from the various informal and

semi-formal groups in the country, reducing the influence o f interest
groups which are o ften a vehicle for the expression of public opin.

ion.

7

All characteristics of the pre-state Zionist movement can be
seen in present day Israe l .

The cultural values o f the society are

still based on those imported from Europe , although since 1948, more
than half the immigrants to Israel came from Africa and Asia.

8

Chap-

ter 3 describes in detail the dominance o f Western culture in Israel
and the feelings of superiority of European-American Jews over Arabs
and Oriental Jews .

According to Alex Weingrod, the pioneer ethic o f

public service , cooperation , �desty, simplicity , egalitarianism,
and dignity of labor retains official prominence since vetercn elites
still have political control and enunciate those values through the
major national institutions .

He also explains that education, mili-

tary service and the policy of settling immigrants in cooperative
agricultural corranunities contribute to the inculcation o f these
values .

However, Weingrod describes a change in behavior among

younger Israelis who emphasize materialism and middle-class values
in the Euro-American sense.

9

Although these are contrasting value

systems , they are both o f Western origin.

Any entrance into the

elite still depends on adopting the European cultural style, whether
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'

it be based on pioneer or middle class values .
The secrecy involved in the Zionist was
Israeli political system.
described as a

10

incorporated into the

Political communication in Israel has been

"gossip system" with great status accorded to those

that obtain inside information .

Such knowledge creates social as

well as political distinctions between people in Israe l .
raeli j ournalists ,

Yuval Elizur and Eliahu

Salpeter

11

Two Is-

established

"access to inside information" as a distinguishing quality ,

writing

Access to inside information is an
important attribute of any modern elite

member.

But in Israel it seems this is
Centuries of

of particular importance.

persecution have led Jews to attach
extraordinary weight to any bit of in
formation emanating from a center of

power that in the past could have had
life or death implications

The

y

for them.

brought this keen sense of the im

portance of information with them to
Israe l ,

and there the relative

of the entire

intimacy

structure only adds to the

value attached to

' being in the know . '

With independence came the conviction
that having inside information is part of

a two-way communication system:

those

who know qui°ckly what important people

think or do can also influence decisions
before they are made final .

The small

size of the country also accentuates the
snob value of inside information :

those

who know what Moshe Dayan said yesterday
can also create the impression,

least try to create it ,

or at

that they are part

of the decis ion-making circle .

Thus in

formation has become one of the most im

portant coins

of exchange at all

Israel ' s national

levels of

and local elite. 1 3

The Israeli elite is perpetuated not only by a dominant culture
and limited access to information ,

but also by the political system.

In addition to the preeminence of elite-controlled political parties,
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the centralization of the government and the economy contribute to
elitist politics .

All major political organizations, economic in

stitutions, and public issues are national in scope.

Local politics

is relatively unimportant in Israel, while national politics is well
organized and highly centralized.
growth of local attachments.

Israel's small size inhibits the

Local elections are heavily influenced

by the national leadership and party affiliation.

Because of this,

immigrants rising to high positions in local government have not been
14
able to use this as a springboard to national prominence.
portional representation also limits local power.

Pro

Local officials

have few resources to distribute and must make requests for assis
tance or policy change to national authorities who make the final de
cisions.

As a result, veteran

European groups who initially

controlled parties and the administrative bureaucracies are able
to monopolize strategic political positions and control entrance
into the elit e .
Economic power i s subject to the same conditions since much of
economic policy is gove rnment planned.

Also, government and party

connections to the Jewish agency and the Histadrut increase the power
of the elite over the nation's economy.

In Israel's short history,

foreign policy, defense, economic development, and immigrant absorp
tion have been the dominant political issues.
in scope, requiring

These are all national

centrally established policy.

Also, the mechan

isms to deal ·with those issues are set up to limit public access.
For example, treaties made by the government do not have to be
approved by the Knesset and are not subject to court authority.
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The

Foreign Affairs

Committee of the Knesset is the only group that can

demand exp lanations of policy or action from the Foreign Ministe r ,
and it is always controlled by the ruling party.

15

Again ,

intra-

party dynamics are superior to either public opinion or the relationship between parties

in the Israeli decision-making system.

Prior to

1977, most important decisions in foreign affairs , defens e , and finance were made within the Labor Party rather than through a public
dialogue or an inter-party proce s s .

16

The fact that Israel

is

still

in a state of Emergency enables the government to use powers without
Knesset approval.

The government is more significant than the Knes-

set in Israeli politics ,

the ruling party controls the government ,

and elites control the parties .
trolling parties,

With the veteran European elite con-

economic institutions ,

the most significant policy decision s ,

access to information,

and

their position is extraordi-

narily strong.
The small number of people significantly involved in Israeli
policy-making through the system described in the preceding discussion is astonishing.

The Israeli j ournalists Elizur and Salpeter

stated in the Preface to Who Rules Israel?

that,

it is enough to know one hundred, perhaps
one hundred and fifty or at most two hun
dre d ,

people in Israel in order to know

who is responsible for decision making in
the political and military sphere s ,

who

makes the wheels of the economy turn and
who zoo lds public opinion .

Despite immi

gr�tion to Israel during its twenty-five
years of existence ,

despite the fact that

during that period its population grew
alzoos t four fold - and perhaps because of
these

factors - the range where in all
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political ,

economic ,

and perhaps even

cultural power is concentrated is ex
tremely narrow . 1 7
Michael Brecher ,

au�hor of two major works on Israeli

I n The Foreign Policy System of Israe l ,

cites even a smaller number .

Brecher says that through interviews and research ,
persons ,

foreign policy ,

mostly from the Mapai mainstream,

eign policy elite from 1948 to 1968.

he identified 18

who made up the high for-

Within this group he found an

inner circle o f nine who played commanding roles .

�8

From 1948 to

1964,

only 39 persons held ministerial positions and in Israel ' s

.
first

25 years ,

19
.
.
.
inister
s.
there were on1y 4 Foreign M

A look at the composition of the Israeli elite confirms the
Western dominance of the stat e .
foreign policy elite,

Of the 1 8 persons i n Brecher ' s high

13 were born in Eastern Europe .

The inner

circle he identified for the period 1948 to 1968 consisted of David
Ben-Gurion,
Levi Eshko l ,

Moshe Sharrett, . Golda Meir,
Abba Eban,

Pinhas Sapir,

six were born in Europe ,

one was

Moshe Dayan ,

Shimon Pere s ,

and Yigal Allon.

from South Africa,

were native Israelis , both with European parents .

20

Of the s e ,

and only two
The

first Is-

raeli Cabinet had all been born in Eastern Europe between 1880 and
1900 and came to Palestine before 1924 .
eluded eight Europeans,

By 1 9 6 3 ,

two native Israelis ,

the Cabinet in-

and one Iraqui .

1967 Cabinet had nine central or eastern Europeans,
raelis,

and two from other countries .

The

two native Is

21

The fol iowing table shows the geographical origin of Knesset
members through 1961.

It clearly shows the European dominance over

the Israeli legislature .
-
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Geographical Origin of Knesset Members
First
Knesset
1949-51

Region of Birth

Israel
Eastern Europe and
Russia
Central Europe, including Germany
Balkans
Moslem countries
Western Europe ·
United States and
British Commonwealth
Other

Second
Knesset
1951-55

Third
Knesset
1955-59

Fourth
Knesset
1959-61

13

20

18

23

86

84

83

77

10
1
2
1

10
1
3

11
2
5

9
1
9

2
5

1
l

1

1

Of the 212 persons who served as Knesset members from 1948 to 1964,
73% were born in Eastern Europe .

The first Knesset contained four

members of Asian-African origin and three native Israelis of Middle
East background.

In the fifth Knesset of 1961, 9 Easterners were

members as were two native Israelis of Eastern origin.

23

The eighth

Knesset of 1973-1977 had 14 Oriental Jewish members and six Arabs .

24

Those two groups make up about 75% of Israel ' s population yet held
at that time , one-sixth of the Knesset seat s .

The top officials of

the Histadrut are overwhelmingly of Russian , Polis h , and German descent.

25
It appears that the advantages o f European Israelis described in

Chapter 3 and the political party system described in Chapter 4 have
indeed put a European elite in control of Israe l .

I t i s true that

the 1977 Likud victory brought in new faces such as Begin , Ezer
Weizmann , and Ariel Sharon .

But Begin and Sharon had been party

leaders throughout Israel ' s history, and Weizmann is a Herut veteran
whose uncle was the state ' s first President.
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Begin ' s Cabinet also

included Labor Party member Dayan and Yigal Yadin,
of Staff, who was also active in pre-state affairs .

former Army Chief
So Begin ' s Cab-

inet contains many elements of consistency and has not brought drastic change in the nature of Israe l ' s elite.

And should the Begin

government fall, veteran Labor leader Shimon Peres would be the
likely successor.
The fact that most of Israel ' s leaders share common racial
origins and common expeiences in forming the state , undoubtedly
affects their policy positions .

The dominant factor in the per-

spective of all of them is, �f course , their Jewishness.

Regard-

less of other differences , they all believe in Israel as a Jewish
state necessary to solve the Jewish problem.
could ever take a stand against that .

.

No

member o f the: elite

Also, with the exception of

Eban, none of the top Israeli leadership favors real conciliation
with the Arabs.

They may make gestures designed to create a more

peaceful and ' secure situation , but are not really committed to
building friendships with the Arab people .

Most follow Ben-Gurion ,

Meir, Dayan, Begin, Peres, and Allon in emphasizing strength and
coercion in conducting foreign policy.

26

The common personal traits

among Israel ' s leadership are decisiveness, rigidity , and sometimes
extremisrn.

27

Such traits are the result of their obsession with

the heroic fight for statehood and contribute to the aggressiveness
and intransigence of the state ' s foreign policy .
The basic principles of Zionism are adhered to by all members
of the elite.
over the years .

This is reflected in the country ' s policy consistency
Despite stated differences over territorial
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concessions and over taking a moderate or hard line approach toward
the Arabs , policies have not differed much.

Regardless of who has

been Prime Minister or which party has been in control , foreign
policy actions have been quite similar.

Since 1967 , no action has

been taken to indicate a willingness to give up the West Bank or
Gaz a , and both Labor and Likud governments have allowed extensive
Israeli settlements there .

Israel has always followed an aggressive

military policy, both toward perceived threats from Arab states and
Palestinian terrorism.

Israel has not hesitated to use force or to

invade the territory of other countries to achieve policy goals re
gardless of who has been in power .

This is shown by military action

in the 1955 Sinai invasion, the 1967 war, and the recent incursions
into Lebanon .
The historical development of Israe l , the strong influence of
Zionist ideology over state action, overriding concern with security
matters, the superior status of Western Jews aver other groups in
the country , the centralized and party-dominated political system,
the role and functions of political partie s , proportional repre
sentation elections , the lack of vehicles for effectively communi
cating public opinion, and limited access to important information
are all factors in the creation of an elitist system in Israel .

It

could be argued that in Israel ' s short history, dominated by conflict
and war with its neighbors, that it was natural for an elite to
develop as a · guiding force in creating and maintaining the state,
and with time and the achievement of stability, wider participation
in all areas of decision making and more equality in other aspects
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of society would result.

But the present system of distributing

political power and economic resources is so biased toward the ex
isting elite that it has become self-perpetuating, restricting the
opportunities for general public participation in and access to
decision making centers , regardless of external and internal con
ditions.

Also, the rigid views o f the elite and its present con

trol over all major institutions is working against the achievement
of stable conditions that might allow an opening of the system.

The

existence of a Western elite in control of all important aspects of
the society with a system working to perpetuate that control makes
it very likely that past policies will continue .

- 13 2 -

Chapter 6

CONCLUS ION:

THE EFFECT OF ISRAELI DOMESTIC POLITICAL
CHARACTERISTICS ON THE MIDDLE EAST
CONFLICT

French statesman Jean Monnet once said that,
Peace depends not only on treaties and
promises.
It depends essentially on
the creation of conditions which, if they
do not change the nature of men, at least
guide their behavior toward each other in
a peaceful direction. l
Studying the propositions in Chapter 1 has led to the conclusion
that , despite the successful completion of a peace treaty between
Egypt and Israe l , the creation of a state based on Zionist ideology,
the translation of that ideology into government policy, and the
political system of Israel have created conditions that work against
a complete resolution of the Middle East conflict and drive the
participants away from peac e .
One major factor in this situation is the existence of racial
discrimination throughout Israeli society.
racism is a part o f Zionism.
racist tendencies.

Chapter 2 showed that

Several Zionist principles indicate

The basic belief that Jews must be set apart or

liberated from all other people in order to fulfill their individual
and collective potential implies something negative about non-Jews .
The statements of individuals instrumental in the development of t�e
Zionist concept and of those who participated in the political movement express racism more directly.

Lack of concern and even contempt

for other cu�ture s , belief in Jewish superiority, and claims of
greater rights for Jews than for others within Palestine can be seen
in many of the writings and statements of Zionists .
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The European

origin o f Zionism contributed to the development of these ideas as
Zionist leaders adopted the chauvinistic attitudes o f European nationalism.

Some factions of the movement abhorred racism and sought to

rejuvenate Jewish culture by adherence t o high moral standards.

How-

ever, as described in Chapter 3 , the state and the society b u i l t by
the Zionists exhibits a great deal of discrimination , much of which
appears purposely designed into the system.

Evidence presented indi-

cates that discriminatory treatmen t is not limited to non-Jew s , but
is practiced against Jews of African and Asian descent as wel l .

In

areas of citizenship , inc0me and occupational distribution , immigration, education, politics , and culture , the position of and
opportunities for individuals is heavily influenced by race .
_

Euro-

pean Jews have achieved and maintained superior status in Israel
with the help of government policy.
Failing to respond to the needs and desires of Arabs and
Oriental Jews in Israel could threaten the security of Israel from
within.

Yigael Yadin, current Israeli Cabinet memb e r , said that ,
internal problems are so pressing that if
they were to be neglected on the pretext that
we have too much of a defense problem, those
very internal p rob lems would be so exacerbated
that they �ould threaten the very security
of Israe l .

I n 1949 , Israel ' s first Presiden t , Chaim Weizmann , said , "Our
security will to a great extent depend not only on the armies and
navies we can creat e , but on the internal moral stability of the
country, which will in turn influence its external political
stability . 11

3

This s ituation has helped build an atmosphere of distrust ,
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Israe r s

fear, and cultural confrontation in the Middle East.

history o f discrimination against its Arabs and Oriental Jews has
made it appear as a product of Western imperialism rather than as
a necessary entity for the protection of the world ' s Jews .

Leaders

of the Oriental Jewish community have claimed that their relegation to second-class status in Israel diminishes the chances for
rapproachement with the Arab s .

4

The Zionist belief in Jewish

superiority and disrespect for Middle Eastern culture are emotional
issues that involve national and racial pride .

This is especially

dangerous in the Middle East where religious and ellX>tional attachments to the land already play such an important role .

These con-

ditions lead the parties involved to take rigid stances , reducing
the potential for compromise and making meaningful communication
difficult.
The record of Israel on the issue of land is clear .

Zionists

began a pattern of territorial gains long before the establi shment
of Israel that has continued to the present .

Land has been obtained

through direct and indirect purchase , taking over abandoned land,
force of violence , and force of law.

As shown in Chapter 3 , most o f

these actions were sanctioned by the official Zionist organization
and are still supported by the Israeli government .
I

Z:i:onis.t:. control

over land in Palestine was extended during and after the
that created Israe l .

1947

war

It has continued within the state ' s borders

through expropriation of Arab owned land.

More signi ficant , however ,

is Israel ' s tendency to enter and confiscate land in neighboring
countries.

This was attempted unsuccessfully in 1955 with the Sinai
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invasion and successfully in the 1967 war.

Israel defended its 1967

gains from Egypt , Jordan , and Syria in 1973 and has continued a
policy of solidifying its control over the Gaza Strip and the West
Bank areas through the building of settlements there.

In 1979 and

1980, Israeli military forces entered Lebanon, but its intentions
there are not yet clear.

Expansion of the Jewish state is consistent

with, even required by, Zionist ideology.

To achieve the goals of

creating a state for all the world ' s Jews and restoring Jewish con
trol over Eretz Israe l , more land gains are necessary.

Returning

the Sinai peninsula to Egypt does not conflict with Zionism because
it was not part of what is considered as ancient Israel and holds
little religious or historical significance for Zionists.
The Zionist record of expansionism and its j ustification of
that record through its ideological claims of historic and religious
rights is a continuing source of hostility in the Middle East .

It

represents a threat to Arab territorial sovereignty and violates many
international agreements which Israel has been a party to.

Accep

tance of Israe l ' s legitimacy by the Arab states in unlikely while
Israel continues to expropriate the land of its Arab citizens, hold
on to Arab land captured by force , and invade the territory of
neighboring countries regularly.

These actions also block the sat

isfactton of Palestinian Arab demands without which there can be no
resolution of the conflict.

Zionist ideology and its implementation

in the form of territorial expansion are obstacles to a peaceful and
just settlement in the Middle East which would insure stability
there.
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The relationship between domestic and foreign policy is complex.
The discussion so far has emphasized the effect of domestic politics
on foreign policy actions.

But

foreign policy can also be used as a
Israel has pursued an aggressive

tool in achieving domestic goals .

foreign policy throughout its history based on Zionist principles
Besides achieving specific foreign policy objectives ,

and traditions .

this aggressiveness has been an e f fective way to deal with internal
strains .

Uniting its

citizens around an expansionist crusade or in

response to a perceived threat can divert public attention from
social and economic problems .

The poor state of the Israeli economy

and conflict between racial groups make actions

such as capturing

the territory of other states particularly valuable .

Doing nothing

would allow frustrations and animosities to grow and tackling do
mestic issues directly could damage the nation ' s
ment ' s )

cohesion.

(and the govern

Engineering a foreign policy victory has often

been an easy way to unify the nation and avoid confronting difficult
domestic problems .

Considering the seriousness of Israel ' s

problems and the availability of
justification of action,

internal

Zionism as both a source and a

aggressive

foreign policy will likely con

tinue to be an important part of the country ' s politic s .
The dominance of Zionism over Israeli policy decisions
severely limits the range of choice available to government leaders .
Any compromise on major

issues

such as

right to settle parts of the West Bank,
estinian Arabs ,

Israel ' s claim to a historic
the return of land to Pal

and the creation of a Palestinian state would not be

consistent with the Zionist precepts outlined in Chapter 2.
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Chapter

3 indicates that many domestic policy decisions have conformed to
these precepts .

An acknowledgement of legitimate Palestinian

rights in regard to land or nationality would raise questions
about the justification of any set of boundaries for Israel and
about its existence as a Jewish state.

Relinquishing occupied land

would reduce Israe l ' s ability to accommodate new Jewish immigran t s ,
Also,

which is the central task of the state .
economic opportuniti e s ,

social

status ,

granting equal rights ,

and political representation

to non-Jews in Israel would seem to be a weakening of the commit
ment to Zionism ' s goal o f a Jewish state .

If non-Jews can reach

important positions in politics ,

communications ,

areas ,

busine s s ,

or other

the possibility would exist that part of the Jewish state

could be controlled by non-Jews .

So ,

to carry out Zionism,

has worked to eliminate this possibility.
domestic and international difficulties

Israel

Underlying Israel ' s

is the

fundamental Zionist

teaching that anti-Semitism is inherent and incurable.

Israel can

not make concessions to its Arab neighbors nor work to improve the
lives of its non-Jewish citizens if it believes them to be natural
and permanent enemies to Jews and their state.

Major options avail

able to Israel to bring internal justice to the Jewish state and
peace to the .Middle East are not considered because of the influence
of Zionist

ideology over the decision-making proces s .

ible approach· on the part of Israel

A more flex

is neces sary to resolve the

major issues· in the Middle East but impossible within the principles
of Zionism.
It does not appear likely that Zionist ideology will be ignored
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or rejected by Israeli leaders in the forseeable future.

This paper

has documented the significance o f Zionism as the force that created
the state and now guides its actions .

But Chapters 4 and 5 indi

cated that more than commitment to ideological principles in involved
in maintaining the strength of Zionism and the government policies

resulting from it.

Political structure and processes in Israel

operate in a manner that discourages major modification of Zionist
ideas and government policy.

The historical role and position of

political parties contributes greatly to this .

Most of the major

Israeli parties originated as part of the Zionist movement to create
Israel and a.re still loyal to the goals of that movement .

Since the

first election in 1949 , there has been a generally consistent divi
sion of votes among the major parties and alignment s .

Only excep

tional events like the October war of 1973 and the Labor Party scan
dals of 1976 have brought significant change in vote distribution.
Clear and consistent positions on issues by parties is one factor
in this .

Also, the social and financial service functions of the

parties help them to attract and maintain a base of support.
Structural features such as the proportional representation
electoral system; multiple parties ; and the centralized nature of
parties, government, and the economy are causal. factors in ideo
logical and policy consistency.

This system has led to a series of

coalition governments in Israel in which no party represents a
majority of the population.

It has also led to a situation in which

party loyalty is of more importance than public, representation.
Party leaders are primarily interested in maintaining support and
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rely on negotiations with other leaders to make policy decisions and
to maintain power ;

The inevitable results of such a system are a

sluggish and indirect response to public demands and an extremely
slow process of making any changes in policy direction .

The power

of this policy inertia is illustrated by the similarity in foreign
policy actions of past Labor governments and the Likud government
which took control in 197 7 , as detailed in Chapter 4 .

The tendency

toward policy consistency that originated in the commitment to Zion
ism is reinforced by Israe l ' s political structure.
The orientation of these policies is determined not only by
Zionism but also by the nature of the count;r;:y ' s leadership.

Chapter

5 discussed the make-up and the characteristics o f Israel ' s leader
ship and showed it to consist essentially of a small elite of Western
Jews committed to traditional Zionist principles.

The Israeli elite

was created by the superior position of Western Jews throughout the
society and the political structure which protects the position of
existing leaders.

Limited access to significant information also

contributes to elite power .

Ths position of' the elite on major

issues has remained basically the same throughout Israel ' s history.
In fact ,

Ch�p ter S indicated that the individual members of the elite

group have not changed much .

The existence o f this elite and its

influence over policy decisions is an importaht additional factor in
the inflexibility of the Israeli system and the intransigence of its
foreign policy positions .

The combination of the elite ' s commitment

to conservative Zionism and its Western nature and orientation help
continue the expansionist and racist policies of the state .
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The

influence of Israel ' s elite,

together with its political structure ,

limit the possibility that Israel will be open to policy change or
adopt a flexible approach to Middle East issues .
The most significant of all these issues is the question of the
Palestinian Arabs .

People who were displaced through the various

aspects of mass Jewish immigration,
zens within Israe l ,

who exist as second-class citi

or who reside in Israeli-occupied territories

form the crux of the conflict in the Middle East.
raeli response to these people has been varied.
inunigration to Palestine ,

During early Zionist

the existing population was largely ignored.

Upon recognition of their existence ,

the Zionist movement proved in

different to the situation of Palestinian Arabs ,

regarding their own

The military takeover of Arab land by Israel in

goals as paraioount .

1967

Zionist and Is

brought more Arabs under Israeli control and forced the govern

ment to deal with them in some way.

But there has been

no compre

hensive policy on the issue of the Palestinians yet established by
Israel.

Chapter

3

illustrated that Arabs have not been granted full

citizenship wi�hin Israel.

And although Israel has moved to tie the

West Bank economy to its own and has established Jewish settlements
there to extend its contro l ,

it has not accepted the idea of making

the area an official part of Israel .

It also

refuses to seriously

discuss the creation of a Palestinian state to satisfy the demands
of its Arab opponents .

Begin ' s proposed Palestinian autonomy plan

would give Arabs minimal administrative responsibilities while re
taining real control
economic ,

for Israe l .

territorial,

Israel seems to be extracting the

and security benefit of controlling the West
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Bank without accepting complete responsibility for providing benefits
to the area or for giving West Bank residents any voice in deter
mining policy.

This is nothing short of colonization.

It is con

sistent with previous Israeli actions and Zionism in that it
increases the area under Jewish control while refusing to allow
meaningful participation in the system by non-Jews .
Flexibility is the es sential element necessary to resolve the
Palestinian problem and all other Middle East issue s .

No treaty can

be effective in achieving peace and stability without change s in the
attitudes of all parties involved in the conflict .

Since Israel. is

a part of the Middle Eas t , exists on land previously owned by Arabs ,
and was assisted in its creation by much of the international com
munity, it has a primary responsibility in making the necessary ad
justments .

It should grant to Palestinians the same rights to

nationhood that it claimed for Jews , and it should offer to its
neighbor countries the same respect for territorial sovereignty and
security as it demands for itself.

However , commitment to Zionism,

racist and expansionist government policies , a political structure
that works against the achievement of substantial change , and elite
control of the government seriously restrict Israel ' s ability to be
flexible or to alter its existing policies on major Middle East
issue s .
The results o f such a rigid system could b e disastrous for
Israel and the world.

Regardless of any moral responsibility to

deal j ustly with its own citizens and its fellow nations , it is in
Israe l ' s own interest to adjust its ideological perspective and
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change its policie s .

Current domestic policies create internal

conflict that· could affect Israel ' s security from within.

Those

same policies reduce the possibility for Israel to become an ac
cepted member of the Middle East community and have undermined its
international position.

Most dangerous , the present domestic and

foreign policies of Israel and its inflexible political system
could contribute to renewed military conflict in the Middle East.
With the increased political power of Arab nations due to oil , and
the presence of nuclear weapons in Israel, such a conflict would
have worldwide consequences with the possibility of leading to a
big power confrontation.
The threat of such a confrontation is one factor in convincing
the United States to take such a major role in seeking a solution
to Middle East problems .

The Camp Dav,i·d

Accords reached in Septem

ber , 1978, would ' not have been possible without the participation
of the U . S .

The same i s true o f the Egypt-Israel peace treaty

signed in March, 1979.

The negotiation of an official end to the

hostility between Egypt and Israel and their agreement on a general
approach to a comprehensive Middle East peace are obviously signifi
cant.

However, it is not so obvious that they have led to sub

stantial progress toward an overall settlement .

There are basic

weaknesses in the Accords that make achieving this unlikely.

Most

important , the agreement does not recognize a right of the Pales
tinian Arabs . to self-determination.

In fact , residents of the West

Bank and Gaza Strip were not given independent status in future
negotiations but were included as potential participants within the
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delegations of Egypt or Jordan .

Camp

David did not set any

obj ective to be worked for in terms o f the ultimate source of
authority in the occupied territories .

The vagueness of the

agreement leaves in doubt whether Israel intends to relinquish
control over the · area to any significant degree .

Since the de

velopment of any plan for Palestinian autonomy was set up to
occur after the conclusion of the peace treaty,

Israel was not

forced to make any prior commitments on this issue .

The real

meaning of Camp David is that Israel was able to obtain large
benefits while making only minor concessions .
rael agreed to return the Sinai to

Egypt

negotiating proces s ,
not attack it,

In return it re

security would not be compromised in the

that the strongest of its past enemies would

and that economic aid and an adequate oil supply

would be provide d .
peace

Is

and to discuss self

government for the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
ceived promise that its

Essentially,

The Camp David Accords and the subsequent

treaty put Israel in a position from which it could remain

intransigent on the most crucial Middle East issues while becoming
safer than it has ever been .
Thi� intransigence has been a major factor in the criticism of
Israel by the international community.

Israel has been condemned

many times by the UN ,

IOC>St seriously by the
,

Zionism with racism.

As mentioned previously,

1973

resolution equating

many nations and

organizations have protested violations of human rights and inter
national agreements in regard to the occupied territories .
is most sensitive to criticism from
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the United States .

Israel

The U . S .

withheld aid from Israel when it refused to halt work on a
hydroelectric project in the demilitarized zone between Israel and
Syria.

In 1953, when Israeli troops killed a large number of Arabs

in the village o f Qibya, it was the United States that brought the
matter be fore the Security Counci l .

The U . S . also pressured Israel

to withdraw from the Sinai in 1955 and voted to condemn it for a
1966 attack on Jordan.

5

Official criticism was also made over Is-

raeli military action in Lebanon in 1979 , particularly regarding
the use of American supplied weapons there.

Presently , the u . s .

and I srael disagree strenuously over Jewish settlements in the
occupied territories with the U . S . condemning them as obstacles to
peace.
Some changes have resulted from these external pressure s .
Israel did return the Sinai to Egypt. and i s discussing the future
of the West Bank.

Also, its status in the U . S . is still high as

most American officials continue to affirm �upport for Israel.
The Camp David Accords included U . S . guarantees of economic and
military aid and an assurance that an adequate oil supply would be
provided.

A major indication of the limits to U . S . opposition to

Israeli policies was the resignation of UN Ambassador Andrew Young.
Young ' s resignation came after he was' widely condemned for meeting
with the UN observer representing the Palestine Lib..eration Organiza

..-

tion .

Although the meeting was between participants in the UN and

was not intended as a shift in U . S . policy toward the P . L . O . , Israel
and its supporters strongly protested it as a betrayal of the
official line .

The fact that the Carter administration gave in to
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this criticism and allowed Young to resign indicates the strength of
Israel ' s position in the U . S .

Presidential candidate John Connally

encountered this same strength when he stated that Israeli with
drawal from the occupied territories and the creation O f some type
of autonomous entity for Palestinian Arabs would provide a fair
solution to the Middle East conflict.

This approach had been ad

vocated by others previously and was not far from the agreements
reached at Camp David.

But a Presidential candidate publicly

expressing such views brought waves of protest and even Connally
conceded he had lost the Jewish vote .

Further complicating rela

tions between the two countries was the public debate on the Middle
East conducted between leaders of the American black community .
The Young incident opened the issue of U . S . Middle East policy among
blacks , with Jesse Jackson and Joseph Lowery leading the discus
sions .

This group came out in favor o f U . S . recognition of the

P . L . O . and traveled to. the Middle East to meet with Palestinian
leaders.

Vernon Jordan of the Urban League responded by criticizing

Jackson and Lowery and reaffirming the close ties of blacks and Jews
on civil rights issue s .

These incidents illustrate that the rela

tionship between America and Israel is a dynamic one involving many
elements .

But U . S . pressure was the primary force in working out

the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian- Israeli peace treaty.

In

creased aid makes Israel more. dependent on the U . S . , particularly in
light of the. poor state of the Israeli economy .

So despite the

complexities involved; U . S . influence has been and will continue to
be the most si gn�fic an t factor in producing any change in Israeli
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foreign policy.
This does not make progress toward a lasting peace inevitable .
Commitment to the racist and expansionist goals of Zionism, a rigid
political structure, and the closed nature of the cowitry ' s leader
ship limit the ability of Israel to make the changes in policy
necessary to bring an end to the conflict.

The inertia of past

policies is continuin g , as illustrated by the periodic expropriation
of ·more Arab land ,£'or.-· settlements , the fr�quent pronouncements of
historic and religious rights to the occupied territories , and the
replacement of a somewhat flexible Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan
with an ultra-conservative follower of Jabotinsky, Yitzhak Shami r .
Such actions indicate how slow and difficult the process of resol
ving the Middle East conflict will b e .

Zion i s t ideology , its transla

tion into government policy , the cowitry ' s political structure, and
its elitist leadership are to a large degree responsible for th is .
The dangers of war and its consequences that are a part of this
situation will insure the continuation of external pressures which
will b e helpful in bringing about a more flexible Israeli policy .
Howeve r , domestic politics in Israel has so far worked against
peace, stability , and j ustice for all parties in the Middle East
conflict and changes in the the internal situation of Israel must
occur before these goals can be achieve d .

- 147 -

CHAPTER END NOTES

Chapter 1
1

Henry Kissinge r , American Foreign Policy (New York : W . W . Norton
and Co . , 1969) , p . 1 2 .
2

Marian Irish and Elke Frank , U . S . Foreign Policy: Context, Conduct,
Content ( New York ; Harcourt , Brace , Jovanovich , Inc . , 197S ) , p . 64 .
3

Maxime Rodinson , Israel : A Colonial-Settler State? (New York:
Monad Pres s , 197 3 ) , p . 4 4 .
4

Keesing Research Report s , The Arab-Is raeli Conflict (NewYork :
Charles Scribner ' s Son s , 1 9 68 ) , p . 2 .
5

V . D . Segre, Israe l : A Society in Transition (London : Oxford
University Pres s , 19 7 1 ) , p . 1 7 6 .
6

The Balfour Dclaration, British Foreign Office , Nov . 2 , 1 9 1 7 .

7
8

Rodinson, Israe l :

A Colonial- Settler State ? , pp . 45-4 7 .

Ibi d . , , p . S S .

9

uri Avnery, Israel Without Zionists : A Plea for Peace in the
Middle East (NewYork : Macmillan , 1968) , p . 8S .
lO

ibid . , p . 22 4 .

11
12

Ibid . , p . S8 .
Rodinson , Israe l : A Colonial-Settler State ? , p . 56 .

13
Keesing Research Reports , The Arab-Israeli Conflict , p . 6 .
14

Avnery, Israel Without Zionis ts , p . 1 9 6 .

15

Ibid.

16

Erskine B . Childe rs , "The Other Exodous , " Palestine : A Search for
Truth , edited by Alan . R. Taylor and Richard Tetlie (Washington , D .C . :
Pub l i c Affairs Press , 1 9 68 ) , p . 1 9 1 .
17

samuel J . Roberts , Survival or Hegemony: The Foundations o f
Israeli Foreign Policy (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins Unive rsity Pres s ,
1 9 7 3 ) , pp . 34 , 37 .
.,
I

Chapter 2
1

1eo Pinsker , "Auto-Emancipation , " The Zionist Idea, edited b y
Arthur Herzberg ( New York: Harper and Row , 1959 ) , p p . 185-6.
2

Theodor Herzl , The Jewish State, translated by Harry Zohn (New
York : Herzl Press, 1970) , p . 4 4 .
3
Walter Laque r , A History of Zionism (New York: Hol t , Rinehart , and
Wins ton, 19 72) , p . 9 1 .
4

Martin Bub e r , On Zion : The History o f an Idea (London : Horovi t z
Publishing, 1 9 7 3 ) , p p . 5 3 , 7 7 .
5
6

Ibid. , p . 9 3.
1bid . , p . 1 33 .

7

Hans Kohn, "Zionism and the National Idea , " Zionism Reconside red,
edited by Michael Selzer (New YOrk : Macmillan and Co . , 1970) , pp . 1 84-185 .
8
9

!b i d .
Laque r , A History o f Zionism, p . 2 1 5 .

lO

lbid . , p . 240-24 1 .

11

sami' Hadaw1. , Bitter Harvest (.New York : The New World Press , 1 9 6 7 ) ,
pp . 190- 1 9 1 .
12

chaim Weizman n , Trial and Error (New York : Harper and Brothers ,
1949) , p . 46 2 .
13

Laque r , A ·His tory o f Zionism, p . 25 1 and Rael Jean Isaac, Israel
Divided : Ideological Politics in the Jewish State (Baltimore : Johns
Hopkins University Press , 1 9 76 ) , p . 29 .
14
Bub e r , On Zion , p . 1 2 2 .
15

Ibid . , p . 1 45 .

16

Ben Halpern , The Idea of the Jewish State ( Cambridge : Harvard
University Press, 1969) , pp. 142 , 34 5 .
17

Avne ry , Is·rael Without Zionists , p . 5 8 .

18

Janice J . Terry , "Zionist Atti tudes Toward Arab s , " Journal 0 f
Palestine Studies , Vo l . V I , No . l , Autumn 1976 , p . 69 .
19
20

Rodinson , Israe l : A Colonial-Settler State ? , p . 20 .

1nterview with Frank Giles , Sunday Times , June 1 5 , 1969. Quoted
in Terry , "Zionist Atti tudes Toward Arab s . '' pp. 93-94.

21

Terry, "Zionist Attitudes Toward Arab s , " pp . 9 3- 9 4 .

22

Max Nordc:u, " Speech to the First Zion i s t Congre s s , " The Zionist
Idea, edited by Herzberg, p p . 235-24 1 .
23
willi�m B . Zif f , The Rape of Pales�ine (London : S t . Botolph ' s
Press , 1948) , pp . 1 49 , 1 5 4 , 1 9 0 , 329 .
24

J . L . Talmon , Israel Among the Nations (London : Weidenfield and
Nicholson, 1970) , p . 1 8 3 .
25
.

.
, Trial and Error, p . 46 2 .
weizmann

26

David Ben-�urion, Ben-Gurion Looks Back in Talks With Moshe Pearl
man (New York: Simon and Schus t e r , 1 9 65 ) , p . 16 1 . Quoted in Terry,
"Zionist Atti tudes Toward Arab s , " p . 6 9 .
27

Avnery, Israel Without Zionis t s , p . 8 3 .

28

L . Humphrey Walz , "Zionism? Racism? What Do You Mean ? " , The Link,
Vol . 8 , No . 5 , Win ter 1975-76 , p . l .
29

Rod 1nson,
'
Israe l : A Colonial Settler-State ? , p . 1 6 .

30
Joanne McKenna, "Zionism or Racism? " , Palestine Dige s t , Vol . 5 , No .
1 2 , March , 1 9 7 6 , p . 1 2 .
31

Alan R . Tay l o r , "The Isolation o f Israe l " , Journal o f Palestine
Studies , Vol . IV , No . I , Autumn 1 9 7 4 , p . 88 .
32

Halpern, The Idea o f the Jewish State , p . 20 8 .

33

navid Ben-Gurion , Israe l : A Personal History (New York : Funk and
Wagnalls , Inc . , 1 9 7 1 ) , p . 4 1 .
34

Ben-Gurion , introduction to the History o f the Haganah ( 19 54 ) .
Quoted in Roger . Garaudy , "Religious and Historical Precepts o f Zionism",
Journal of Palestine Studies , Vol . V I , No. 2 , Winter 19 7 7 , p . 4 1 .
35
36

united Nations Resolution, November 2 9 , 1 9 4 7 .
Bub e r , On Zion, p . 1 32 .

37

Isaac, Israel Divide d , p . 20 .

38

Alan R . Tayl o r , "The Aftermath o f Statehood " , Pales tin e : A
Search for Truth , edited by Taylor and Tetlie , p . 28 1 .
39

v1adimir Jabotinsky , "Evidence Submi tted to the Palestine Royal
Commission " , The Zionist Idea, edited by Hertzberg, pp . 56 3 , 5 6 7 .
40
.
B en- Gurion
, Israel: A Personal History, p . 79 8 .

41

Ibid . ' p . 2 3 0 .

42

Ibid . ,

43

p . 76 .

Ibid . , p . 77 .

44
Menahem Begin, The Revolt (Los Angeles : Nash Publishing, 1948) ,
p . 335 .
45

Hyman Lume r , Zion ism: Its Role in World Politics (New York : Inter
national Publishers, 1 9 7 3 ) , p . 35 .
46
Elmer Berger , "A Letter From an American Rabbi to an Arab Ambassador", The Link, Vol . 8 , No . 5 , Winter 1975-76 , p . 1 3 .
47

Ibid .

48
Buber , On Zion , p . 1 3 .
49

united Nations Resolution 2 106 , December 2 1 , 1965 .

50

Donald Wil l , "The UN, Zionism, and Racism", The Link, Vol . 8 , No . 5 ,
Winter 1975-76 , p . 7 .

Chapter 3
1

Hadawi Bitter Harve s t , p . 1 9 9 .

2

Will, "The U N , Zionism, and Racism", p . 8 .

3

Michael Adams , "Israel ' s Treatment o f the Arabs in the Occupied
Territories " , Journal o f Palestine Studies , Vol . VI , No . 2 , Winter 1 9 7 7 ,
p . 23 .
4
w . F . Abbous h i , Political Sys tems o f the Middle East in the Twenti
eth Century ( New York : Dodd, Mead , and Co . , 1 9 70 ) , p p . 2 14-2 1 5 .
5

congressional Record, Nov. 1 1 , 1975 , p . Hl093 1 .

6
Alex Weingro d , Israel : Group Relations in a New Society (New York :
Praeger , 1965 ) , p . 15 .
7

Ben-Gurion , Israe l : A Personal History, p . 838.

8

g

celia S. Heller, "The Emer ing Consciousness o f the Ethnic f'roblems
Among the Jews o f Israel�', Israel : Social Structure and Change , edited
by Michael Curtis and Mordecai Chertoff (New Brunswick : Transaction, Inc . ,
1 9 7 3 ) , p . 32 8 .
9

Marian Woolfson , Palestine Diges t , Vol . 5 , No . 12 , March , 1976 , p . 15 .

10
Adams , "Israe l ' s Treatment o f the Arabs in the Occupied Territories " , p . 2 4 .
11

Edwin Samuel , The Structure o f Society in Israel (New York:
Random House, 1969 ) , p . 1 0 3 .
12

Tawfiq Zayad , "The Fate o f Arabs in Israel", Journal o f Palestine
Studies, Vol . VI , No . l , autumn 1 9 7 6 , p . 95 .
13
Adams , "Israe l ' s Treatment o f the Arabs in the Occupied Territories", p . 2 6 .
14

Leonard Fein, Politics in Israel (Boston : Lit t l e , Brown , and Co . ,
1967) ' p . 5 7 .
15'lQ:f.cl .. .

,

__

· : _� ·'; :·:;· ...

.

.

.

.

·
:. .'_� · .r. ... -··::: L.:.� · · .::. . � .:... ,:; �i .. :.... . �:.. .�·,!... . ·.�..:. - . :::· .. .

- ..

..

�,

,

.

.

� !·

• •

16
.
. y, p . 1 8 .
.
in
a New S ociet
weingro d , I srae 1 : Group Re1 ations
·

17

Ibid . , p . 26

18

Ibid . , p . 2 7 .

19

Howard Pack, "Income Distribution and Economic Development : The
Case o f Israel " , Israel : Social Structure and Change , edited by Curtis
and Chertof f , p . 1 7 7 .
2°
Fred M . Gottheil, "On the Economic Development o f the Arab Region
in Israe l " , Israe l : Social Structure and Change , edited by Curtis and
Chertof f , p . 1 7 7 .
21

Fein, Politics in Israe l , p . 2 13 .

22

Ann Crit tenden , "Israel ' s Economic Pligh t " , Foreign Affairs , Vol.
5 7 , No . 5 , Summer , 1 9 7 9 , p . 10 1 2 .
23

Pack, "The Case o f Israel" . p . 189 .

24
Michael Brecher , The Foreign Policy System of Israel ( New Haven :
Yale University Press, 1 9 72 ) , p . 98 .
25

Pack, "The Case o f Israel", p . 189 and Ibid.

26

Bernard Reich, Israe l ' s Que s t for Security , " Current History,
Vol . 62 , No . 365 , January , 1 9 7 2 .
27

Nadav Safran, Israeli Politics Since the 1 9 6 7 War", Current His
tory, Vol . 66 , No. 3 5 3 , January , 1 9 7 1 .
28
nwight James Simpson, "Israel After Twenty Five Years " , Current
History, Vol . 64 , No . 37 7 , Jan . , 1 9 7 3 .
29

'-1 c: ·.

;"

crittenden , "Israel ' s Economic Pligh t " , p . 10 1 1 .

: .,

.

. .
. ., _

..

·:. ·, .�

.�. . r·

, .

:. .. 1·-� .

· ,·

J;. .

•

.

•

'.. ..\

;·

.. : t

• �;•

•

:'

.

.

. ... . �� :.'· .. .

J

...

.

.. . -

.

30

Dwight James Simpson , "Israe l ' s Year of Decision", Current History,
Vol . 70 , No. 4 1 2 , Jan . , 1 9 7 6 , p . 1 1 .
31

Ibid.

32

Ibid .

33

Ibi d .

34

Bernard Reich , "Israe l ' s Time of Tranquility " , Current History,
Jan . , 197 7 .
35

Peter Keeln e r , "Israe l ' s Economy on the Brink , " Middle East International, No . 72 , June , 1 9 7 7 , p . 6 7 .
36

Reich, "Israe l ' s Time of Tranquility".

37

Bernard Reich , " Israe l ' s Year of Decision", Current History,
Jan , 19 7 8 , p . l7 .
•

38
39

Crittenden , Israel ' s Economic Pligh t " , p . 1008.
Ibid.

40
41

rbid.
Ibid.

42

Hyman Lumer , "Zionism i s Racism", Palestine Dige s t , Vol . 5 ,
No . 1 2 , March, 1 9 7 6 , p . 19 .
43
44

Fein, Politics in Israel, p . 22 3 .

Pack, "The Case of Israel", p . 1 8 5 .

45

Henry Toledan o , "Time to S t i r the Melting Pot " , Israe l : Social'
Structure and Change , edited by Curtis and Chertof f , p . 20 0 .
46

Pack, "The Case of Israe l , " p . 1 85 .

47

oded Remb a , "Income Inequality in Israe l : Ethnic Aspec t s " , Israe l :
Social Structure and Change , edited by Curtis and Che rtoff. p . 20 0 .
48
Toledano , "Time to S t i r the Melting Pot " , p . 33 7 .
49

shlomo Avineri , "Israel : Two Nation s ? " , Israel : Social Structure
and Change , edited by Curtis and Cherto f f , p . 2 9 8 .
SO
Elia T . Zure i k , "Transformation of Class St ructure Among the Arabs
in Israel : From Peasantry to Proletariat", Journal o f Palestine Studies ,
Vol. V I , Nci, l , Autumn 1 9 7 6 , p . 5 9 .
51

Ibi d .

52

Zayad , "The Fate o f the Arabs in Israel", p . 98 .

53

11News Out of Israel�', Middle East International, No , 5 2 , Dec . ,
197 5 , p . 20 .
54

zure i k , "Transformatiom o f Class S t ructure among the Arabs in
Israe l , " pp . 57-59 .
55

Ibid.

56

Fred M . Gottheil, "On the Economic Development o f the Arab Region
in Israel", p p . 239-240.
57

Gunnar Myrdal , Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Region s , (New
York : Harper and Row, 195 7 ) , Chapter 3 .
58

Gottheil , "On the Economic Development o f the Arab Region in
Israel", p . 2 45 .
59

Brian Van Arkad i e , "The Impact o f the Israeli Occupation on the
Economies of the West Bank and Gaza", Journal of Palestine Studies,
Vol . V I , No . 2 , Winter 1 9 7 7 , pp. 1 0 3- 1 1 2 .
60
Maxime Rodinson , Israel : A Colonial-Settler State? , p . 14 .
61
van Arkadie , "The Impact of the Israeli Occupation on the Econo
mies of the West Bank and Gaza", p . 1 18 .
62

Brecher, The Foreign Policy Sys tem of Israel , p . 2 8 6 .

63
64

.
Fein, Politics in Israe l , pp . 1 7- 1 8 .
Ibid . , p . 18

65
Avnery, Israel Without Zionists , p . 84 .
66

Woolfson , Palestine Dige s t , p . 14 .

67
Walz, "Zionism? Racism? What Do You Mean ? " , p . l .
68
S . n . Eisen s t ad t , Israeli Society (New York: Basic Books, 1967) ,
p . 39 7 .
69

J . Joseph Loewenburg, "Histadrut : Myth and Real i t y " , Israel :
Social S t ructure and Change , edited b y Curtis and Che r t o f f , p . 2 5 2 .
70
walz, "Zionism? Racism? What !Jo You Mean ? " , p . l .
71
72

Lumer , Zionism: Its Role in World Politics, p . 19 .

Gotthei l , "On the Economic Development of the Arab Region in
Israel " , p . 2 4 1 .

73

zure i k , "Trans formation of Class Structure Among the Arabs in
Israe l " , p p . 50-5 1 .
74

Ibid.

75

Samue l , The S t ructure o f Society in Israel , p . 106

•

.

76

11News Out o f Israel", Middle East International , No . 60 , Jun e ,
1976, p . 1 7 .
77

Eisenstad t , Israeli Society, p . 162 .

78
79

Remba , . "Income Inequal ity in Israel", p . 20 9 .
Toledano, "Time to Stir the Melting Pot , " p . 338*

80
Yoram Ben-Porath, "On East-We s t Differences in Occupational
Structure in Israel " , Israel : Social St ructure and Change , edited b y
Curtis and Che r t o f f , p . 2 3 2 .
81

Hadaw i , Bitter Harvest , pp . 2 1 2-2 16 .

82

Ibid .

83
Adams , "Israel ' s Treatment of the Arabs in the Occupied Territories", p . 28 .
84

zayad , "The Fate o f the Arabs in Israel", p . 100.

85

Ibid .

86
.
Ben-Gurion , Israe l : A Personal History, p . 74 1 .
87
88
89

Eisenstad t , I s raeli Society, p . 39 8 .
Samuel , The Structure of Society in Israel , p . 10 5 .
Ibid . , p . 1 3 2 .

90

Seymour Martin Lips e t , "The Israeli Dilemma", Israel : Social
Structure and Change , edited by Curtis and Chertof f , p . 35 3 .
91
92

Garaudy , "Religious and Historical Precepts o f Zionism", p . 48 .
Eisens t a d t , Israeli Society, p , 40 4 .

93
Garaud y , "Religious and His to::ical Precepts of Zionism',' , p . 48 .
94

Elia T . Zureik , "Arab Youth in Israel : Their Situat ion and Status
perceptions " , Journal of Pale s t ine Studies, Vol . II I , No . 3 , p . 104 .
9 5 11
New Out of Israel" , Middle East Inte.rn ational, No . 58 , Apri l , 1 9 7 6 .
96

Ibi d .

·

97

walter Ackerman , "Reforming Israeli Education , " Israel : Social
Structure and Change , edited by Curtis and Chertof f , p . 39 J .
98
Eisen s t a d t , Israeli Society, pp . 2 4 8 , 2 6 4 . ·
99

rbid . , " pp264-265.

lOO i
bid.
l Ol

ib id . , and Ackerman , "Reforming Israeli Education " , p p . 397-399 ;
and Elad Pelled, "Education, The Social Challenge " , Israel : Social
Structure and Change , edited by Curtis and Chertoff , p p . 392-39 3 .
102
Ackerman , "Reforming Israeli Education", p . 400.
103
Pack, "The Case of Israel" , p . 1 9 3 .
104
Moshe Lissak, "Pluralism in Israeli Society, " Israe l : Social
Structure and Change , edited b y Curtis and Chertof f , p . 3 7 3 .
105

Toledan o , "Time to Stir the Melting Pot" , p . 339 .

106
Ackerman , "Reforming Israeli Education " , p . 40 7 .
107

Fein
. , Politics in Israel, p . 1 2 1 .

1 08
Remb a , "Income Inequali t y in Israe l " , p . 20 8 .
109

Fe in , Politics in Israe l , p . 12 1 .

1 10

Toledan o , "Time to S t i r the Melting Po t " , p . 339 .

111

Ibid . ' p . 34 1 .

112

Lip s e t , "The Israeli Dil emma " , p . 35 0 .

ll J

ibid . , p . 35 4 .

1 1 4 11

.
News Out of I srael ", , Middle East Internationa
1 , No . 5 7 , June ,
7
19 6 , p . 2 2 .
·1 1 5

Fein, Politics in Israel, p . 6 1 .

1 16
Avineri , "Israe l : Two Nations " , p . 2 8 8 .
u7

Fein, Politics i n Israe l , p . 145 .

118
119

Ibid .
Ibi d .

120
Abbous h i . Political Sys tems of the Middle East in the Tewn t i e th
Cen tury, pp . 2 19-2 20 .

121

Hadawi , Bitter Harvest , p . 22 2 .

122

Daniel J . Elazar, "Local Government as an Integrating Factor in
Israeli Societ y " , Israel : Social Struct ure and Change , edited by Curtis
and Cher t o f f , p . 24 .
123
Avin£ r i , "Israel : Two Nation s ? " , p . 2 9 0 .
124

Zureik, "Arab Youth in Israel " , p . 9 9 .

125

Ibid.

.
Charles Glass, "Jews Against Zion " , Journal of Palestine Studies,
Vol . V , No . l and 2 , Autumn 1975/Winter 1976 , p . 76 .
126

127

Samuel , The Structure o f Society in Israel , pp . .143- 1 4 4 .

128

Rustun Bastumi, "The Arab Israelis " , Israel : Social Structure
and Change , edited by Curtis and Cherto f f , p . 4 1 2 .
129

Ibid . , p . 4 14 .

130
Avne ry , Israel Without Zion i s t s , p . 15 .
131
132

Lumer , Zionism: Its Role in World Politics , p . 2 1 .
Ibid.

133

Toledan o , "TimP. t o Stir the _Me l ting Pot " , p . 342 .

1 34

Ibid.

135

Raphael Patai, Israel Between East and West (Westport : Greenwood ,
1953) ; and Toledano, "Time to Stir the Melting Pot " , p . 336 ; and
Eisens tadt , Israeli Society, p . 196 .
136

Raphael Patai, "Western and Oriental Culture in Israe l " , Israe l :
Social Structure and Change , edited by Curtis and Cher t o f f , p p . 309-310.
137

Abboush i , Political Sys te ms o f the Middle East in the Twentieth
Century , pp . 2 1 3-2 1 4 .
1 38

sabri Jiryis , "The Land Question in Israe l " , Journal of Pales
tine Studie s , Vol . 6 , No . S and 6 , Augus t/Sep temb e r , 1 9 7 6 , p . l .
1 39

Samuel , The Structure o f Society in Israe l , p . 1 3 .

140
Jiryis, "The Land Question in Israel", p . l .
1 41
Weizmann , Trial and Error, p . 186 .
1 42

Ibid.

143
Avne ry, Israel Without Zionis t s , p . 70 .
144

Erskine B . Childers , "The Broken Triangle " , Palestine : A Search
for Truth , edited by Taylr and Tetlie , p p . 81-82 .
14S

.
, Israel : A Personal History, p . 6 7 0 .
Ben-Gurion

146

Ibid . , p . 804 .

147

Samuel , The St ructure of Society in Israe l , p . 9 8 .

148
Childers , "The Other Exodous 1 1 , p . 9 4 .
149

sabri Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel . (New York: Monthly Review
Press , 1976) , p . 78 .
lS O

ibid . , pp . 78-79.

151

zureik , Transformation of Class Structure Among the Arabs in
Israel 1 1 , p . 6 0 .
152

Jiry i s , The Arabs in Israel , p p . 83-84 .

153

Ibid . , p . 86 .

154
155

Ib id.
Ibid . , p . 89 .

156

Ibid . , p p . 90-9 1 .

157
·
H ad awi
Bi tter H arve s t , p p . 203-204

•

158
Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel , p . 9 2 .
159

Ibid.

160 1
wa z , "Zionism? Racism? What Do You Mean ? " , p . 1 .
16 1

Article 4 , Emergency Regulation Ordinance 5709 , 1949 .
in Jiryis , The Arabs in Israe l , p . 9 4 .
162

Quoted

Ibid . , p p . 94-9 5 .

163

zureik, "Transformation o f Class Structure Among the Arabs in
Israe l " , p . 46 .
164

Jiryis , The Arabs in Israel , p . 9 5 .

165
166

Ibid . , p . 96 .

Article 2 , Land Acquisition Law 5 7 1 3 , 1 9 5 3 .
The Arabs in Israel , p . 9 7 .

Quoted in Jiryis ,

167

Ibid.

168
Lawrence H. DeBivort , "Paradoxes in the Con f l i c t " , Palestine : A
Search for Trut h , edited by Taylor and Tetlie , p . 1 5 8 .
1 69

Ibid�, and Abboushi , Political Systems o f the Middle East in the
Twentieth Century, p . 1 5 8 .
170
Abboushi , Political Systems o f the Middle East in the Twen tieth
Century, p . 1 7 7 .
·

171

.
Glas s , "Jews Against Zion", p . 7 7 .

172

Edgar O ' Ballance , The Third Arab-Israeli War (Hamden , Conn . :
Archon Books, 1 9 7 2 ) , p . 2 7 2 .
173

John Ruedy, "Guidelines t o a Solution", Palestine : A Search f.or
Truth, edited by Taylor and Tetlie , p . 1 5 8 .
174

Elish Efrat, Guidelines for Regional and Physical Planning
(Jerusalem: Israel Ministry o f Interior , Planning Department , 1970 ) .
Quoted in Abu-Ayash and Abdul-Ilah, "Israeli Regional Planning in the
Occupied Territorie s " , Journal of Palestine Studies , Vol . V , No . 3 and 4 ,
Spring/Summer 1 9 7 6 , p p . 84-85.
.
175
Colonel Merrill A . McPeak , "Israel : Borders and Security " ,
Foreign Affairs , Vol . 54 , no . 3 , April , 1 976 , p . 435 .
176

Adams , "Israe l ' s Treatment o f the Arabs in the Occupied Territories " , p p . 36- 37 .
177
- Sunday Times , June 1 9 , 1 9 7 7 , p . 17 .
178
Adams , "Israe l ' s Treatment o f the Arabs i n the Occupied Territories " , p . 3 7 .
1 79

Arabic Bulletin o f Institute for Palestine Studies , "Palestinian
Emigration and Israeli Land Expropriat ion in the Occupied Territorie s " ,
Journal o f Palestine Studies, Vol . II I , No . l , Autumn 1 9 7 3 , p . 10 7 ; and
Glass , "Jews Against Zion " , p . 16 1 .
180
181

Efrat , Guidelines for Regional and Physical Planning, p . 9 5 .
Glas s , "Jews Against Zion " , p . 1 7 3 .

182

Arab ic Bulletin of Institute o f Palestinian Studies , "Pales
tinian Emigration and Israeli Land Expropriation in the Occupied Terri
tories", pp . 10 7 , 1 10 .
183

H . D . S . Greenway , "Renewal Drives Arabs From Traditional Jewish
Home s " , Wash ington Pos t , Jan . 16 , 1 9 7 7 .
'
:

�

, ..

.

'

.

"

"

.

.

· .

. ' ' ....: . � .� :· . : .
··. � ·-

' .

L
'

.. •,

,..
.

.

.

• t.
.

.

•

':

•

�

• • f � ..
•
•
:

. -.

-; .

. .

184

11Jerusalem Christians Protest Arab Eviction s " , Pales-tine
Digest , Vol . 6 , No. 1 2 , March, 1 9 7 7 , p . l .
185
Golda Meir, My Life (New York : G . P . Putnam ' s Son s , 1975) ,
p p . 407-408.
186

lb id. , p . 3 7 3 .

187
Edmund R . Hanaue r , "Human Righ t s and Israeli Settlement s , "
Palestine Digest , Vol . 8 , No . 10 , Jan . , 1979 . p . 5 .
188
Ann M0seley Lesch, "Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Terri
tories, 1967- 1 9 7 7 " , Jc,urnal of Palestine Studies, p . 5 .
189

rbid . , p . 26 ; and Hanauer , ''Human Righ ts and Israeli Settle
men t s " , p . 5 .
190

rbid.

191

Lesch , "Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territorie s , 19671977", p . 2 6 .
192

Hanaue r , "Human Rights and Israeli Settlemen t s " , p . 5 .

193

"U . S . Joins U N Resolution Censuring Israeli Policies " , Wash
ington Pos t , Nov. 1 2 , 1 9 7 6 .
194
Abu-Ayash and Abdul-Ilah, "Israeli Regional Planning in the
Occupied Territories , " p . 9 7 .
195
196

Ibid . , pp . 96-9 7 .
Ibid . , p . 9 8 .

197

Ben-Gurion , Israe l : A Personal History, p . 800 .

198
Avne ry, Israel Without Zionist s , p . 182 .

Chapte r 4
1

Brech e r , The Foreign Policy System of Israel, p p . 1 1 8- 1 1 9 : and
Abbous h i , Political Systems of the Middle East in the Twentieth Cen
turl, p . 2 3 8 .
2

Abbous h i , Political Sxstems of the Middle East in the Twentieth
Century, p . 25 5 .

3
Ben-Gurion , Israel : A Personal History, , p . 3 1 1 .
4
5
6
7

Eisenstad t , Israeli Society, p . 40 2 .
Avnery, Israel Without Zionis t s , p . 1 7 4 .
Eisens tad t , Israeli Society, p . 33 7 .
Avnery, Israel Without Zionis t s , p . 1 7 4 .

8
Abbous h i , Political Sys tems o f the Middle East in the Twen tieth
Century, p . 2 37 ; and Brech e r , The Foreign Policy Sys tem o f Israe l , p . 1 1 9 .
9

Brech e r , The Foreign Policy System o f Is ra�l , p . 220 ; and Avnery,
Israel Without Zionis t & , p . 1 76 .
10
Avnery , Israel Without Zionists , p . 1 7 6 .
'
Abboush i , Political Systems of the Middle East in the Twen tieth
Century, p . 2 5 .4 .
11

12

Lume r , "Zionism i s Racism", p .1 9 .
•

13

Abboushi , Polit ical Systems o f the Middle East in the Twentieth
Century, p . 25 6 .
14
15

Ibid . , 2 5 4 .
Avnery , Israel Without Zion is t s , p . 1 7 3 .

16

Lumer , Zionism is Racism", p . 19 .

17

Abboushi , Political Systems of the Middle East in the Twentieth
Century, p . 2 5 6 .
lS

ibid . , pp . 2 5 1 , 2 5 6 .

19

Election results available i n Israeli Government Yearbook for
respective years; Official Gaze tte for respective years ; and many
secondary sources .
20
21
22
23
24

Eisenstad t , Israeli Society, p . 30 4 .
Fein , Politics in Israe l , p . 74 .
Ihid . , pp . 74- 7 5 .
Eisenstad t , Israeli Society, · p . 39 2 .

Abboushi, Political Sys tems o f the Middle East in the Twentieth
Century, p . 24 2 .

25

0 ' Ballance, The Third Arab-Israeli War, p . 3 3 .

26

Abboushi, Political Sys tems o f the Middle East in the Twen tieth
Century, p . 2 4 2 .
27

Safran , "Israeli Politics Since the 1 9 6 7 War,

28

p . 22 .

Ibid.

29 1
1 News Out o f Israel " , Middle East International , No . 58 , March ,
1 9 7 6 , pp . 22 -2 3 .
30

Reich, " Israe l ' s Year o f DeciRion " , p . 16 .

31

Dwight James Simpson , "Israel After Thirty Year s " , Current
History, Vol . 76 , No . 44 3 ,Jan . , 1979 , pp . 1 6- 1 7 .
32

. h , " Israe l ' s Year o f Decision " , p . 16 .
Reic

33
34
35

Ibid.
Fein, Politics in Israel, p . 74 .

Brecher, The Foreign Policx Sys tem o f Israel , p . 1 7 3 .

36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

Ibi d .
1bid.
Ibi d .
Eisens tad t , Israeli Society, p . 33 7 .
.
Politics in Israe l , p . 88 .
F ein,
Ibi d .
Reich , "Israel ' s Que s t for Security", p . 2 .
Ib i d .

44
Robert s , Survival o r Hegemony, p . 1 2 6 .
45

11News Out o f Israe l " , Middle East International , No . 58 , March ,
1976 , p . 22 .
46
47

. h , Israel ' s Year o f Decis ion " , p . 18 .
Reic

Tue discussion o f the Begin government ' s autonomy proposals is
based on a compilation o f information from the following sources :
William Claiborne , "Israel Holds Firm", Washington Pos t , May 2 5 , 1 9 79 ;
William Claiborne , "Begin Presents Palestinian Autonomy Plan to

Cabinet Group" , Washington Pos t , May 4 , 1979 ; and Anan Safadi ,
"Begin ' s Autonomy Plan Approved by Government Team'..' , Jerusalem Pos t ,
May 2 0 , 1979 .
48
49

Reich , "Israe l ' s Year o f Decision", p . 19 .
Brecher , The Foreign Policy System of Israe l , pp . 120-12 1 .

SOF
ein , Politics in Israe l , p . 93 .
51

Avnery, Israel Without Zionis t s , pp . 1 7 3- 1 7 4 .

52

Fein, Politics in Israel , p . 9 3 .

53
Weingrod , Israe l : Group Relations in a New Society, p . 72 .
54

Isaac, Israel Divided, p . 66 .

55

Ibid . , pp . 4 1 , 4 4 , 4 9 , 155 .

56

Ibid . , pp . 92-102 .

57

Ibid . , p p . 1 12- 1 1 4 .

58
59

Ibid . , p p . 127-129 .
tbid . , p p . 123-126 .

GO !

b id . , p . 1 2 8 .

61t
bid .
62
63
64

Ibid . , p . 14 1 .
Ibi d . , p p . 140-145 .
Brecher, The Foreign Policy Sys tem of Israe l , p . 1 7 6 .

Chapter 5
1
2

Fein, Politics in Israe l , p . 22 4 .
Weingro d , Israe l : Group Relations in a New Society, p . 16 .

3
4
5

Segre, Israel : A Society in Transition, p . 78 .
Ibid . , p . 1 39 .
Fein, Politics in Israel, p . 22 4 .

6

Ibid.

7

Eisenstad t , Israeli Society, p . 304 ; and Brecher, The Foreig_n
Policy Sys tem of Israe l , p . 160.
8
9

Fein, Politics in Israel ,

p . 37 .

Weingrod , Israel : Group Relations in a New Society, pp . 26-2 8 .

lO

ibid . , p . 45 .

11

Segre , Israel : A Society in Transi t i on , p . 1 3 9 .

12

Yuval Elizur and Eliahu Salpe t e r , Who Rules Israe l ? (New York :
Harper and Row , 1973) , p . 10 .
13

Ibid . , p . 1 2 .

14
Weingro d , Israel : Group Relations in a New Society, p p . 6 2 - 6 3 .
15

Brecher, The Foreig_n Policy Sys tem of Israel, pp . 1 2 7 , 1 3 1 .

16
17

Ibid . , p . 1 6 0 .
Elizur and Salpeter, Who Rules Israel?, p . vi i .

18
Brecher, The Foreign Policy Sys tem of Israe l , pp . 2 1 7 , 2 19 .
19

Ibid . , p p . 1 20 , 2 18 .

20

rbid . , pp . 2 19 - 2 2 0 .

21

Segre, Israel : A Society in Transition , p . 14 1 ; and Fein, Politics
in Israe l , p p . 1 5 2 - 1 5 3 .
22

B . Akzin , "The Knesse t " , International Social Science Journal ,
3
Vol . 1 , No . 4 , 196 1 , p . 5 7 1 .
23

Fein, Politics in Israe l , p p . 152- 1 5 3 .

241

1News Out of Israel , " Middle �as t international, No . 5 7 , June ,
1 9 7 6 , p . 22 ; and Avnery, Israel Without Zionis t� ,. p . 288.
25
26
27

toewenburg , "Histadrut : Myth and Reality" , p . 26 4 .
Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel, p p . 246 , 24 7 , 36 6 .
Ibid . , P . 2 5 0 .

Chapter
1
2

6

Mei r , My Li fe , p . 4 1 7 .
Segre, Israe l : A Society in Transition, p . 53 .

3
weizmann , Trial and Error, p . 46 2 .
4

.
Toledan o , "Time to Stir the Melting Pot " , p . 34 5 .

5
Abboushi , Political Sys tems of the Middle East in the Twentieth
Centurx , p . 266 .

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abboushi , W . F . Political Sys tems o f the Middle East in the Twentieth
Century. New York : Dodd, Mead , and Co . , 1 9 7 0 .
Abu-Ayyash and Abdul-Ilah .
"Israeli Regional Planning in the Occu
pied Territories , " · Journal o f Pales tine Studies , Vol. V , No . 3 and
4 , Spring/Summer 1 9 7 6 .
"Israel ' s Treatment o f the Arabs in the Occupied
Adams , Michael .
Territorie s , " Journal o f Palestine Studies , Vol . V I , No . 2 ,
Winter 1 9 7 7 .
Akzin , B .
"The Knesset , " International Social Science Journal ,
Vol . 1 3 , No . 4 , 196 1 .
Alter, Robert . "Rhetoric and the Arab Min d , " Commentary , October,
1968.
Arabic Bulletin o f Institute for Palestine Studies , "Palestinian Emi
gration and Israeli Land Expropriation in the Occupied Territories , "
Journal o f Palestine Studies , Vol . II I , No . 1 , Autumn 1 9 7 3 .
Avnery, Uri . Israel Without Zionists : A Plea for Peace in the Middle
Eas t . New York; Macmillan , 1 9 6 8 .
Balfour Declaration.
Begin ,Menachem.

British Foreign Office .

November 2 , 19 1 7 .

The Revolt . Los Angeles : Nash Publishing, 1948 .

Ben-Gurion, David. Ben-Gurion Looks Back in Talks With Moshe
Pearlman .
New York: Simon and Schuste r , 1965 .
Ben-Gurion , Davi d .
Israe l : A Personal Histori.
Wagnalls , Inc . , 197 1 .
Ben-Gurion, David.
Glond, 1 9 6 4 .

Israe l : Years of Challenge .

New York : Funk and
London : Anthony

"A Letter from an American Rabbi t o an Arab Ambas
Berger , Elme r .
sador , " The Link , Vol . 8 , No . 5 , Winter 1975- 1 9 7 6 .
The Foreign Policy Sys tem o f Israe l .
Brecher, Michae l .
Yale University Press, 1972 .

New Haven :

Buber , Martin. On Zion : The History o f an Idea. London : Horovit z
Publishing, 1 9 7 3 .
Claiborn e , William.
"Begin Presents Palestinian Autonomy Plan to
"
Cabinet Group , Washington Pos t , May 4 , 1 9 7 9 .

Claiborne , William.
1979.

"Israel Holds Firm , " Washington Pos t , May 25 ,

Congressional Record. November 1 1 , 1 9 7 5 .
Crittenden , Ann .
"Israe l ' s Economic Pligh t . " Foreign Affairs ,
Vol . 5 7 , No . 5 , Summer 1 9 7 9 .
Israel : Social Structure and
Cur t i s , Michael and Mo�decai Cher t o f f .
Change . New Brunswick : Transaction, Inc . , 1 9 7 3 .
Drap e r , Theodore .
January , I 9 7 4
Efrat, Elisha.
Jerusalem:

"The Road to Geneva , " Commentary, Vol . 5 7 , No . I ,
•

Guidelines for Regional and Physical Plann ing.
Ministry o f Interior, Planning Department , 1 9 7 0 .

Eisenstad t , S . N .

Israeli Society.

Elizur, Yuval and Eliahu Salpeter.
Harper and Row, 1 9 7 3 .
Fein, Leonard.
196 7 .

New York : Basic Books , 196 7 .
Who Rules Israe l ?

Politics in Israe l .

New York:

Boston·: Little , Brown , and Co . ,

Garaudy , Roger .
"Religious and Historical Precepts o f Zionism , "
Journal o f Palestine Studies , Vol . V I , No . 2 , Winter 19 7 7 .
Glass, Charles . "Jews Against Zion , " Journal o f Palestine Studies ,
Vol . V , No . I and 2 , Autumn 1 9 7 5 /Winter 1 9 7 6 .
Greenway, H . D . S .
"Renewal Drives Arabs From Traditional Jewish
Homes , " Washington Post , January 1 6 , 1 9 7 7 .
Hadawi , Sarni .

Bitter Harves t .

New York: The New World Press , 196 7 .

Halpern , Ben.
The Idea o f the Jewish State .
University Press , 1969 .

Cambridge : Harvard

Hanauer, Edmund R .
"Human Rights and Israeli Settlements , "
Palestine Diges t , Vol . 8 , No . 10 , January , 1979 .
Hert�berg, Arthur.
1959 .

The Zionist Idea.

Herzl , Theodor. The Jewish State .
York: Herzl Press , 1 9 7 0 .

New York : Harper and Row ,

Translated b y Harry Zohn .

New

Irish , Marian and Elke Frank. U . S . Foreign Policy: Context, Con
duct, Content .
New York: Harcourt, Brace , Jovanovich , Inc . ,
1975.
Israel Divided : Ideological Politics in the Jew
Isaac, Rael Jean .
ish State .
Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University. Press , 1976 .

"The Land Question in Israel , " Journal of Palestine
Jiryis, Sabri.
Studies, Vol . 6 , No . S and 6 , Augus t / Septemb e r , 1 9 7 6 .
"Jerusalem Christians Protest Arab Evictions , " Palestine .=:Digest ,
Vol . 6 , .No . 12 , March , 1 9 7 7 .

-

·

Keeln e r , Peter. "Israe l ' s Economy on the Brink, " Middle East Inter
national , No . 72 , June , 1 9 7 7 .
Keesing Research Report s .
The Arab-Israeli Con f l ic t .
Charles Scribne r ' s Sons , 1 9 6 8 .

New York :

Kissinger, Henry . American Foreign Polic�. New York : W . W . Norton
and Co. , 1969 .
Laque r , Wal t e r . A History o f Zionism.
and Winston, 1 9 7 2 .

New York: Holt , Rinehar t ,

Lesch , Ann Mosely.
"Israel i Settlemen ts in the Occupied Territories ,
1 9 6 7- 1 9 7 7 , " Journal o f Palestine S t udies , Vol . VI I , No . l ,
Autumn 1 9 7 7 .
Lewis , Bernard. "The Anti-Zionist Resolution , " Fori.�.ign Affairs ,
Novemb e r , 1 9 7 5 .
"Zionism is Racism , " Palestine Diges t , Vol . 5 , No . 1 2 ,
Lumer , Hyman .
March , 1 9 7 6 .
Lumer, Hyman.
Zionism: Its Role in World Politics .
International Pub l ishers , 1 9 7 3 .

New York :

McKenna, Joanne.
"Zionism or Racism ? " , Palestine Dige s t , Vol . 5 ,
No . 12 , March , 1 9 7 6 .
McPeak . Colonel Merill A . "Is rael : Borders and Securi ty , " Forei..sE_
Affairs , Vol . 54 , No . 3 , April , 1976 .
M e i r , Golda. My Life .

New York : G . P . Putnam ' s Son s , 1975 .

Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Region s .
Myrdal , Gunnar .
York: Harper and Row, 1 9 5 7 .

New

"News Out o f Israel , " Middle East Internat ional , No . 5 4 , December ,
1975.
"News Out o f Israe l , II Middle East Internat ional , No . 58 , Ap ril , 1976 .
"News Out of Israe l ,
"News Out of Israe l ,

II

II

Middle East International , No . 60 , June , 1976 .
Middle East International, No . 5 7 , March , 1976 .

The Third Arab-Israeli War .
O ' Ballance , Edgar.
Arch on Books , 1972 .

Hamden , Conn . :

Pata!, Raphael .
wood , 1 9 5 3 .

Israel Between East and Wes t .

Westport : Green

Roberts, Samuel J . Survival or Hegemony: The Foundations of Israeli
Baltimore : Johns Hopkins Unive rsity Pre s s , 1 9 7 3 .
Foreign Policy.
Israe l : A Colonial-Settler State?
Rodinson , Maxime .
Monad Pres s , 1 9 7 3 .

New York:

"Isra� l ' s Quest for Securi ty , " Current History,
Reich, Bernard.
Vol . 62 , No . 36 5 , January , 1 9 7 2 .
Reich , Bernard.
"Israe l ' s Time of Tranquil � ty , " Current History,
January , 1 9 7 7 .
"Israe l ' s Year of Decision , " Current Hist ory,
Reich , Bernard.
January, 197 8 .
"Begin ' s Autonomy Plan Approved b y Government Team , "
Safad i , Anan .
Jerusalem Pos t , May 2 0 , 1 9 7 9 .
Safran , Nadav.
"Israeli Politics Since the 1 9 6 7 War, " Current
History, Vol . 6 6 , No . 35 3 , January , 1 9 7 1 .
Samue l , Edwin .
The Structure of Society in Israel.
Random House, 1 9 6 9 .

New York :

Schechtman , Joseph B .
Rebel and Statesman, The Vladimir Jabotinsky
Years.
New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1956 .
Story: The Early
Israel : A Society in Transition.
Segre, V . D .
versity Press , 1 9 7 1 .
Selzer, Michae l .

Zionism Reconsidered.

London : Oxford Uni

London : Macmil l an Cof

�

.19-70,

"The Racist Nature o f Zionism and o f the Zionist
Shahak, Israe l .
State of Israe l /' The Link, Vol . 8 , No . S , Winter 19-75.-.19 7 6 ,
"Israel After Thirty Years , " Current History,
Simpson , Dwight Jame s .
Vol . 76 , No . 44 3 , January , 1 9 79 .
"Isl"ael Af te.r Twenty-Five Years. , " Current
Simpson , Dwight James .
History, Yol . 6 4 , No . 3 7 7 1 January , 1 9 7 3.
Simpson , Dwight Jame s .
"Israel ' s Year of Decision, " Current
History, Vol . 70 , No . 4 1 2 , January , 1 9 7 6 .
Smi th , Barbara.
"The Politics of Water on the West Bank , " Middle
East International , No . 7 2 , June, 1 9 7 7 .
Talmon , J . L . Israel Among the NatiQn s ,
Nicholson, 19 7 0 .

London : Weidenfield and

